In the short second session of the Thirtieth Congress in late 1848 and
early 1849, Senator Stephen A. Douglas had a simple solution to the
question of the status of slavery in the newly acquired Mexican Cession.
(A solution to the problem was urgent for Douglas, for local political
reasons as well as for the sake of the Union; normally heavily Democratic
Illinois had almost gone for Taylor because of pro-Wilmot Proviso
Democrats defecting to Van Buren's Free Soil candidacy. Taylor's
percentage of the vote in Illinois--42.4 percent--was virtually the same
as Clay's 42.1 percent in 1844. But Cass got only 44.9 percent of the
vote, a marked decline from Polk's 53.9 percent.
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1844.txt
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1848.txt Evidently
Abraham Lincoln and other local Whig leaders had persuaded most Illinois
Whigs that Taylor would sign the Wilmot Proviso. Besides, antislavery
Whigs in Illinois as elsewhere had a deep suspicion of Van Buren.)
Douglas' solution was to admit the entire Mexican Cession as one single
state of California, thereby bypassing the territorial stage to which the
Proviso would apply.

Since Whigs controlled the House of Representatives, the success of
Douglas' proposal depended on getting at least some Whig support. Most
northern Whigs regarded it as a "pusillanimous dodge" (to use Michael F.
Holt's phrase in The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party, p. 385
https://books.google.com/books?id=hMkYklGTY1MC&pg=PA385) and demanded
passage of the Wilmot Proviso to undercut the Free Soilers. (As noted, the
Free Soilers in Illinois got most of their support from Democrats, but in
some other northern states, notably Ohio, they hurt the Whigs more.)
Fortunately for Douglas, he did get support from southern Whigs:

"The solution to which southern Whigs resorted was Douglas's California
proposal, which had been bottled up in the Senate since early December.
Some of them, like Clayton and his frequent correspondent, Kentucky
Governor Crittenden, had favored that plan from the time Douglas
introduced it, but only after the majority of southern Democrats signed
the [Calhoun militantly pro-slavery] Southern Address
http://history.furman.edu/~benson/docs/calhoun.htm did most southern Whigs
turn to it. Skipping the territorial phase and admitting the Mexican
Cession at once as a single state struck Whigs as a suitable solution for
a variety of reasons, even though everyone expected that California would
be a free state. First, given northern Whigs' insistence on enacting the
Proviso, they knew they needed Democratic support to pass the measure.
Such support seemed probable, not only from northern Democrats like
Douglas, who wanted to resolve the territorial issue permanently in order
to undermine the Free Soil party, but also from the many southern
Democrats who rejected the Southern Address as bad politics and a threat
to the Union. Furthermore, the prospect of blocking slavery extension and
gaining a new free state might even win over support from northern Whigs
like Nathan Hall, who feared the disruptive impact of the territorial
impact as much as southern Whigs.

"Second, virtually all southern Whigs, convinced 'that no sensible man
would carry his slaves there if he could,' had always regarded the
question of slavery extension into the Mexican Cession as symbolic rather
than substantive. As Toombs told Crittenden, when he described the bill
southern Whigs planned to introduce, 'It cannot be a slave country; we
have only the point of honor to save; this will save it, and rescue the
country from all danger of agitation.'

"Third, if they passed their proposal, they might be able to claim
concrete as well as symbolic gains for the South--not just an end to
northern aggressions but the actual expansion of the area in which slavery
was legal. That paradox is explained by the ambiguity of what men meant by
the 'territory' of the Mexican Cession that was to be included in the
state of California. Texas, a slave state, claimed all the land east of
the Rio Grande as its own, an area that encompassed about a fourth of the
former Mexican province of New Mexico, and half of the present state of
New Mexico, including Santa Fe....The bill southern Whigs introduced
blandly--and imprecisely--spoke of erecting a new state 'out of and
including all that territory ceded to the United States by the recent
treaty of peace.' Toombs, a major proponent and engineer of the southern
Whig plan, explicitly denied that 'that territory' included the areas
claimed by Texas...

"Because Douglas' bill was irretrievably mired in the Senate and because
southern Whigs wanted the credit for solving the issue for themselves,
they moved in the House, which Whigs controlled. On February 7, three days
after the publication of the Southern Address, Representative William
Ballard Preston of Virginia...soon to be secretary of the Navy in Taylor's
administration, introduced the Whigs' measure and defended it as the 'only
door' through which the rival sections could reach a mutually acceptable
solution on the divisive territorial issue. Despite Preston's passionate
entreaties to Northerners to give up the unnecessary Proviso, despite
southern Whigs' optimism about the effect of Preston's speech, and despite
backing of some sort of statehood bill from President Polk, important
Democratic newspapers, and many Democrats in Congress, Preston's bill
failed because of northern Whigs' implacable opposition. Whether they
recognized its implications for enlarging Texas or feared that any
conciliatory step might leave them vulnerable to the Free Soilers, they
insisted that the Proviso be applied to the Cession." Holt, *The Rise and
Fall of the American Whig Party*, pp. 388-90
https://books.google.com/books?id=5aGyVFn3VnMC&pg=PA389

However, the vote to attach the Proviso--which torpedoed the Preston
bill--was very close: 91-87, according to Michael A Morrison, *Slavery and
the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the
Civil War*, p. 102.
https://books.google.com/books?id=qgjICQAAQBAJ&pg=PA102 If just a few more
northern Whigs had been convinced that the Proviso was unnecessary--and
remember that many of them would later back Taylor's plan for the
immediate admission of both California and New Mexico, which likewise
bypassed the Proviso--Preston's bill could have passed the House. Yes,
there was the problem of determining the California-Texas border, but it
did not seem as urgent in early 1849 as the Texas-New Mexico border
situation would be in 1850 when Texans were talking of marching on Santa
Fe. Once California was admitted as a state, the dispute would be between
two states, and the US Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction to
settle it. (Article III, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the
judicial power of the United States extends to "controversies between two
or more states" and gives the Supreme Court original jurisidiction in all
cases "in which a state shall be a party.")

That of course leaves the Democratic-controlled Senate. Douglas' bill had
fared poorly there. One problem was that while Polk was not opposed to
some sort of statehood bill, he had doubts about Douglas's plan. "The
President and his cabinet were taken by surprise. Frequent consultations
were held. Douglas was repeatedly closeted with the President. All the
members of the cabinet agreed that the plan of leaving the slavery
question to the people of the new State was ingenious; but many objections
were raised to a single State. In repeated interviews, Polk urged Douglas
to draft a separate bill for New Mexico; but Douglas was obdurate." Allen
Johnson, Stephen A. Douglas: A Study in American Politics,
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15508/15508-h/15508-h.htm So the bill, to
Douglas' chagrin, was referred not to his own Committee on Territories but
to the Committee on the Judiciary. "Perhaps this course was in accord with
precedent, but it was noted that four out of the five members of this
committee were Southerners, and that the vote to refer was a sectional
one.[268] An adverse report was therefore to be expected." Ibid. Perhaps
if Polk had agreed with Douglas' plan, he could have exerted enough
pressure to get the Senate to refer it to Douglas' own committee and then
to pass it--admittedly the power of a lame-duck president is limited, but
still Polk's support would make it more difficult for southern Democrats
to label Douglas' bill a sell-out to free soilers. (Not that they did so
openly anyway; their chief argument was that a state should not be
admitted to the Union without first having some sort of political
organization. But there is no doubt that the slavery issue was on their
minds.) In any event, if the Preston bill passed the House, and if it got
Polk's support, the pressure to pass it in the Senate might be
irresistible, despite the Judiciary Committee's prior rejection of the
Douglas bill. After all, as Douglas argued, some form of government was
needed for California to save it "from all the horrors of anarchy and
violence" and there was no chance of a territorial government bill being
passed before the second session of the Thirtieth Congress was to end in
March. And after all, at least the Preston-Douglas plan provided for the
admission of only one free state, whereas Taylor's later plan would
provide for two such states, so the Preston-Douglas plan should have been
at least marginally more acceptable to Southerners.

On 1/17/23 23:08, David Tenner wrote:
> In the short second session of the Thirtieth Congress in late 1848 and
> early 1849, Senator Stephen A. Douglas had a simple solution to the
> question of the status of slavery in the newly acquired Mexican Cession.
> (A solution to the problem was urgent for Douglas, for local political
> reasons as well as for the sake of the Union; normally heavily Democratic
> Illinois had almost gone for Taylor because of pro-Wilmot Proviso
> Democrats defecting to Van Buren's Free Soil candidacy. Taylor's
> percentage of the vote in Illinois--42.4 percent--was virtually the same
> as Clay's 42.1 percent in 1844. But Cass got only 44.9 percent of the
> vote, a marked decline from Polk's 53.9 percent.
> http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1844.txt
> http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1848.txt Evidently
> Abraham Lincoln and other local Whig leaders had persuaded most Illinois
> Whigs that Taylor would sign the Wilmot Proviso. Besides, antislavery
> Whigs in Illinois as elsewhere had a deep suspicion of Van Buren.)
> Douglas' solution was to admit the entire Mexican Cession as one single
> state of California, thereby bypassing the territorial stage to which the
> Proviso would apply.
>
> Since Whigs controlled the House of Representatives, the success of
> Douglas' proposal depended on getting at least some Whig support. Most
> northern Whigs regarded it as a "pusillanimous dodge" (to use Michael F.
> Holt's phrase in The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party, p. 385
> https://books.google.com/books?id=hMkYklGTY1MC&pg=PA385) and demanded
> passage of the Wilmot Proviso to undercut the Free Soilers. (As
noted, the
> Free Soilers in Illinois got most of their support from Democrats, but in
> some other northern states, notably Ohio, they hurt the Whigs more.)
> Fortunately for Douglas, he did get support from southern Whigs:
>
> "The solution to which southern Whigs resorted was Douglas's California
> proposal, which had been bottled up in the Senate since early December.
> Some of them, like Clayton and his frequent correspondent, Kentucky
> Governor Crittenden, had favored that plan from the time Douglas
> introduced it, but only after the majority of southern Democrats signed
> the [Calhoun militantly pro-slavery] Southern Address
> http://history.furman.edu/~benson/docs/calhoun.htm did most southern
Whigs
> turn to it. Skipping the territorial phase and admitting the Mexican
> Cession at once as a single state struck Whigs as a suitable solution for
> a variety of reasons, even though everyone expected that California would
> be a free state. First, given northern Whigs' insistence on enacting the
> Proviso, they knew they needed Democratic support to pass the measure.
> Such support seemed probable, not only from northern Democrats like
> Douglas, who wanted to resolve the territorial issue permanently in order
> to undermine the Free Soil party, but also from the many southern
> Democrats who rejected the Southern Address as bad politics and a threat
> to the Union. Furthermore, the prospect of blocking slavery extension and
> gaining a new free state might even win over support from northern Whigs
> like Nathan Hall, who feared the disruptive impact of the territorial
> impact as much as southern Whigs.
>
> "Second, virtually all southern Whigs, convinced 'that no sensible man
> would carry his slaves there if he could,' had always regarded the
> question of slavery extension into the Mexican Cession as symbolic rather
> than substantive. As Toombs told Crittenden, when he described the bill
> southern Whigs planned to introduce, 'It cannot be a slave country; we
> have only the point of honor to save; this will save it, and rescue the
> country from all danger of agitation.'
>
> "Third, if they passed their proposal, they might be able to claim
> concrete as well as symbolic gains for the South--not just an end to
> northern aggressions but the actual expansion of the area in which
slavery
> was legal. That paradox is explained by the ambiguity of what men
meant by
> the 'territory' of the Mexican Cession that was to be included in the
> state of California. Texas, a slave state, claimed all the land east of
> the Rio Grande as its own, an area that encompassed about a fourth of the
> former Mexican province of New Mexico, and half of the present state of
> New Mexico, including Santa Fe....The bill southern Whigs introduced
> blandly--and imprecisely--spoke of erecting a new state 'out of and
> including all that territory ceded to the United States by the recent
> treaty of peace.' Toombs, a major proponent and engineer of the southern
> Whig plan, explicitly denied that 'that territory' included the areas
> claimed by Texas...
>
> "Because Douglas' bill was irretrievably mired in the Senate and because
> southern Whigs wanted the credit for solving the issue for themselves,
> they moved in the House, which Whigs controlled. On February 7, three
days
> after the publication of the Southern Address, Representative William
> Ballard Preston of Virginia...soon to be secretary of the Navy in
Taylor's
> administration, introduced the Whigs' measure and defended it as the
'only
> door' through which the rival sections could reach a mutually acceptable
> solution on the divisive territorial issue. Despite Preston's passionate
> entreaties to Northerners to give up the unnecessary Proviso, despite
> southern Whigs' optimism about the effect of Preston's speech, and
despite
> backing of some sort of statehood bill from President Polk, important
> Democratic newspapers, and many Democrats in Congress, Preston's bill
> failed because of northern Whigs' implacable opposition. Whether they
> recognized its implications for enlarging Texas or feared that any
> conciliatory step might leave them vulnerable to the Free Soilers, they
> insisted that the Proviso be applied to the Cession." Holt, *The Rise and
> Fall of the American Whig Party*, pp. 388-90
> https://books.google.com/books?id=5aGyVFn3VnMC&pg=PA389
>
> However, the vote to attach the Proviso--which torpedoed the Preston
> bill--was very close: 91-87, according to Michael A Morrison,
*Slavery and
> the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the
> Civil War*, p. 102.
> https://books.google.com/books?id=qgjICQAAQBAJ&pg=PA102 If just a few
more
> northern Whigs had been convinced that the Proviso was unnecessary--and
> remember that many of them would later back Taylor's plan for the
> immediate admission of both California and New Mexico, which likewise
> bypassed the Proviso--Preston's bill could have passed the House. Yes,
> there was the problem of determining the California-Texas border, but it
> did not seem as urgent in early 1849 as the Texas-New Mexico border
> situation would be in 1850 when Texans were talking of marching on Santa
> Fe. Once California was admitted as a state, the dispute would be between
> two states, and the US Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction to
> settle it. (Article III, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the
> judicial power of the United States extends to "controversies between two
> or more states" and gives the Supreme Court original jurisidiction in all
> cases "in which a state shall be a party.")
>
> That of course leaves the Democratic-controlled Senate. Douglas' bill had
> fared poorly there. One problem was that while Polk was not opposed to
> some sort of statehood bill, he had doubts about Douglas's plan. "The
> President and his cabinet were taken by surprise. Frequent consultations
> were held. Douglas was repeatedly closeted with the President. All the
> members of the cabinet agreed that the plan of leaving the slavery
> question to the people of the new State was ingenious; but many
objections
> were raised to a single State. In repeated interviews, Polk urged Douglas
> to draft a separate bill for New Mexico; but Douglas was obdurate." Allen
> Johnson, Stephen A. Douglas: A Study in American Politics,
> http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15508/15508-h/15508-h.htm So the bill, to
> Douglas' chagrin, was referred not to his own Committee on
Territories but
> to the Committee on the Judiciary. "Perhaps this course was in accord
with
> precedent, but it was noted that four out of the five members of this
> committee were Southerners, and that the vote to refer was a sectional
> one.[268] An adverse report was therefore to be expected." Ibid. Perhaps
> if Polk had agreed with Douglas' plan, he could have exerted enough
> pressure to get the Senate to refer it to Douglas' own committee and then
> to pass it--admittedly the power of a lame-duck president is limited, but
> still Polk's support would make it more difficult for southern Democrats
> to label Douglas' bill a sell-out to free soilers. (Not that they did so
> openly anyway; their chief argument was that a state should not be
> admitted to the Union without first having some sort of political
> organization. But there is no doubt that the slavery issue was on their
> minds.) In any event, if the Preston bill passed the House, and if it got
> Polk's support, the pressure to pass it in the Senate might be
> irresistible, despite the Judiciary Committee's prior rejection of the
> Douglas bill. After all, as Douglas argued, some form of government was
> needed for California to save it "from all the horrors of anarchy and
> violence" and there was no chance of a territorial government bill being
> passed before the second session of the Thirtieth Congress was to end in
> March. And after all, at least the Preston-Douglas plan provided for the
> admission of only one free state, whereas Taylor's later plan would
> provide for two such states, so the Preston-Douglas plan should have been
> at least marginally more acceptable to Southerners.
>
> So what happens if the Preston-Douglas plan is passed? (Polk will
sign it;
> it might not be his first choice among plans, but any bill that resolves
> the territorial issue without enacting the Wilmot Proviso will be
> satisfactory to him.) A few thoughts:
>
> (1) The territorial issue would be settled before the elections of 1849.
> In those days, many members of Congress were elected during odd-numbered
> years, and in OTL it happened that a majority of the congressional
> elections of 1849 were in the South. Democrats, supporting Calhoun's
> "Southern Address" and warning that Taylor would sell out the South,
> scored impressive victories against Whigs in Virginia and Georgia. This
> led many southern Whigs to take a hard line against Taylor's plan for the
> admission of California and New Mexico as free states, even though they
> thought slavery had little or no chance of taking root there. Whigs also
> did poorly in northern elections, due in part to the strength of
> Democratic-Free Soil coalitions in some states--which made northern Whigs
> more determined than ever to pass the Wilmot Proviso. Thus, by the time
> the new Thirty-First Congress met in December 1849 sectional lines had
> hardened. Whigs were no longer guaranteed control of the House, and
Robert
> Winthrop, a pro-Taylor Whig from Massachusetts, was narrowly defeated in
> the contest for Speaker by Democrat Howell Cobb of Georgia, in what
was as
> much a sectional as a party contest, with some key southern Whigs
> deserting Winthrop. Had the territorial issue been settled, I have little
> doubt that Winthrop would have been elected.
>
> (2) How would the Supreme Court ultimately resolve the California-Texas
> boundary issue? Given its generally pro-southern views at this time, I
> would say the odds are that it would take Texas' side.
>
> (3) Even Douglas admitted that his new California was in the long run too
> large a state, so he put in a provision that it could later be divided
> into new states by Congress. When the Judiciary Committee argued that
this
> was contrary to state sovereignty, Douglas agreed to modify this by
saying
> that California could be divided by Congress "with the state's consent."
> So in that sense, the territorial struggle would not be over but would be
> transferred to California itself--we have already discussed in this group
> the attempts to detach southern California from the rest of the state in
> the 1850's.
>
> (4) A related point--what happens to the Mormons in this Greater
> California? Both the Californians and the Mormons may want to separate
> Utah from California, but it's hard to see Congress agreeing to it as
long
> as polygamy remains a Mormon doctrine. Meanwhile the Mormons do not have
> even the limited self-government Utah had in OTL as a territory.
>
> (5) Can a Fugitive Slave Law pass the northern-dominated House
without the
> territorial issue? It is true that the Clay "Omnibus" failed, and
that the
> compromise measures of 1850, including the fugitive slave bill, were
> ultimately enacted as separate measures--but that doesn't mean that
> members weren't conscious that each measure was part of an overall
> compromise that would collapse if any of its separate components failed.
> Many northerners abstained on the fugitive bill who might have faced
> strong pressure to vote against it if it weren't part of a compromise
that
> seemed essential to preserve the Union.
>
> (6) Without the territorial issue, presumably the Whigs are less bitterly
> divided than they were in OTL in 1852 and have a better chance of
> retaining the White House. It's even possible we delay Taylor's death
> (after all, the sectional conflict took a toll on his health) and that he
> is re-elected in 1852...
>
> (7) The lack of a compromise of 1850--with its provisions for territorial
> governments in New Mexico and Utah unencumbered by the Wilmot Proviso--
> destroys the precedent Douglas constantly cited in 1854 for the Kansas-
> Nebraska bill. True, there is still Cass's campaign of 1848 to cite as
> evidence that territorial sovereignty was the doctrine of the Democratic
> Party [1]--but there would have been no case where it had actually been
> implemented. Whether that would make any real difference is doubtful--one
> can argue that the "precedent" of 1850 (which in any event was a specific
> measure for the Mexican Cession, and not intended to apply elsewhere, let
> alone to repeal the Missouri Compromise) was just an excuse. Still, the
> vote in the House was close, and perhaps that "precedent" influenced
a few
> members. (And of course it is possible we have butterflied away Pierce's
> candidacy, and might have another president--whether a Whig or a
> Democrat--who does not exert the pressure Pierce did in OTL to pass the
> bill. And if the Whigs do better in *1852 than in OTL there may be a few
> more Whigs in the House, and this in itself may kill the bill, since
not a
> single northern Whig voted for it, and not all southern Whigs did so.)
>
> [1] Though actually in 1848 Cass was ambiguous about the stage at which
> "popular sovereignty" applied--throughout the territorial stage or only
> when the territory had enough people to be admitted as a state?

On 1/17/23 23:08, David Tenner wrote:
> In the short second session of the Thirtieth Congress in late 1848 and
> early 1849, Senator Stephen A. Douglas had a simple solution to the
> question of the status of slavery in the newly acquired Mexican Cession.
> (A solution to the problem was urgent for Douglas, for local political
> reasons as well as for the sake of the Union; normally heavily Democratic
> Illinois had almost gone for Taylor because of pro-Wilmot Proviso
> Democrats defecting to Van Buren's Free Soil candidacy. Taylor's
> percentage of the vote in Illinois--42.4 percent--was virtually the same
> as Clay's 42.1 percent in 1844. But Cass got only 44.9 percent of the
> vote, a marked decline from Polk's 53.9 percent.
> http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1844.txt
> http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1848.txt Evidently
> Abraham Lincoln and other local Whig leaders had persuaded most Illinois
> Whigs that Taylor would sign the Wilmot Proviso. Besides, antislavery
> Whigs in Illinois as elsewhere had a deep suspicion of Van Buren.)
> Douglas' solution was to admit the entire Mexican Cession as one single
> state of California, thereby bypassing the territorial stage to which the
> Proviso would apply.
>
> Since Whigs controlled the House of Representatives, the success of
> Douglas' proposal depended on getting at least some Whig support. Most
> northern Whigs regarded it as a "pusillanimous dodge" (to use Michael F.
> Holt's phrase in The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party, p. 385
> https://books.google.com/books?id=hMkYklGTY1MC&pg=PA385) and demanded
> passage of the Wilmot Proviso to undercut the Free Soilers. (As
noted, the
> Free Soilers in Illinois got most of their support from Democrats, but in
> some other northern states, notably Ohio, they hurt the Whigs more.)
> Fortunately for Douglas, he did get support from southern Whigs:
>
> "The solution to which southern Whigs resorted was Douglas's California
> proposal, which had been bottled up in the Senate since early December.
> Some of them, like Clayton and his frequent correspondent, Kentucky
> Governor Crittenden, had favored that plan from the time Douglas
> introduced it, but only after the majority of southern Democrats signed
> the [Calhoun militantly pro-slavery] Southern Address
> http://history.furman.edu/~benson/docs/calhoun.htm did most southern
Whigs
> turn to it. Skipping the territorial phase and admitting the Mexican
> Cession at once as a single state struck Whigs as a suitable solution for
> a variety of reasons, even though everyone expected that California would
> be a free state. First, given northern Whigs' insistence on enacting the
> Proviso, they knew they needed Democratic support to pass the measure.
> Such support seemed probable, not only from northern Democrats like
> Douglas, who wanted to resolve the territorial issue permanently in order
> to undermine the Free Soil party, but also from the many southern
> Democrats who rejected the Southern Address as bad politics and a threat
> to the Union. Furthermore, the prospect of blocking slavery extension and
> gaining a new free state might even win over support from northern Whigs
> like Nathan Hall, who feared the disruptive impact of the territorial
> impact as much as southern Whigs.
>
> "Second, virtually all southern Whigs, convinced 'that no sensible man
> would carry his slaves there if he could,' had always regarded the
> question of slavery extension into the Mexican Cession as symbolic rather
> than substantive. As Toombs told Crittenden, when he described the bill
> southern Whigs planned to introduce, 'It cannot be a slave country; we
> have only the point of honor to save; this will save it, and rescue the
> country from all danger of agitation.'
>
> "Third, if they passed their proposal, they might be able to claim
> concrete as well as symbolic gains for the South--not just an end to
> northern aggressions but the actual expansion of the area in which
slavery
> was legal. That paradox is explained by the ambiguity of what men
meant by
> the 'territory' of the Mexican Cession that was to be included in the
> state of California. Texas, a slave state, claimed all the land east of
> the Rio Grande as its own, an area that encompassed about a fourth of the
> former Mexican province of New Mexico, and half of the present state of
> New Mexico, including Santa Fe....The bill southern Whigs introduced
> blandly--and imprecisely--spoke of erecting a new state 'out of and
> including all that territory ceded to the United States by the recent
> treaty of peace.' Toombs, a major proponent and engineer of the southern
> Whig plan, explicitly denied that 'that territory' included the areas
> claimed by Texas...
>
> "Because Douglas' bill was irretrievably mired in the Senate and because
> southern Whigs wanted the credit for solving the issue for themselves,
> they moved in the House, which Whigs controlled. On February 7, three
days
> after the publication of the Southern Address, Representative William
> Ballard Preston of Virginia...soon to be secretary of the Navy in
Taylor's
> administration, introduced the Whigs' measure and defended it as the
'only
> door' through which the rival sections could reach a mutually acceptable
> solution on the divisive territorial issue. Despite Preston's passionate
> entreaties to Northerners to give up the unnecessary Proviso, despite
> southern Whigs' optimism about the effect of Preston's speech, and
despite
> backing of some sort of statehood bill from President Polk, important
> Democratic newspapers, and many Democrats in Congress, Preston's bill
> failed because of northern Whigs' implacable opposition. Whether they
> recognized its implications for enlarging Texas or feared that any
> conciliatory step might leave them vulnerable to the Free Soilers, they
> insisted that the Proviso be applied to the Cession." Holt, *The Rise and
> Fall of the American Whig Party*, pp. 388-90
> https://books.google.com/books?id=5aGyVFn3VnMC&pg=PA389
>
> However, the vote to attach the Proviso--which torpedoed the Preston
> bill--was very close: 91-87, according to Michael A Morrison,
*Slavery and
> the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the
> Civil War*, p. 102.
> https://books.google.com/books?id=qgjICQAAQBAJ&pg=PA102 If just a few
more
> northern Whigs had been convinced that the Proviso was unnecessary--and
> remember that many of them would later back Taylor's plan for the
> immediate admission of both California and New Mexico, which likewise
> bypassed the Proviso--Preston's bill could have passed the House. Yes,
> there was the problem of determining the California-Texas border, but it
> did not seem as urgent in early 1849 as the Texas-New Mexico border
> situation would be in 1850 when Texans were talking of marching on Santa
> Fe. Once California was admitted as a state, the dispute would be between
> two states, and the US Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction to
> settle it. (Article III, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the
> judicial power of the United States extends to "controversies between two
> or more states" and gives the Supreme Court original jurisidiction in all
> cases "in which a state shall be a party.")
>
> That of course leaves the Democratic-controlled Senate. Douglas' bill had
> fared poorly there. One problem was that while Polk was not opposed to
> some sort of statehood bill, he had doubts about Douglas's plan. "The
> President and his cabinet were taken by surprise. Frequent consultations
> were held. Douglas was repeatedly closeted with the President. All the
> members of the cabinet agreed that the plan of leaving the slavery
> question to the people of the new State was ingenious; but many
objections
> were raised to a single State. In repeated interviews, Polk urged Douglas
> to draft a separate bill for New Mexico; but Douglas was obdurate." Allen
> Johnson, Stephen A. Douglas: A Study in American Politics,
> http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15508/15508-h/15508-h.htm So the bill, to
> Douglas' chagrin, was referred not to his own Committee on
Territories but
> to the Committee on the Judiciary. "Perhaps this course was in accord
with
> precedent, but it was noted that four out of the five members of this
> committee were Southerners, and that the vote to refer was a sectional
> one.[268] An adverse report was therefore to be expected." Ibid. Perhaps
> if Polk had agreed with Douglas' plan, he could have exerted enough
> pressure to get the Senate to refer it to Douglas' own committee and then
> to pass it--admittedly the power of a lame-duck president is limited, but
> still Polk's support would make it more difficult for southern Democrats
> to label Douglas' bill a sell-out to free soilers. (Not that they did so
> openly anyway; their chief argument was that a state should not be
> admitted to the Union without first having some sort of political
> organization. But there is no doubt that the slavery issue was on their
> minds.) In any event, if the Preston bill passed the House, and if it got
> Polk's support, the pressure to pass it in the Senate might be
> irresistible, despite the Judiciary Committee's prior rejection of the
> Douglas bill. After all, as Douglas argued, some form of government was
> needed for California to save it "from all the horrors of anarchy and
> violence" and there was no chance of a territorial government bill being
> passed before the second session of the Thirtieth Congress was to end in
> March. And after all, at least the Preston-Douglas plan provided for the
> admission of only one free state, whereas Taylor's later plan would
> provide for two such states, so the Preston-Douglas plan should have been
> at least marginally more acceptable to Southerners.
>
> So what happens if the Preston-Douglas plan is passed? (Polk will
sign it;
> it might not be his first choice among plans, but any bill that resolves
> the territorial issue without enacting the Wilmot Proviso will be
> satisfactory to him.) A few thoughts:
>
> (1) The territorial issue would be settled before the elections of 1849.
> In those days, many members of Congress were elected during odd-numbered
> years, and in OTL it happened that a majority of the congressional
> elections of 1849 were in the South. Democrats, supporting Calhoun's
> "Southern Address" and warning that Taylor would sell out the South,
> scored impressive victories against Whigs in Virginia and Georgia. This
> led many southern Whigs to take a hard line against Taylor's plan for the
> admission of California and New Mexico as free states, even though they
> thought slavery had little or no chance of taking root there. Whigs also
> did poorly in northern elections, due in part to the strength of
> Democratic-Free Soil coalitions in some states--which made northern Whigs
> more determined than ever to pass the Wilmot Proviso. Thus, by the time
> the new Thirty-First Congress met in December 1849 sectional lines had
> hardened. Whigs were no longer guaranteed control of the House, and
Robert
> Winthrop, a pro-Taylor Whig from Massachusetts, was narrowly defeated in
> the contest for Speaker by Democrat Howell Cobb of Georgia, in what
was as
> much a sectional as a party contest, with some key southern Whigs
> deserting Winthrop. Had the territorial issue been settled, I have little
> doubt that Winthrop would have been elected.
>
> (2) How would the Supreme Court ultimately resolve the California-Texas
> boundary issue? Given its generally pro-southern views at this time, I
> would say the odds are that it would take Texas' side.
>
> (3) Even Douglas admitted that his new California was in the long run too
> large a state, so he put in a provision that it could later be divided
> into new states by Congress. When the Judiciary Committee argued that
this
> was contrary to state sovereignty, Douglas agreed to modify this by
saying
> that California could be divided by Congress "with the state's consent."
> So in that sense, the territorial struggle would not be over but would be
> transferred to California itself--we have already discussed in this group
> the attempts to detach southern California from the rest of the state in
> the 1850's.
>
> (4) A related point--what happens to the Mormons in this Greater
> California? Both the Californians and the Mormons may want to separate
> Utah from California, but it's hard to see Congress agreeing to it as
long
> as polygamy remains a Mormon doctrine. Meanwhile the Mormons do not have
> even the limited self-government Utah had in OTL as a territory.
>
> (5) Can a Fugitive Slave Law pass the northern-dominated House
without the
> territorial issue? It is true that the Clay "Omnibus" failed, and
that the
> compromise measures of 1850, including the fugitive slave bill, were
> ultimately enacted as separate measures--but that doesn't mean that
> members weren't conscious that each measure was part of an overall
> compromise that would collapse if any of its separate components failed.
> Many northerners abstained on the fugitive bill who might have faced
> strong pressure to vote against it if it weren't part of a compromise
that
> seemed essential to preserve the Union.
>
> (6) Without the territorial issue, presumably the Whigs are less bitterly
> divided than they were in OTL in 1852 and have a better chance of
> retaining the White House. It's even possible we delay Taylor's death
> (after all, the sectional conflict took a toll on his health) and that he
> is re-elected in 1852...
>
> (7) The lack of a compromise of 1850--with its provisions for territorial
> governments in New Mexico and Utah unencumbered by the Wilmot Proviso--
> destroys the precedent Douglas constantly cited in 1854 for the Kansas-
> Nebraska bill. True, there is still Cass's campaign of 1848 to cite as
> evidence that territorial sovereignty was the doctrine of the Democratic
> Party [1]--but there would have been no case where it had actually been
> implemented. Whether that would make any real difference is doubtful--one
> can argue that the "precedent" of 1850 (which in any event was a specific
> measure for the Mexican Cession, and not intended to apply elsewhere, let
> alone to repeal the Missouri Compromise) was just an excuse. Still, the
> vote in the House was close, and perhaps that "precedent" influenced
a few
> members. (And of course it is possible we have butterflied away Pierce's
> candidacy, and might have another president--whether a Whig or a
> Democrat--who does not exert the pressure Pierce did in OTL to pass the
> bill. And if the Whigs do better in *1852 than in OTL there may be a few
> more Whigs in the House, and this in itself may kill the bill, since
not a
> single northern Whig voted for it, and not all southern Whigs did so.)
>
> [1] Though actually in 1848 Cass was ambiguous about the stage at which
> "popular sovereignty" applied--throughout the territorial stage or only
> when the territory had enough people to be admitted as a state?

On Wed, 18 Jan 2023 07:08:05 -0000 (UTC), David Tenner
<dtenner@ameritech.net> wrote:

>In the short second session of the Thirtieth Congress in late 1848 and
>early 1849, Senator Stephen A. Douglas had a simple solution to the
>question of the status of slavery in the newly acquired Mexican Cession.

Stuff like this is why I consider David a WI Saint and it's
astonishing how few people know of him given the depth of his 19th
century Congressional knowledge.

David's been here for the better part of 2 decades as well so there is
both achievement and long-term achievement.

Not being an American I don't understand the full depth of all this
but I do know enough to understand the 30000' view of America
1815-1860 (though he's equally strong on the Reconstruction era) and
Sir I stand in awe.

On 1/18/23 1:08 AM, David Tenner wrote:

> Douglas' solution was to admit the entire Mexican Cession as one single
> state of California, thereby bypassing the territorial stage to which the
> Proviso would apply.

Twice the area of Texas... Could the proposal founder on mere
practicality? With no telegraph and no railroad, administering the
Denver area from Sacramento seems impossible.

> Texas, a slave state, claimed all the land east of
> the Rio Grande as its own, an area that encompassed about a fourth of the
> former Mexican province of New Mexico, and half of the present state of
> New Mexico, including Santa Fe... The bill southern Whigs introduced
> blandly--and imprecisely--spoke of erecting a new state 'out of and
> including all that territory ceded to the United States by the recent
> treaty of peace.' Toombs, a major proponent and engineer of the southern
> Whig plan, explicitly denied that 'that territory' included the areas
> claimed by Texas... Yes, > there was the problem of determining the California-Texas border, but it
> did not seem as urgent in early 1849 as the Texas-New Mexico border
> situation would be in 1850 when Texans were talking of marching on Santa
> Fe. Once California was admitted as a state, the dispute would be between
> two states, and the US Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction to
> settle it. (Article III, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the
> judicial power of the United States extends to "controversies between two
> or more states" and gives the Supreme Court original jurisidiction in all
> cases "in which a state shall be a party.")

What happens if Texas claims the east bank of the Rio Grande and the
people there resist? Would Taylor enforce the Texas claim? If the
dispute goes to the Supreme Court... both Texas and California are a
long way away. Wou[d Texans attempt to plant slavery in the Rio Grande
country, and how would the hispanic New Mexicans react? (OTL there were
almost no slaves in the Territory, but ITTL the area is in a slave
state, which gives slaveholders a fairly strong incentive to try it.)

If the "Nuevo Mexicanos" resist slavery, could they win the sympathy of
anti-slavery Northerners, in spite of their being Catholics?

> (2) How would the Supreme Court ultimately resolve the California-Texas
> boundary issue? Given its generally pro-southern views at this time, I
> would say the odds are that it would take Texas' side.
>
> (3) Even Douglas admitted that his new California was in the long run too
> large a state, so he put in a provision that it could later be divided
> into new states by Congress. When the Judiciary Committee argued that this
> was contrary to state sovereignty, Douglas agreed to modify this by saying
> that California could be divided by Congress "with the state's consent."

That was always true of any state, and was put into practice with Maine
breaking off from Massachusetts.

> So in that sense, the territorial struggle would not be over but would be
> transferred to California itself--we have already discussed in this group
> the attempts to detach southern California from the rest of the state in
> the 1850's.

ITTL, there would be thoughts of detaching the eastern parts from
California. One major issue: the area between the Louisiana Purchase
border and the OTL California border was and remained thinly populated,
and unfit for statehood for at least 25 years (Nevada's statehood was
premature and due to the ACW and Republicans wanting two more Senators.)

This makes it awkward to relieve California of those areas. It's one
thing to turn part of a state into another state, but maybe not even
constitutional to turn it into a territory. Suppose there is a US
Representative from that area? What happens to him?

> (4) A related point--what happens to the Mormons in this Greater
> California? Both the Californians and the Mormons may want to separate
> Utah from California, but it's hard to see Congress agreeing to it as long
> as polygamy remains a Mormon doctrine.

_If_ separation requires statehood.

> (6) Without the territorial issue, presumably the Whigs are less bitterly
> divided than they were in OTL in 1852 and have a better chance of
> retaining the White House. It's even possible we delay Taylor's death
> (after all, the sectional conflict took a toll on his health) and that he
> is re-elected in 1852...

Wasn't he, as a Whig, pledged to a single term?

> (7) The lack of a compromise of 1850--with its provisions for territorial
> governments in New Mexico and Utah unencumbered by the Wilmot Proviso--
> destroys the precedent Douglas constantly cited in 1854 for the Kansas-
> Nebraska bill.

Thus changing the dynamics of the 1850s beyond recognition.

A possible knock-on: with the precedent of California, would the Oregon
Country be admitted as a single state.

Another knock-on: ITTL, what becomes of the Gadsden Purchase? Would it
be immediately added to California? Or become a separate territory?

--
Nous sommes dans une pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdés.
--- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.

On Mon, 23 Jan 2023 17:57:10 -0600, Rich Rostrom
<rrostrom@comcast.net> wrote:

>Another knock-on: ITTL, what becomes of the Gadsden Purchase? Would it
>be immediately added to California? Or become a separate territory?
>
The whole reason for the Gadsden purchase was the desire to build a
railroad through it. Tucson came later :)

On 1/23/23 8:44 PM, The Horny Goat wrote:
> On Mon, 23 Jan 2023 17:57:10 -0600, Rich Rostrom
> <rrostrom@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>> Another knock-on: ITTL, what becomes of the Gadsden Purchase? Would it
>> be immediately added to California? Or become a separate territory?
>>
> The whole reason for the Gadsden purchase was the desire to build a
> railroad through it. Tucson came later :)

The reason still applies; my question is how it is implemented.

None of the other territorial acquisitions of the US were added
to an existing state.

--
Nous sommes dans une pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdés.
--- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.

On 1/23/23 18:44, The Horny Goat wrote:
> On Mon, 23 Jan 2023 17:57:10 -0600, Rich Rostrom
> <rrostrom@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>> Another knock-on: ITTL, what becomes of the Gadsden Purchase? Would it
>> be immediately added to California? Or become a separate territory?
>>
> The whole reason for the Gadsden purchase was the desire to build a
> railroad through it. Tucson came later :)

I myself do not think that was really the whole reason.

To me, it really looks like at the end of the Mexican-American
war, they simply rounded up a bunch of people in Mexico City
to sign a treaty debated in the US Congress. Probably not all
of them were drunk when they signed it.

They agreed that Texas was not part of Mexico and to some US
territorial acquisitions west of there. The US did not
consider the heavily populated belt from Veracruz to Mexico
City to westward part of the United States. Then U.S. forces
left Mexico City.

The Gadsden purchase however was negotiated with Santa Anna
himself. The persons negotiating the treaty offered an array
of prices for varying amounts of land. Santa Anna chose the
smallest amount of money for the smallest amount of land.
It is difficult to say how much of the money if any he
kept for himself but he also likely used some of it to
finance the Mexican military. Either way, as a side effect
he may have partially agreed to the earlier acquisition.
This was a somewhat older but generally the same Santa
Anna as the one of 'Remember the Alamo'.

Was Santa Anna signing the Gadsden purchase of his own
free will? Does anyone have free will?

On Fri, 27 Jan 2023 01:21:41 -0800, Trolidan7 <x@x.org> wrote:

>The Gadsden purchase however was negotiated with Santa Anna
>himself. The persons negotiating the treaty offered an array
>of prices for varying amounts of land. Santa Anna chose the
>smallest amount of money for the smallest amount of land.
>It is difficult to say how much of the money if any he
>kept for himself but he also likely used some of it to
>finance the Mexican military. Either way, as a side effect
>he may have partially agreed to the earlier acquisition.
>This was a somewhat older but generally the same Santa
>Anna as the one of 'Remember the Alamo'.

I don't at all doubt what Santa Anna would have done to US troops had
he the power to do so.

Obviously he was under a certain amount of duress but equally
obviously he knew the US was not going to take ALL of Mexico so
future relations were important as both sides knew.

On Monday, January 23, 2023 at 11:57:13 PM UTC, Rich Rostrom wrote:
> On 1/18/23 1:08 AM, David Tenner wrote:
>
> > Douglas' solution was to admit the entire Mexican Cession as one single
> > state of California, thereby bypassing the territorial stage to which the
> > Proviso would apply.
> Twice the area of Texas... Could the proposal founder on mere
> practicality? With no telegraph and no railroad, administering the
> Denver area from Sacramento seems impossible.
> > Texas, a slave state, claimed all the land east of
> > the Rio Grande as its own, an area that encompassed about a fourth of the
> > former Mexican province of New Mexico, and half of the present state of
> > New Mexico, including Santa Fe... The bill southern Whigs introduced
> > blandly--and imprecisely--spoke of erecting a new state 'out of and
> > including all that territory ceded to the United States by the recent
> > treaty of peace.' Toombs, a major proponent and engineer of the southern
> > Whig plan, explicitly denied that 'that territory' included the areas
> > claimed by Texas... Yes, > there was the problem of determining the California-Texas border, but it
> > did not seem as urgent in early 1849 as the Texas-New Mexico border
> > situation would be in 1850 when Texans were talking of marching on Santa
> > Fe. Once California was admitted as a state, the dispute would be between
> > two states, and the US Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction to
> > settle it. (Article III, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the
> > judicial power of the United States extends to "controversies between two
> > or more states" and gives the Supreme Court original jurisidiction in all
> > cases "in which a state shall be a party.")
> What happens if Texas claims the east bank of the Rio Grande and the
> people there resist? Would Taylor enforce the Texas claim? If the
> dispute goes to the Supreme Court... both Texas and California are a
> long way away. Wou[d Texans attempt to plant slavery in the Rio Grande
> country, and how would the hispanic New Mexicans react? (OTL there were
> almost no slaves in the Territory, but ITTL the area is in a slave
> state, which gives slaveholders a fairly strong incentive to try it.)
>
> If the "Nuevo Mexicanos" resist slavery, could they win the sympathy of
> anti-slavery Northerners, in spite of their being Catholics?
> > (2) How would the Supreme Court ultimately resolve the California-Texas
> > boundary issue? Given its generally pro-southern views at this time, I
> > would say the odds are that it would take Texas' side.
> >
> > (3) Even Douglas admitted that his new California was in the long run too
> > large a state, so he put in a provision that it could later be divided
> > into new states by Congress. When the Judiciary Committee argued that this
> > was contrary to state sovereignty, Douglas agreed to modify this by saying
> > that California could be divided by Congress "with the state's consent."
> That was always true of any state, and was put into practice with Maine
> breaking off from Massachusetts.
> > So in that sense, the territorial struggle would not be over but would be
> > transferred to California itself--we have already discussed in this group
> > the attempts to detach southern California from the rest of the state in
> > the 1850's.
> ITTL, there would be thoughts of detaching the eastern parts from
> California. One major issue: the area between the Louisiana Purchase
> border and the OTL California border was and remained thinly populated,
> and unfit for statehood for at least 25 years (Nevada's statehood was
> premature and due to the ACW and Republicans wanting two more Senators.)
>
> This makes it awkward to relieve California of those areas. It's one
> thing to turn part of a state into another state, but maybe not even
> constitutional to turn it into a territory. Suppose there is a US
> Representative from that area? What happens to him?
>
There was some precedent in the case of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erie_Triangle where four states surrendered their claims to it to the Federal government. And there would soon be the Compromise of 1850, where some areas, which Texas had considered part of itself, became federal territories. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas%27s_2nd_congressional_district#List_of_members_representing_the_district says that from 1845-51, that district included Bexar County. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bexar_County,_Texas#History says that "Bexar County was created on December 20, 1836, and encompassed almost the entire western portion of the Republic of Texas. This included the disputed areas of eastern New Mexico northward to Wyoming. " I'm not sure how many votes were actually cast in congressional elections in the 1840's in areas that did not end up in the present-day State of Texas.

On 1/28/23 12:35 PM, Graham Truesdale wrote:
> I'm not sure how many votes were actually cast in congressional elections
> in the 1840's in areas that did not end up in the present-day State of Texas.

Probably none. Texas claimed sovereignty over the east bank of the Rio
Grande in New Mexico, but never exercised any authority there.

--
Nous sommes dans une pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdés.
--- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.