Rocksolid Light

Welcome to Rocksolid Light

mail  files  register  newsreader  groups  login

Message-ID:  

Remember the good old days, when CPU was singular?


computers / Security / Hive

SubjectAuthor
o HiveAnonymous

1
Hive

<ou5g8v$ejt$1@novabbs.com>

  copy mid

https://news.novabbs.org/computers/article-flat.php?id=275&group=rocksolid.shared.security#275

  copy link   Newsgroups: rocksolid.shared.security
Path: retrobbs.novabbs.com!.POSTED.localhost!not-for-mail
From: root@192.168.0.42 (Anonymous)
Newsgroups: rocksolid.shared.security
Subject: Hive
Date: Sat, 11 Nov 2017 00:29:19 +0000
Organization: RetroBBS II
Lines: 69
Message-ID: <ou5g8v$ejt$1@novabbs.com>
Reply-To: Anonymous <root@192.168.0.42>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed;
boundary="ac390218a65ffc143e54271e2a02d28d"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Injection-Date: Sat, 11 Nov 2017 00:29:19 -0000 (UTC)
Injection-Info: novabbs.com; posting-host="localhost:127.0.0.1";
logging-data="14973"; mail-complaints-to="usenet@novabbs.com"
User-Agent: FUDforum 3.0.7
X-FUDforum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e <40029>
 by: Anonymous - Sat, 11 Nov 2017 00:29 UTC

https://wikileaks.org/vault8/
Hive
9 November, 2017

Today, 9 November 2017, WikiLeaks publishes the source code
and development logs to Hive, a major component of the CIA
infrastructure to control its malware.

Hive solves a critical problem for the malware operators at
the CIA. Even the most sophisticated malware implant on a
target computer is useless if there is no way for it to
communicate with its operators in a secure manner that does
not draw attention. Using Hive even if an implant is
discovered on a target computer, attributing it to the CIA
is difficult by just looking at the communication of the
malware with other servers on the internet. Hive provides a
covert communications platform for a whole range of CIA
malware to send exfiltrated information to CIA servers and
to receive new instructions from operators at the CIA.

Hive can serve multiple operations using multiple implants
on target computers. Each operation anonymously registers at
least one cover domain (e.g.
"perfectly-boring-looking-domain.com") for its own use. The
server running the domain website is rented from commercial
hosting providers as a VPS (virtual private server) and its
software is customized according to CIA specifications.
These servers are the public-facing side of the CIA back-end
infrastructure and act as a relay for HTTP(S) traffic over a
VPN connection to a "hidden" CIA server called 'Blot'.

The cover domain delivers 'innocent' content if somebody
browses it by chance. A visitor will not suspect that it is
anything else but a normal website. The only peculiarity is
not visible to non-technical users - a HTTPS server option
that is not widely used: Optional Client Authentication. But
Hive uses the uncommon Optional Client Authentication so
that the user browsing the website is not required to
authenticate - it is optional. But implants talking to Hive
do authenticate themselves and can therefore be detected by
the Blot server. Traffic from implants is sent to an implant
operator management gateway called Honeycomb (see graphic
above) while all other traffic go to a cover server that
delivers the insuspicious content for all other users.

Digital certificates for the authentication of implants are
generated by the CIA impersonating existing entities. The
three examples included in the source code build a fake
certificate for the anti-virus company Kaspersky Laboratory,
Moscow pretending to be signed by Thawte Premium Server CA,
Cape Town. In this way, if the target organization looks at
the network traffic coming out of its network, it is likely
to misattribute the CIA exfiltration of data to uninvolved
entities whose identities have been impersonated.

The documentation for Hive is available from the WikiLeaks
Vault7 series.
Leaked Documents
Hive Repository
Hive Commit History
Top

1
server_pubkey.txt

rocksolid light 0.9.8
clearnet tor