Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
> Bob <bob@domain.com> wrote:
>> On 24.04.2024 17:20, Roland Perry wrote:
>>> In message <v084cf$1j2ev$1@dont-email.me>, at 13:00:31 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>> On 23.04.2024 09:27, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>> In message <v07lsl$1fqv7$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:53:08 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>>
>>>>>> The regulatory environment that railways existed in between WWII and
>>>>>> Beeching meant that there was basically nothing of value the
>>>>>> railways were able to actually do with any kind of detailed
>>>>>> understanding of traffic flows. They couldn't alter fares, and the
>>>>>> process for eliminating service on low traffic routes was extremely
>>>>>> difficult. Fighting the unions to reduce staffing levels was not
>>>>>> politically viable at the time. If having the information is not
>>>>>> going to bring any value to the organisation, there is little point
>>>>>> spending time and  effort to collect it.
>>>
>>>>>  Welcome to Nationalised Industry, in a mythical Golden Age people
>>>>> constantly hark on about wanting to return to.
>>>>
>>>> The relevant legislation and regulation that gave rise to this state
>>>> of affairs significantly predated nationalisation. It was a creation
>>>> of the era of rampant corporate greed in the era where railways had a
>>>> monopoly on mechanised transportation. The problem was the regulations
>>>> were left on books long after the need for them had passed, and
>>>> effectively crippled the railways for decades.
>>>
>>> WWII ends 1945         ) 3yrs
>>> Nationalisation 1948   ) )
>>> Beeching 1963            ) 15yrs
>>
>> The financial constraints and the inability to deal with competition
>> resulting in the loss of profitable business was already causing a
>> significant impact to the railways' financial position well before the
>> start of the second world war. The advances in motor vehicle technology
>> that resulted from the first world war produced an environment of road
>> based competition pretty well as soon as the motor vehicle industry was
>> able to pivot away from wartime production to the civilian market after
>> the end of the first world war.
>
> As I recall, lots of surplus military trucks were disposed of cheaply after
> WWI, while lots of demobbed soldiers had learned to drive those same trucks
> during their service. So, all of a sudden, the newly amalgamated Big Four
> had major new, flexible and low cost, freight competition from the roads.

A reasonable number were converted into small buses or charabancs and
started to abstract passenger traffic as well. Buses operations were not
regulated till 1930.

GH

On 24/04/2024 16:15, Roland Perry wrote:
> In message <v07ve6$1hv98$2@dont-email.me>, at 10:36:06 on Tue, 23 Apr
> 2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>> On 23/04/2024 09:43, Roland Perry wrote:
>>> In message <v07p56$1gj74$2@dont-email.me>, at 08:48:54 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>> 2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>>>> On 23/04/2024 07:41, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>>> Salisbury isn’t part of TFL , to exit with a paper ticket I insert
>>>>>> into a
>>>>>> slot to open  the barrier which if  the ticket is no longer valid for
>>>>>> further journeys it retains. Do the barriers have no way of
>>>>>> recording how
>>>>>> many journeys have ended at them?
>>>
>>>>>  I doubt it, they are very dumb. And there's vast numbers of
>>>>> stations  with no barriers.
>>>>
>>>> But, as they have to be emptied on a regular basis. It is not that
>>>> difficult to count the number of tickets retained.
>
>>>  Counting the number [using what as manpower?] tells you nothing
>>> about  the details of the individual journeys. Then you have the
>>> barriers which  return the tickets (Kings Cross for example).
>>>  Which are locked out of use more often than not.
>>
>> But then all paper tickets are issued by computerised ticketing
>> systems that will give you all the detail you want.
>
> A TVM at the station doesn't know where I changed trains, or finished my
> journey.

It does know you bought a ticket from A to B, the rest it can deduce.
--
Graeme Wall
This account not read.

On 24/04/2024 19:21, Marland wrote:
> Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Bob <bob@domain.com> wrote:
>>> On 24.04.2024 17:20, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>> In message <v084cf$1j2ev$1@dont-email.me>, at 13:00:31 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>> On 23.04.2024 09:27, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>>> In message <v07lsl$1fqv7$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:53:08 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The regulatory environment that railways existed in between WWII and
>>>>>>> Beeching meant that there was basically nothing of value the
>>>>>>> railways were able to actually do with any kind of detailed
>>>>>>> understanding of traffic flows. They couldn't alter fares, and the
>>>>>>> process for eliminating service on low traffic routes was extremely
>>>>>>> difficult. Fighting the unions to reduce staffing levels was not
>>>>>>> politically viable at the time. If having the information is not
>>>>>>> going to bring any value to the organisation, there is little point
>>>>>>> spending time and  effort to collect it.
>>>>
>>>>>>  Welcome to Nationalised Industry, in a mythical Golden Age people
>>>>>> constantly hark on about wanting to return to.
>>>>>
>>>>> The relevant legislation and regulation that gave rise to this state
>>>>> of affairs significantly predated nationalisation. It was a creation
>>>>> of the era of rampant corporate greed in the era where railways had a
>>>>> monopoly on mechanised transportation. The problem was the regulations
>>>>> were left on books long after the need for them had passed, and
>>>>> effectively crippled the railways for decades.
>>>>
>>>> WWII ends 1945         ) 3yrs
>>>> Nationalisation 1948   ) )
>>>> Beeching 1963            ) 15yrs
>>>
>>> The financial constraints and the inability to deal with competition
>>> resulting in the loss of profitable business was already causing a
>>> significant impact to the railways' financial position well before the
>>> start of the second world war. The advances in motor vehicle technology
>>> that resulted from the first world war produced an environment of road
>>> based competition pretty well as soon as the motor vehicle industry was
>>> able to pivot away from wartime production to the civilian market after
>>> the end of the first world war.
>>
>> As I recall, lots of surplus military trucks were disposed of cheaply after
>> WWI, while lots of demobbed soldiers had learned to drive those same trucks
>> during their service. So, all of a sudden, the newly amalgamated Big Four
>> had major new, flexible and low cost, freight competition from the roads.
>
> A reasonable number were converted into small buses or charabancs and
> started to abstract passenger traffic as well. Buses operations were not
> regulated till 1930.
>

The local bus company round here, Safeguard, started that way. They have
just celebrated their centenary.

--
Graeme Wall
This account not read.

In message <v0blcv$2g4eh$1@dont-email.me>, at 20:09:19 on Wed, 24 Apr
2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>On 24/04/2024 16:15, Roland Perry wrote:
>> In message <v07ve6$1hv98$2@dont-email.me>, at 10:36:06 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>>> On 23/04/2024 09:43, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>> In message <v07p56$1gj74$2@dont-email.me>, at 08:48:54 on Tue, 23
>>>>Apr 2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>>>>> On 23/04/2024 07:41, Roland Perry wrote:

>>>>>>> Salisbury isn’t part of TFL , to exit with a paper ticket I
>>>>>>>insert into a slot to open  the barrier which if  the ticket
>>>>>>>is no longer valid for further journeys it retains. Do the
>>>>>>>barriers have no way of recording how many journeys have ended at them?
>>>>
>>>>>>  I doubt it, they are very dumb. And there's vast numbers of
>>>>>>stations  with no barriers.
>>>>>
>>>>> But, as they have to be emptied on a regular basis. It is not that
>>>>>difficult to count the number of tickets retained.
>>
>>>>  Counting the number [using what as manpower?] tells you nothing
>>>>about  the details of the individual journeys. Then you have the
>>>>barriers which  return the tickets (Kings Cross for example).
>>>>  Which are locked out of use more often than not.
>>>
>>> But then all paper tickets are issued by computerised ticketing
>>>systems that will give you all the detail you want.

>> A TVM at the station doesn't know where I changed trains, or
>>finished my journey.
>
>It does know you bought a ticket from A to B, the rest it can deduce.

If I buy a walk-up ticket from Ely to Sheffield[1] it's valid on the
direct EMR train (which somewhat uncomfortable and tedious), or I could
catch an XC-lite train to Leicester and change to a mainline EMR train
via Derby. Or I could catch one of GA/XC/EMR trains to Peterborough,
then change to LNER as far as Doncaster, then a TP/NT/XC train across
to Sheffield.

Often it's the latter which OJP's recommend, although for a change(sic)
I might get the EMR as far as Nottingham, then either:

(a) get an XC-lite to Derby then either mainline XC/EMR to Sheffield.

(b) get a Northern, direct to Sheffield (on its way to Leeds).

[1] My son was at University there for five years, and also used the
train a lot.
--
Roland Perry

In message <v0bant$2deir$1@dont-email.me>, at 18:07:25 on Wed, 24 Apr
2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>On 24.04.2024 17:20, Roland Perry wrote:
>> In message <v084cf$1j2ev$1@dont-email.me>, at 13:00:31 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>> On 23.04.2024 09:27, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>> In message <v07lsl$1fqv7$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:53:08 on Tue, 23
>>>>Apr 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>
>>>>> The regulatory environment that railways existed in between WWII
>>>>>and Beeching meant that there was basically nothing of value the
>>>>>railways were able to actually do with any kind of detailed
>>>>>understanding of traffic flows. They couldn't alter fares, and the
>>>>>process for eliminating service on low traffic routes was extremely
>>>>>difficult. Fighting the unions to reduce staffing levels was not
>>>>>politically viable at the time. If having the information is not
>>>>>going to bring any value to the organisation, there is little point
>>>>>spending time and  effort to collect it.
>>
>>>>  Welcome to Nationalised Industry, in a mythical Golden Age people
>>>>constantly hark on about wanting to return to.
>>>
>>> The relevant legislation and regulation that gave rise to this state
>>>of affairs significantly predated nationalisation. It was a creation
>>>of the era of rampant corporate greed in the era where railways had a
>>>monopoly on mechanised transportation. The problem was the
>>>regulations were left on books long after the need for them had
>>>passed, and effectively crippled the railways for decades.

>> WWII ends 1945         ) 3yrs
>> Nationalisation 1948   ) )
>> Beeching 1963            ) 15yrs
>
>The financial constraints and the inability to deal with competition
>resulting in the loss of profitable business was already causing a
>significant impact to the railways' financial position well before the
>start of the second world war. The advances in motor vehicle technology
>that resulted from the first world war produced an environment of road
>based competition pretty well as soon as the motor vehicle industry was
>able to pivot away from wartime production to the civilian market after
>the end of the first world war.

Are we supposed to ignore the statement:

"The regulatory environment that railways existed in between WWII
and Beeching..."
--
Roland Perry

On 24/04/2024 20:58, Roland Perry wrote:
> In message <v0blcv$2g4eh$1@dont-email.me>, at 20:09:19 on Wed, 24 Apr
> 2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>> On 24/04/2024 16:15, Roland Perry wrote:
>>> In message <v07ve6$1hv98$2@dont-email.me>, at 10:36:06 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>> 2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>>>> On 23/04/2024 09:43, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>> In message <v07p56$1gj74$2@dont-email.me>, at 08:48:54 on Tue, 23
>>>>> Apr  2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>>>>>> On 23/04/2024 07:41, Roland Perry wrote:
>
>>>>>>>> Salisbury isn’t part of TFL , to exit with a paper ticket I
>>>>>>>> insert  into a  slot to open  the barrier which if  the ticket
>>>>>>>> is no longer valid for  further journeys it retains. Do the
>>>>>>>> barriers have no way of  recording how  many journeys have ended
>>>>>>>> at them?
>>>>>
>>>>>>>  I doubt it, they are very dumb. And there's vast numbers of
>>>>>>> stations  with no barriers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But, as they have to be emptied on a regular basis. It is not that
>>>>>> difficult to count the number of tickets retained.
>>>
>>>>>  Counting the number [using what as manpower?] tells you nothing
>>>>> about  the details of the individual journeys. Then you have the
>>>>> barriers which  return the tickets (Kings Cross for example).
>>>>>  Which are locked out of use more often than not.
>>>>
>>>> But then all paper tickets are issued by computerised ticketing
>>>> systems that will give you all the detail you want.
>
>>>  A TVM at the station doesn't know where I changed trains, or
>>> finished my  journey.
>>
>> It does know you bought a ticket from A to B, the rest it can deduce.
>
> If I buy a walk-up ticket from Ely to Sheffield[1] it's valid on the
> direct EMR train (which somewhat uncomfortable and tedious), or I could
> catch an XC-lite train to Leicester and change to a mainline EMR train
> via Derby. Or I could catch one of GA/XC/EMR trains to Peterborough,
> then change to LNER as far as Doncaster, then a TP/NT/XC train across
> to Sheffield.
>
> Often it's the latter which OJP's recommend, although for a change(sic)
> I might get the EMR as far as Nottingham, then either:
>
> (a) get an XC-lite to Derby then either mainline XC/EMR to Sheffield.
>
> (b) get a Northern, direct to Sheffield (on its way to Leeds).
>
> [1] My son was at University there for five years, and also used the
>     train a lot.

Anyone who is not a ned or a track basher is most likely going to use
the OJP's suggested routes. The number who don't are going to be in the
noise level.

--
Graeme Wall
This account not read.

On 24/04/2024 17:16, Recliner wrote:
> Bob <bob@domain.com> wrote:
>> On 24.04.2024 17:20, Roland Perry wrote:
>>> In message <v084cf$1j2ev$1@dont-email.me>, at 13:00:31 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>> On 23.04.2024 09:27, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>> In message <v07lsl$1fqv7$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:53:08 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>>
>>>>>> The regulatory environment that railways existed in between WWII and
>>>>>> Beeching meant that there was basically nothing of value the
>>>>>> railways were able to actually do with any kind of detailed
>>>>>> understanding of traffic flows. They couldn't alter fares, and the
>>>>>> process for eliminating service on low traffic routes was extremely
>>>>>> difficult. Fighting the unions to reduce staffing levels was not
>>>>>> politically viable at the time. If having the information is not
>>>>>> going to bring any value to the organisation, there is little point
>>>>>> spending time and  effort to collect it.
>>>
>>>>>  Welcome to Nationalised Industry, in a mythical Golden Age people
>>>>> constantly hark on about wanting to return to.
>>>>
>>>> The relevant legislation and regulation that gave rise to this state
>>>> of affairs significantly predated nationalisation. It was a creation
>>>> of the era of rampant corporate greed in the era where railways had a
>>>> monopoly on mechanised transportation. The problem was the regulations
>>>> were left on books long after the need for them had passed, and
>>>> effectively crippled the railways for decades.
>>>
>>> WWII ends 1945         ) 3yrs
>>> Nationalisation 1948   ) )
>>> Beeching 1963            ) 15yrs
>>
>> The financial constraints and the inability to deal with competition
>> resulting in the loss of profitable business was already causing a
>> significant impact to the railways' financial position well before the
>> start of the second world war. The advances in motor vehicle technology
>> that resulted from the first world war produced an environment of road
>> based competition pretty well as soon as the motor vehicle industry was
>> able to pivot away from wartime production to the civilian market after
>> the end of the first world war.
>
> As I recall, lots of surplus military trucks were disposed of cheaply after
> WWI, while lots of demobbed soldiers had learned to drive those same trucks
> during their service. So, all of a sudden, the newly amalgamated Big Four
> had major new, flexible and low cost, freight competition from the roads.
> They obviously set out to undercut the railway's profitable business, while
> the railways were obliged to continue offering unprofitable services.

It was not really the competition that was the problem, it was
unbalanced competition. The railways were obliged, as you said, to
provide services when the comptitors could pick and choose the
profitable bits. The demise of the railways was government policy well
before WW2.

--
Colin

On 24/04/2024 21:33, ColinR wrote:
> On 24/04/2024 17:16, Recliner wrote:
>> Bob <bob@domain.com> wrote:
>>> On 24.04.2024 17:20, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>> In message <v084cf$1j2ev$1@dont-email.me>, at 13:00:31 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>> On 23.04.2024 09:27, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>>> In message <v07lsl$1fqv7$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:53:08 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The regulatory environment that railways existed in between WWII and
>>>>>>> Beeching meant that there was basically nothing of value the
>>>>>>> railways were able to actually do with any kind of detailed
>>>>>>> understanding of traffic flows. They couldn't alter fares, and the
>>>>>>> process for eliminating service on low traffic routes was extremely
>>>>>>> difficult. Fighting the unions to reduce staffing levels was not
>>>>>>> politically viable at the time. If having the information is not
>>>>>>> going to bring any value to the organisation, there is little point
>>>>>>> spending time and  effort to collect it.
>>>>
>>>>>>   Welcome to Nationalised Industry, in a mythical Golden Age people
>>>>>> constantly hark on about wanting to return to.
>>>>>
>>>>> The relevant legislation and regulation that gave rise to this state
>>>>> of affairs significantly predated nationalisation. It was a creation
>>>>> of the era of rampant corporate greed in the era where railways had a
>>>>> monopoly on mechanised transportation. The problem was the regulations
>>>>> were left on books long after the need for them had passed, and
>>>>> effectively crippled the railways for decades.
>>>>
>>>> WWII ends 1945         ) 3yrs
>>>> Nationalisation 1948   ) )
>>>> Beeching 1963            ) 15yrs
>>>
>>> The financial constraints and the inability to deal with competition
>>> resulting in the loss of profitable business was already causing a
>>> significant impact to the railways' financial position well before the
>>> start of the second world war. The advances in motor vehicle technology
>>> that resulted from the first world war produced an environment of road
>>> based competition pretty well as soon as the motor vehicle industry was
>>> able to pivot away from wartime production to the civilian market after
>>> the end of the first world war.
>>
>> As I recall, lots of surplus military trucks were disposed of cheaply
>> after
>> WWI, while lots of demobbed soldiers had learned to drive those same
>> trucks
>> during their service. So, all of a sudden, the newly amalgamated Big Four
>> had major new, flexible and low cost, freight competition from the roads.
>> They obviously set out to undercut the railway's profitable business,
>> while
>> the railways were obliged to continue offering unprofitable services.
>
> It was not really the competition that was the problem, it was
> unbalanced competition. The railways were obliged, as you said, to
> provide services when the comptitors could pick and choose the
> profitable bits. The demise of the railways was government policy well
> before WW2.
>

Should have added:
QUOTE
The revenues of the railway companies suffered because of the loss of
freight to road haulage in particular. This was largely because the
Government would not release the railways from their obligations as
'common carriers', which had been brought in the 19th century. It
obliged railway companies to carry any cargo offered to it at a
nationally agreed charge, which was usually well below a rate necessary
to make the operation profitable for the railways
UNQUOTE
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_rail_transport_in_Great_Britain_1923–1947

(Other references available, that was the quickest that I found.)

--
Colin

In message <im5CjhAKbNJmFAtb@perry.uk>, at 10:05:14 on Sun, 21 Apr 2024,
Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> remarked:
>In message <6ba26da0ef0ab291e5adcf9d77efc7ec@www.novabbs.org>, at
>08:36:27 on Sun, 21 Apr 2024, ulf_kutzner <Ulf.Kutzner@web.de> remarked:
>
>>>>> Meanwhile my local bus service has gone from up to 4 buses an hour
>>>>>down to 2 a day in the last two years.
>
>>>> Lack of drivers or still uncompensated pandemic effect?
>>
>>> The council can't afford the subsidy
>>
>>Used to be a fixed amount?
>
>There's three subsidies here:
>
>1. The government is subsidising a countrywide £2-single scheme.
>
>2. The local council pays (in the region of £1 per trip) for buses to
>take passengers with 'free passes', such as old people and disabled.
>It's generally reckoned that most of the £1's arise from people who
>simply would not otherwise have travelled by bus, rather than those who
>are no longer paying full fare. So for the bus companies it's "free
>money" replacing an empty seat.
>
>3. The Transport Authority (which may or may not be the same body) pays
>fixed sums for private companies to operate buses over certain routes,
>with the fares and types 1 and 2 subsidies the same as commercial
>routes.
>
>The latter leads to scare stories in the press about "£145 per
>passenger trip" for some little-used routes.

Locally the main cause celebre is the bus route from Cambridge to Ely
and Littleport (shadowing the A10 and Fen Line corridor) was slashed by
Stagecoach at the beginning of the month to a third of its former
frequency. The TA, which has a substantial portfolio of subsidised
routes already, added back one third (and locals demand to know why not
two-thirds while simultaneously complaining about the rise in council
tax to pay for it).

Anyway, yesterday it was revealed the TA expects/predicts this to be
costing £1.76 per passenger trip, which is regarded as very good value
because apparently their target upper limit for such services is £12 per
passenger trip.

>Some private operators have begged customers benefiting from type 2
>subsidies to make a donation.

--
Roland Perry

In message <v0bqb0$2h85u$1@dont-email.me>, at 21:33:38 on Wed, 24 Apr
2024, ColinR <rail@greystane.shetland.co.uk> remarked:
>On 24/04/2024 17:16, Recliner wrote:
>> Bob <bob@domain.com> wrote:
>>> On 24.04.2024 17:20, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>> In message <v084cf$1j2ev$1@dont-email.me>, at 13:00:31 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>> On 23.04.2024 09:27, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>>> In message <v07lsl$1fqv7$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:53:08 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The regulatory environment that railways existed in between WWII and
>>>>>>> Beeching meant that there was basically nothing of value the
>>>>>>> railways were able to actually do with any kind of detailed
>>>>>>> understanding of traffic flows. They couldn't alter fares, and the
>>>>>>> process for eliminating service on low traffic routes was extremely
>>>>>>> difficult. Fighting the unions to reduce staffing levels was not
>>>>>>> politically viable at the time. If having the information is not
>>>>>>> going to bring any value to the organisation, there is little point
>>>>>>> spending time and  effort to collect it.
>>>>
>>>>>>  Welcome to Nationalised Industry, in a mythical Golden Age people
>>>>>> constantly hark on about wanting to return to.
>>>>>
>>>>> The relevant legislation and regulation that gave rise to this state
>>>>> of affairs significantly predated nationalisation. It was a creation
>>>>> of the era of rampant corporate greed in the era where railways had a
>>>>> monopoly on mechanised transportation. The problem was the regulations
>>>>> were left on books long after the need for them had passed, and
>>>>> effectively crippled the railways for decades.
>>>>
>>>> WWII ends 1945         ) 3yrs
>>>> Nationalisation 1948   ) )
>>>> Beeching 1963            ) 15yrs
>>>
>>> The financial constraints and the inability to deal with competition
>>> resulting in the loss of profitable business was already causing a
>>> significant impact to the railways' financial position well before the
>>> start of the second world war. The advances in motor vehicle technology
>>> that resulted from the first world war produced an environment of road
>>> based competition pretty well as soon as the motor vehicle industry was
>>> able to pivot away from wartime production to the civilian market after
>>> the end of the first world war.

>> As I recall, lots of surplus military trucks were disposed of
>>cheaply after WWI, while lots of demobbed soldiers had learned to
>>drive those same trucks during their service. So, all of a sudden,
>>the newly amalgamated Big Four had major new, flexible and low cost,
>>freight competition from the roads. They obviously set out to
>>undercut the railway's profitable business, while the railways were
>>obliged to continue offering unprofitable services.
>
>It was not really the competition that was the problem, it was
>unbalanced competition. The railways were obliged, as you said, to
>provide services when the comptitors could pick and choose the
>profitable bits.

And I see a trend to getting back to that, with several commentators
bemoaning how railways should be regarded as a "public service" and run
many almost empty trains just because they shouldn't be allowed to let
down that handful of passengers.

>The demise of the railways was government policy well before WW2.

Deliberately, or had they just not thought it through?
--
Roland Perry

In message <v0bp2c$2h03n$1@dont-email.me>, at 21:11:56 on Wed, 24 Apr
2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>On 24/04/2024 20:58, Roland Perry wrote:
>> In message <v0blcv$2g4eh$1@dont-email.me>, at 20:09:19 on Wed, 24 Apr
>>2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>>> On 24/04/2024 16:15, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>> In message <v07ve6$1hv98$2@dont-email.me>, at 10:36:06 on Tue, 23
>>>>Apr 2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>>>>> On 23/04/2024 09:43, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>>> In message <v07p56$1gj74$2@dont-email.me>, at 08:48:54 on Tue, 23
>>>>>>Apr  2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>>>>>>> On 23/04/2024 07:41, Roland Perry wrote:
>>
>>>>>>>>> Salisbury isn’t part of TFL , to exit with a paper ticket I
>>>>>>>>>insert  into a  slot to open  the barrier which if  the
>>>>>>>>>ticket is no longer valid for  further journeys it retains. Do
>>>>>>>>>the barriers have no way of  recording how  many journeys have ended at them?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  I doubt it, they are very dumb. And there's vast numbers of
>>>>>>>>stations  with no barriers.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But, as they have to be emptied on a regular basis. It is not
>>>>>>>that difficult to count the number of tickets retained.
>>>>
>>>>>>  Counting the number [using what as manpower?] tells you nothing
>>>>>>about  the details of the individual journeys. Then you have the
>>>>>>barriers which  return the tickets (Kings Cross for example).
>>>>>>  Which are locked out of use more often than not.
>>>>>
>>>>> But then all paper tickets are issued by computerised ticketing
>>>>>systems that will give you all the detail you want.
>>
>>>>  A TVM at the station doesn't know where I changed trains, or
>>>>finished my  journey.
>>>
>>> It does know you bought a ticket from A to B, the rest it can deduce.

>> If I buy a walk-up ticket from Ely to Sheffield[1] it's valid on the
>>direct EMR train (which somewhat uncomfortable and tedious), or I
>>could catch an XC-lite train to Leicester and change to a mainline
>>EMR train via Derby. Or I could catch one of GA/XC/EMR trains to
>>Peterborough, then change to LNER as far as Doncaster, then a
>>TP/NT/XC train across to Sheffield.

>> Often it's the latter which OJP's recommend, although for a
>>change(sic) I might get the EMR as far as Nottingham, then either:

>> (a) get an XC-lite to Derby then either mainline XC/EMR to
>> Sheffield.
>> (b) get a Northern, direct to Sheffield (on its way to Leeds).
>> [1] My son was at University there for five years, and also used the
>>     train a lot.
>
>Anyone who is not a ned or a track basher is most likely going to use
>the OJP's suggested routes. The number who don't are going to be in the
>noise level.

It's not as simple as that, because the OJP's suggestions are very
time-of-departure sensitive. So might recommend "via Doncaster" for two
trains an hour but "Direct via Nottingham" for one train an hour. And
based on my experience, "via Leicester" for maybe two or three a day.

Passengers are unlikely to be sufficiently sheep-like to always follow
the itinerary to the letter, rather than take the route they are most
familiar with[1] even if it takes a few minutes longer.

And of course TVMs *don't issue* itineraries (not least because they
don't quiz the passenger on their exact departure time)! So the
passenger has to work it out for themselves.

And even if people are forced to specify an exact departure time by an
OJP, that doesn't mean the passenger will necessarily arrive at the
station precisely then.

Meanwhile, my last trip by train to and from Guildford involved me
missing the fast service to Waterloo by about a minute (due to the
excessive distance you have to walk to get to that platform) and it
transpired that rather than wait for the next fast service I'd arrive
sooner by getting a stopper via Effingham Junction. How can the system
predict things like that, or the decisions people make on the fly?

[1] For example one passenger I know refused to attempt "via Leicester"
because thought it was hoax/glitch.
--
Roland Perry

On 25/04/2024 07:43, Roland Perry wrote:
> Meanwhile, my last trip by train to and from Guildford involved me
> missing the fast service to Waterloo by about a minute (due to the
> excessive distance you have to walk to get to that platform) and it
> transpired that rather than wait for the next fast service I'd arrive
> sooner by getting a stopper via Effingham Junction. How can the system
> predict things like that, or the decisions people make on the fly?

Guildford trains tend to go from the middle set of platforms. In that
case the system doesn't care which actual route you took, you entered
the system at Waterloo and left at Guildford without changing trains so
your departure and arrival information was not affected by the route you
took.

--
Graeme Wall
This account not read.

On 25.04.2024 08:48, Roland Perry wrote:
> In message <v0bqb0$2h85u$1@dont-email.me>, at 21:33:38 on Wed, 24 Apr
> 2024, ColinR <rail@greystane.shetland.co.uk> remarked:
>> On 24/04/2024 17:16, Recliner wrote:
>>> Bob <bob@domain.com> wrote:
>>>> On 24.04.2024 17:20, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>> In message <v084cf$1j2ev$1@dont-email.me>, at 13:00:31 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>>> On 23.04.2024 09:27, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>>>> In message <v07lsl$1fqv7$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:53:08 on Tue, 23
>>>>>>> Apr
>>>>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The regulatory environment that railways existed in between WWII
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> Beeching meant that there was basically nothing of value the
>>>>>>>> railways were able to actually do with any kind of detailed
>>>>>>>> understanding of traffic flows. They couldn't alter fares, and the
>>>>>>>> process for eliminating service on low traffic routes was extremely
>>>>>>>> difficult. Fighting the unions to reduce staffing levels was not
>>>>>>>> politically viable at the time. If having the information is not
>>>>>>>> going to bring any value to the organisation, there is little point
>>>>>>>> spending time and  effort to collect it.
>>>>>
>>>>>>>   Welcome to Nationalised Industry, in a mythical Golden Age people
>>>>>>> constantly hark on about wanting to return to.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The relevant legislation and regulation that gave rise to this state
>>>>>> of affairs significantly predated nationalisation. It was a creation
>>>>>> of the era of rampant corporate greed in the era where railways had a
>>>>>> monopoly on mechanised transportation. The problem was the
>>>>>> regulations
>>>>>> were left on books long after the need for them had passed, and
>>>>>> effectively crippled the railways for decades.
>>>>>
>>>>> WWII ends 1945         ) 3yrs
>>>>> Nationalisation 1948   ) )
>>>>> Beeching 1963            ) 15yrs
>>>>
>>>> The financial constraints and the inability to deal with competition
>>>> resulting in the loss of profitable business was already causing a
>>>> significant impact to the railways' financial position well before the
>>>> start of the second world war. The advances in motor vehicle technology
>>>> that resulted from the first world war produced an environment of road
>>>> based competition pretty well as soon as the motor vehicle industry was
>>>> able to pivot away from wartime production to the civilian market after
>>>> the end of the first world war.
>
>>>  As I recall, lots of surplus military trucks were disposed of
>>> cheaply after  WWI, while lots of demobbed soldiers had learned to
>>> drive those same trucks  during their service. So, all of a sudden,
>>> the newly amalgamated Big Four  had major new, flexible and low cost,
>>> freight competition from the roads.  They obviously set out to
>>> undercut the railway's profitable business, while  the railways were
>>> obliged to continue offering unprofitable services.
>>
>> It was not really the competition that was the problem, it was
>> unbalanced competition. The railways were obliged, as you said, to
>> provide services when the comptitors could pick and choose the
>> profitable bits.
>
> And I see a trend to getting back to that, with several commentators
> bemoaning how railways should be regarded as a "public service" and run
> many almost empty trains just because they shouldn't be allowed to let
> down that handful of passengers.

Because since the 1920s we have taken the decision, as a nation, that
every form of passenger transportation should be in receipt of some form
of government subsidy because we recognise that effective and efficient
transportation is a benefit to the wider economy. In a situation where
the whole population, through general taxation, is paying to support the
industry, then it is reasonable that the whole population, through
elected governments, should have a say in what they are getting in
return for that subsidy. Before Beeching, and right up until Serpel,
there was a view that the railways should expect to be a purely
profitable enterprise.

There is a line of thinking that all transportation provision should be
made on a purely commercial basis. The only way that can happen is if
alternatives to rail are charged for on a commercial basis. That means
individual road pricing for each stretch of road, with prices set based
on for-profit revenue generation, with busier routes and busier times
attracting higher fees. Perhaps in a situation where larger scale uptake
of electric cars severelly cuts into fuel duty revenue, we might see
moves in that direction, but I'm not holding my breath.

>> The demise of the railways was government policy well before WW2.
>
> Deliberately, or had they just not thought it through?

Personally I would take the Hanlon's Razor view of it.

Robin

On 24.04.2024 21:59, Roland Perry wrote:
> In message <v0bant$2deir$1@dont-email.me>, at 18:07:25 on Wed, 24 Apr
> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>> On 24.04.2024 17:20, Roland Perry wrote:
>>> In message <v084cf$1j2ev$1@dont-email.me>, at 13:00:31 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>> On 23.04.2024 09:27, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>> In message <v07lsl$1fqv7$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:53:08 on Tue, 23
>>>>> Apr  2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>>
>>>>>> The regulatory environment that railways existed in between WWII
>>>>>> and  Beeching meant that there was basically nothing of value the
>>>>>> railways were able to actually do with any kind of detailed
>>>>>> understanding of traffic flows. They couldn't alter fares, and the
>>>>>> process for eliminating service on low traffic routes was
>>>>>> extremely difficult. Fighting the unions to reduce staffing levels
>>>>>> was not politically viable at the time. If having the information
>>>>>> is not going to bring any value to the organisation, there is
>>>>>> little point spending time and  effort to collect it.
>>>
>>>>>  Welcome to Nationalised Industry, in a mythical Golden Age people
>>>>> constantly hark on about wanting to return to.
>>>>
>>>> The relevant legislation and regulation that gave rise to this state
>>>> of affairs significantly predated nationalisation. It was a creation
>>>> of the era of rampant corporate greed in the era where railways had
>>>> a monopoly on mechanised transportation. The problem was the
>>>> regulations  were left on books long after the need for them had
>>>> passed, and  effectively crippled the railways for decades.
>
>>>  WWII ends 1945         ) 3yrs
>>> Nationalisation 1948   ) )
>>> Beeching 1963            ) 15yrs
>>
>> The financial constraints and the inability to deal with competition
>> resulting in the loss of profitable business was already causing a
>> significant impact to the railways' financial position well before the
>> start of the second world war. The advances in motor vehicle
>> technology that resulted from the first world war produced an
>> environment of road based competition pretty well as soon as the motor
>> vehicle industry was able to pivot away from wartime production to the
>> civilian market after the end of the first world war.
>
> Are we supposed to ignore the statement:
>
>    "The regulatory environment that railways existed in between WWII
>     and Beeching..."

We are supposed to read that statement in the context in which it was
written. It was in reply to the comment, "I thought Beeching's problem
was no-one was collecting any information." In response to a discussion
of Beeching, bringing up Victorian era regulations and the changing
commercial environment of the 1920s transportation sector would have
rightly been criticised as irrelevant to the point being made.

Robin

On Thu, 25 Apr 2024 07:48:12 +0100, Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk>
wrote:

>In message <v0bqb0$2h85u$1@dont-email.me>, at 21:33:38 on Wed, 24 Apr
>2024, ColinR <rail@greystane.shetland.co.uk> remarked:
>>On 24/04/2024 17:16, Recliner wrote:
>>> Bob <bob@domain.com> wrote:
>>>> On 24.04.2024 17:20, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>> In message <v084cf$1j2ev$1@dont-email.me>, at 13:00:31 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>>> On 23.04.2024 09:27, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>>>> In message <v07lsl$1fqv7$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:53:08 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>>>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The regulatory environment that railways existed in between WWII and
>>>>>>>> Beeching meant that there was basically nothing of value the
>>>>>>>> railways were able to actually do with any kind of detailed
>>>>>>>> understanding of traffic flows. They couldn't alter fares, and the
>>>>>>>> process for eliminating service on low traffic routes was extremely
>>>>>>>> difficult. Fighting the unions to reduce staffing levels was not
>>>>>>>> politically viable at the time. If having the information is not
>>>>>>>> going to bring any value to the organisation, there is little point
>>>>>>>> spending time and  effort to collect it.
>>>>>
>>>>>>>  Welcome to Nationalised Industry, in a mythical Golden Age people
>>>>>>> constantly hark on about wanting to return to.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The relevant legislation and regulation that gave rise to this state
>>>>>> of affairs significantly predated nationalisation. It was a creation
>>>>>> of the era of rampant corporate greed in the era where railways had a
>>>>>> monopoly on mechanised transportation. The problem was the regulations
>>>>>> were left on books long after the need for them had passed, and
>>>>>> effectively crippled the railways for decades.
>>>>>
>>>>> WWII ends 1945         ) 3yrs
>>>>> Nationalisation 1948   ) )
>>>>> Beeching 1963            ) 15yrs
>>>>
>>>> The financial constraints and the inability to deal with competition
>>>> resulting in the loss of profitable business was already causing a
>>>> significant impact to the railways' financial position well before the
>>>> start of the second world war. The advances in motor vehicle technology
>>>> that resulted from the first world war produced an environment of road
>>>> based competition pretty well as soon as the motor vehicle industry was
>>>> able to pivot away from wartime production to the civilian market after
>>>> the end of the first world war.
>
>>> As I recall, lots of surplus military trucks were disposed of
>>>cheaply after WWI, while lots of demobbed soldiers had learned to
>>>drive those same trucks during their service. So, all of a sudden,
>>>the newly amalgamated Big Four had major new, flexible and low cost,
>>>freight competition from the roads. They obviously set out to
>>>undercut the railway's profitable business, while the railways were
>>>obliged to continue offering unprofitable services.
>>
>>It was not really the competition that was the problem, it was
>>unbalanced competition. The railways were obliged, as you said, to
>>provide services when the comptitors could pick and choose the
>>profitable bits.
>
>And I see a trend to getting back to that, with several commentators
>bemoaning how railways should be regarded as a "public service" and run
>many almost empty trains just because they shouldn't be allowed to let
>down that handful of passengers.
>
We have roads that do much the same often for more of the day and with
fewer users. Part of the reason for trains doing it is that they have
to go back where they came from and/or that there can be significant
differences in usage on different parts of the route.

>>The demise of the railways was government policy well before WW2.
>
>Deliberately, or had they just not thought it through?

On 23/04/2024 22:01, Marland wrote:
> Bevan Price <bevanprice666@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 23/04/2024 12:00, Bob wrote:
>>> On 23.04.2024 09:27, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>> In message <v07lsl$1fqv7$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:53:08 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>
>>>>> The regulatory environment that railways existed in between WWII and
>>>>> Beeching meant that there was basically nothing of value the railways
>>>>> were able to actually do with any kind of detailed understanding of
>>>>> traffic flows. They couldn't alter fares, and the process for
>>>>> eliminating service on low traffic routes was extremely difficult.
>>>>> Fighting the unions to reduce staffing levels was not politically
>>>>> viable at the time. If having the information is not going to bring
>>>>> any value to the organisation, there is little point spending time
>>>>> and effort to collect it.
>>>>
>>>> Welcome to Nationalised Industry, in a mythical Golden Age people
>>>> constantly hark on about wanting to return to.
>>>
>>> The relevant legislation and regulation that gave rise to this state of
>>> affairs significantly predated nationalisation. It was a creation of the
>>> era of rampant corporate greed in the era where railways had a monopoly
>>> on mechanised transportation. The problem was the regulations were left
>>> on books long after the need for them had passed, and effectively
>>> crippled the railways for decades.
>>>
>>> Robin
>>
>> Another factor that probably did not help the railways was that neither
>> of the first two Chairmen of the British Transport Commission (BTC) was
>> a transport expert. One was a retired general, the other was a retired
>> senior civil servant.
>>
>> Doubtless both "fine fellows" according to the civil servants who
>> recommended them to the government - but probably not the sort of
>> persons with expertise to bring big changes to the railway.
>>
>>
>
> I wonder what the former directors of the big four did after 1948, did most
> go off to do other things possibly with a sigh of relief that the Railways
> with their trouble were going to be someone elses
> problem. The only one I have read a little about was Harold Macmillan who
> in the early fifties commented that the regions should return to the old
> names and liveries as it gave staff a sense of identity irrespective of who
> owned the shares. Later when Prime Minister and the Railways were rapidly
> losing money despite investment he pragmatically said the Nation needed a
> Railway for its life and trade but not at the expense of becoming an
> intolerable economic burden, and of course he appointed Richard Marples
> who appointed Dr Beeching. I wonder if former GWR men felt a little let
> down by their erstwhile Director and what he himself thought as he
> travelled still using his GWR issued lifetime Gold Pass observing the
> dismantling of many railways till his death in 1986.

It was Ernest Marples, not Richard - and his family was part of Marples
Ridgeway, whose business included roadbuilding -- so he might have had
an interest in supporting rail closures if he thought that might lead to
increased road building.....

>

Bevan Price <bevanprice666@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 23/04/2024 22:01, Marland wrote:
>> Bevan Price <bevanprice666@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> On 23/04/2024 12:00, Bob wrote:
>>>> On 23.04.2024 09:27, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>> In message <v07lsl$1fqv7$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:53:08 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>>
>>>>>> The regulatory environment that railways existed in between WWII and
>>>>>> Beeching meant that there was basically nothing of value the railways
>>>>>> were able to actually do with any kind of detailed understanding of
>>>>>> traffic flows. They couldn't alter fares, and the process for
>>>>>> eliminating service on low traffic routes was extremely difficult.
>>>>>> Fighting the unions to reduce staffing levels was not politically
>>>>>> viable at the time. If having the information is not going to bring
>>>>>> any value to the organisation, there is little point spending time
>>>>>> and effort to collect it.
>>>>>
>>>>> Welcome to Nationalised Industry, in a mythical Golden Age people
>>>>> constantly hark on about wanting to return to.
>>>>
>>>> The relevant legislation and regulation that gave rise to this state of
>>>> affairs significantly predated nationalisation. It was a creation of the
>>>> era of rampant corporate greed in the era where railways had a monopoly
>>>> on mechanised transportation. The problem was the regulations were left
>>>> on books long after the need for them had passed, and effectively
>>>> crippled the railways for decades.
>>>>
>>>> Robin
>>>
>>> Another factor that probably did not help the railways was that neither
>>> of the first two Chairmen of the British Transport Commission (BTC) was
>>> a transport expert. One was a retired general, the other was a retired
>>> senior civil servant.
>>>
>>> Doubtless both "fine fellows" according to the civil servants who
>>> recommended them to the government - but probably not the sort of
>>> persons with expertise to bring big changes to the railway.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> I wonder what the former directors of the big four did after 1948, did most
>> go off to do other things possibly with a sigh of relief that the Railways
>> with their trouble were going to be someone elses
>> problem. The only one I have read a little about was Harold Macmillan who
>> in the early fifties commented that the regions should return to the old
>> names and liveries as it gave staff a sense of identity irrespective of who
>> owned the shares. Later when Prime Minister and the Railways were rapidly
>> losing money despite investment he pragmatically said the Nation needed a
>> Railway for its life and trade but not at the expense of becoming an
>> intolerable economic burden, and of course he appointed Richard Marples
>> who appointed Dr Beeching. I wonder if former GWR men felt a little let
>> down by their erstwhile Director and what he himself thought as he
>> travelled still using his GWR issued lifetime Gold Pass observing the
>> dismantling of many railways till his death in 1986.
>
> It was Ernest Marples, not Richard - and his family was part of Marples
> Ridgeway, whose business included roadbuilding -- so he might have had
> an interest in supporting rail closures if he thought that might lead to
> increased road building.....
>
>
>>
>
>

Yep , I made a slip by having Dr Breechings first name in my mind.
That doesn’t change the gist of the post that Marples was appointed by a
Prime Minister
who had been a Director of the GWR .

GH

In message <v0cva6$2s8l1$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:04:38 on Thu, 25 Apr
2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>On 25/04/2024 07:43, Roland Perry wrote:

>> Meanwhile, my last trip by train to and from Guildford involved me
>>missing the fast service to Waterloo by about a minute (due to the
>>excessive distance you have to walk to get to that platform) and it
>>transpired that rather than wait for the next fast service I'd arrive
>>sooner by getting a stopper via Effingham Junction. How can the system
>>predict things like that, or the decisions people make on the fly?
>
>Guildford trains tend to go from the middle set of platforms. In that
>case the system doesn't care which actual route you took, you entered
>the system at Waterloo and left at Guildford

The other way round

>without changing trains so your departure and arrival information was
>not affected by the route you took.

But if you are planning future services to meet demand, you need to know
which route people are taking.
--
Roland Perry

In message <v0d04d$2s7ub$2@dont-email.me>, at 09:18:37 on Thu, 25 Apr
2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:

>>>The advances in motor vehicle technology that resulted from the
>>>first world war produced an environment of road based competition
>>>pretty well as soon as the motor vehicle industry was able to pivot
>>>away from wartime production to the civilian market after the end of
>>>the first world war.

>> Are we supposed to ignore the statement:

>>    "The regulatory environment that railways existed in between
>>WWII
>>     and Beeching..."
>
>We are supposed to read that statement in the context in which it was
>written. It was in reply to the comment, "I thought Beeching's problem
>was no-one was collecting any information." In response to a discussion
>of Beeching, bringing up Victorian era regulations and the changing
>commercial environment of the 1920s transportation sector would have
>rightly been criticised as irrelevant to the point being made.

Is it perhaps a bit of both?
--
Roland Perry

In message <9fqn2j5mbagnu119i4ggil288dk4p6cj54@4ax.com>, at 18:57:50 on
Fri, 26 Apr 2024, Charles Ellson <charlesellson@btinternet.com>
remarked:

>>>> As I recall, lots of surplus military trucks were disposed of
>>>>cheaply after WWI, while lots of demobbed soldiers had learned to
>>>>drive those same trucks during their service. So, all of a sudden,
>>>>the newly amalgamated Big Four had major new, flexible and low cost,
>>>>freight competition from the roads. They obviously set out to
>>>>undercut the railway's profitable business, while the railways were
>>>>obliged to continue offering unprofitable services.
>>>
>>>It was not really the competition that was the problem, it was
>>>unbalanced competition. The railways were obliged, as you said, to
>>>provide services when the comptitors could pick and choose the
>>>profitable bits.
>>
>>And I see a trend to getting back to that, with several commentators
>>bemoaning how railways should be regarded as a "public service" and run
>>many almost empty trains just because they shouldn't be allowed to let
>>down that handful of passengers.
>>
>We have roads that do much the same often for more of the day

It doesn't matter so much what the roads are doing, as what the vehicles
and drivers are doing.

>and with fewer users. Part of the reason for trains doing it is that
>they have to go back where they came from and/or that there can be
>significant differences in usage on different parts of the route.

And that affects buses and Amazon delivery vans just as much.
--
Roland Perry

In message <v0cvmu$2s7ub$1@dont-email.me>, at 09:11:25 on Thu, 25 Apr
2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>On 25.04.2024 08:48, Roland Perry wrote:
>> In message <v0bqb0$2h85u$1@dont-email.me>, at 21:33:38 on Wed, 24 Apr
>>2024, ColinR <rail@greystane.shetland.co.uk> remarked:
>>> On 24/04/2024 17:16, Recliner wrote:
>>>> Bob <bob@domain.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 24.04.2024 17:20, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>>> In message <v084cf$1j2ev$1@dont-email.me>, at 13:00:31 on Tue, 23 Apr
>>>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>>>> On 23.04.2024 09:27, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>>>>> In message <v07lsl$1fqv7$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:53:08 on Tue,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The regulatory environment that railways existed in between
>>>>>>>>>WWII and Beeching meant that there was basically nothing of
>>>>>>>>>value the railways were able to actually do with any kind of
>>>>>>>>>detailed understanding of traffic flows. They couldn't alter
>>>>>>>>>fares, and the process for eliminating service on low traffic
>>>>>>>>>routes was extremely difficult. Fighting the unions to reduce
>>>>>>>>>staffing levels was not politically viable at the time. If
>>>>>>>>>having the information is not going to bring any value to the
>>>>>>>>>organisation, there is little point spending time and  effort to collect it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>   Welcome to Nationalised Industry, in a mythical Golden Age people
>>>>>>>> constantly hark on about wanting to return to.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The relevant legislation and regulation that gave rise to this
>>>>>>> of affairs significantly predated nationalisation. It was a
>>>>>>>creation of the era of rampant corporate greed in the era where
>>>>>>>railways had a monopoly on mechanised transportation. The
>>>>>>>problem was the regulations were left on books long after the
>>>>>>>need for them had passed, and effectively crippled the railways for decades.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> WWII ends 1945         ) 3yrs
>>>>>> Nationalisation 1948   ) )
>>>>>> Beeching 1963            ) 15yrs
>>>>>
>>>>> The financial constraints and the inability to deal with competition
>>>>> resulting in the loss of profitable business was already causing a
>>>>> significant impact to the railways' financial position well before the
>>>>> start of the second world war. The advances in motor vehicle technology
>>>>> that resulted from the first world war produced an environment of road
>>>>> based competition pretty well as soon as the motor vehicle industry was
>>>>> able to pivot away from wartime production to the civilian market after
>>>>> the end of the first world war.
>>
>>>>  As I recall, lots of surplus military trucks were disposed of
>>>>cheaply after  WWI, while lots of demobbed soldiers had learned to
>>>>drive those same trucks  during their service. So, all of a sudden,
>>>>the newly amalgamated Big Four  had major new, flexible and low
>>>>cost, freight competition from the roads.  They obviously set out
>>>>to undercut the railway's profitable business, while  the railways
>>>>were obliged to continue offering unprofitable services.
>>>
>>> It was not really the competition that was the problem, it was
>>>unbalanced competition. The railways were obliged, as you said, to
>>>provide services when the comptitors could pick and choose the
>>>profitable bits.

>> And I see a trend to getting back to that, with several commentators
>>bemoaning how railways should be regarded as a "public service" and
>>run many almost empty trains just because they shouldn't be allowed
>>to let down that handful of passengers.
>
>Because since the 1920s we have taken the decision, as a nation, that
>every form of passenger transportation should be in receipt of some
>form of government subsidy because we recognise that effective and
>efficient transportation is a benefit to the wider economy. In a
>situation where the whole population, through general taxation, is
>paying to support the industry, then it is reasonable that the whole
>population, through elected governments, should have a say in what they
>are getting in return for that subsidy. Before Beeching, and right up
>until Serpel, there was a view that the railways should expect to be a
>purely profitable enterprise.

I'm having a hard time reconciling that with the Common Carrier
provisions which it has been claimed crippled the industry which was
being used a public service for those wanting goods delivered.

>There is a line of thinking that all transportation provision should be
>made on a purely commercial basis. The only way that can happen is if
>alternatives to rail are charged for on a commercial basis. That means
>individual road pricing for each stretch of road, with prices set based
>on for-profit revenue generation, with busier routes and busier times
>attracting higher fees.

Oh not that hoary old one again. Roads are paid for by taxation, and the
direct taxes on motorists (lots of it these days excise duty and VAT on
fuel) more than pay for them. Locally maintenance is done by Highways
Authorities (broadly speaking Counties) who get pretty much all their
revenue from taxation, whether locally or via central grants.

>Perhaps in a situation where larger scale uptake of electric cars
>severelly cuts into fuel duty revenue, we might see moves in that
>direction, but I'm not holding my breath.

At the moment we have a reprieve because not only is production of
electric cars severely limited by supply chain shortages, but the
cost-of-living-crisis means they are unattractive to buy.

--
Roland Perry

On 30/04/2024 08:58, Roland Perry wrote:
> In message <v0cva6$2s8l1$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:04:38 on Thu, 25 Apr
> 2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>> On 25/04/2024 07:43, Roland Perry wrote:
>
>>> Meanwhile, my last trip by train to and from Guildford involved me
>>> missing the fast service to Waterloo by about a minute (due to the
>>> excessive distance you have to walk to get to that platform) and it
>>> transpired that rather than wait for the next fast service I'd arrive
>>> sooner by getting a stopper via Effingham Junction. How can the
>>> system predict things like that, or the decisions people make on the
>>> fly?
>>
>> Guildford trains tend to go from the middle set of platforms. In that
>> case the system doesn't care which actual route you took, you entered
>> the system at Waterloo and left at Guildford
>
> The other way round >
>> without changing trains so your departure and arrival information was
>> not affected by the route you took.
>
> But if you are planning future services to meet demand, you need to know
> which route people are taking.

The number of people taking the slow train all the way will be very few
and some spot checks can fine tune the statistics.

What can confuse the statistics is that quite a few people take the fast
train from Waterloo to Guildford than dash across to P1 to get the up
slow train which takes them as far as London Road,[1] saving a longish
walk through the town centre and up the hill if you are heading for the
Stoke Park and Boxgrove Road areas. Don't know if that happens the other
way in the mornings.

[1]there is a two minute gap between the arrival of one and the
departure of the other. The trick is to exit the first train from the
doors nearest the stairs.
--
Graeme Wall
This account not read.

In message <v0qabr$2bqpb$3@dont-email.me>, at 09:32:59 on Tue, 30 Apr
2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>>> Guildford trains tend to go from the middle set of platforms. In
>>>that case the system doesn't care which actual route you took, you
>>>entered the system at Waterloo and left at Guildford
>> The other way round >
>>> without changing trains so your departure and arrival information
>>>was not affected by the route you took.

>> But if you are planning future services to meet demand, you need to
>>know which route people are taking.
>
>The number of people taking the slow train all the way will be very few
>and some spot checks can fine tune the statistics.

They could, but earlier people were making disparaging remarks about Dr
Beeching's spot checks, and there are an awful lot of trains to check.

Nevertheless, I think the ORCATS people do run at least an annual spot
check, but then someone said "wouldn't it be easier to get the data from
the gates". Rinse and repeat.
--
Roland Perry

On 30/04/2024 12:30, Roland Perry wrote:
> In message <v0qabr$2bqpb$3@dont-email.me>, at 09:32:59 on Tue, 30 Apr
> 2024, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>>>> Guildford trains tend to go from the middle set of platforms. In
>>>> that  case the system doesn't care which actual route you took, you
>>>> entered  the system at Waterloo and left at Guildford
>>>  The other way round >
>>>> without changing trains so your departure and arrival information
>>>> was  not affected by the route you took.
>
>>>  But if you are planning future services to meet demand, you need to
>>> know  which route people are taking.
>>
>> The number of people taking the slow train all the way will be very
>> few and some spot checks can fine tune the statistics.
>
> They could, but earlier people were making disparaging remarks about Dr
> Beeching's spot checks, and there are an awful lot of trains to check.

There was no real way that Beeching could do meaningful spot checks over
the whole network back in the 1950s, the data collection and processing
facilities didn't really exist. At most it was done on a best estimate
basis.

>
> Nevertheless, I think the ORCATS people do run at least an annual spot
> check, but then someone said "wouldn't it be easier to get the data from
> the gates". Rinse and repeat.

Basic data can be taken from the dates, you yourself highlighted an edge
case that would escape that process.

--
Graeme Wall
This account not read.

On 30.04.2024 10:07, Roland Perry wrote:
> In message <v0cvmu$2s7ub$1@dont-email.me>, at 09:11:25 on Thu, 25 Apr
> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>> On 25.04.2024 08:48, Roland Perry wrote:
>>> In message <v0bqb0$2h85u$1@dont-email.me>, at 21:33:38 on Wed, 24 Apr
>>> 2024, ColinR <rail@greystane.shetland.co.uk> remarked:
>>>> On 24/04/2024 17:16, Recliner wrote:
>>>>> Bob <bob@domain.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On 24.04.2024 17:20, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>>>> In message <v084cf$1j2ev$1@dont-email.me>, at 13:00:31 on Tue, 23
>>>>>>> Apr
>>>>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>>>>> On 23.04.2024 09:27, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>>>>>> In message <v07lsl$1fqv7$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:53:08 on Tue,
>>>>>>>>> 2024, Bob <bob@domain.com> remarked:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The regulatory environment that railways existed in between
>>>>>>>>>> WWII  and  Beeching meant that there was basically nothing of
>>>>>>>>>> value the  railways were able to actually do with any kind of
>>>>>>>>>> detailed  understanding of traffic flows. They couldn't alter
>>>>>>>>>> fares, and the  process for eliminating service on low traffic
>>>>>>>>>> routes was extremely  difficult. Fighting the unions to reduce
>>>>>>>>>> staffing levels was not  politically viable at the time. If
>>>>>>>>>> having the information is not  going to bring any value to the
>>>>>>>>>> organisation, there is little point  spending time and  effort
>>>>>>>>>> to collect it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>   Welcome to Nationalised Industry, in a mythical Golden Age
>>>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>>>> constantly hark on about wanting to return to.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The relevant legislation and regulation that gave rise to this
>>>>>>>>  of affairs significantly predated nationalisation. It was a
>>>>>>>> creation  of the era of rampant corporate greed in the era where
>>>>>>>> railways had a  monopoly on mechanised transportation. The
>>>>>>>> problem was the  regulations  were left on books long after the
>>>>>>>> need for them had passed, and  effectively crippled the railways
>>>>>>>> for decades.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> WWII ends 1945         ) 3yrs
>>>>>>> Nationalisation 1948   ) )
>>>>>>> Beeching 1963            ) 15yrs
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The financial constraints and the inability to deal with competition
>>>>>> resulting in the loss of profitable business was already causing a
>>>>>> significant impact to the railways' financial position well before
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> start of the second world war. The advances in motor vehicle
>>>>>> technology
>>>>>> that resulted from the first world war produced an environment of
>>>>>> road
>>>>>> based competition pretty well as soon as the motor vehicle
>>>>>> industry was
>>>>>> able to pivot away from wartime production to the civilian market
>>>>>> after
>>>>>> the end of the first world war.
>>>
>>>>>  As I recall, lots of surplus military trucks were disposed of
>>>>> cheaply after  WWI, while lots of demobbed soldiers had learned to
>>>>> drive those same trucks  during their service. So, all of a sudden,
>>>>> the newly amalgamated Big Four  had major new, flexible and low
>>>>> cost,  freight competition from the roads.  They obviously set out
>>>>> to  undercut the railway's profitable business, while  the railways
>>>>> were  obliged to continue offering unprofitable services.
>>>>
>>>> It was not really the competition that was the problem, it was
>>>> unbalanced competition. The railways were obliged, as you said, to
>>>> provide services when the comptitors could pick and choose the
>>>> profitable bits.
>
>>>  And I see a trend to getting back to that, with several commentators
>>> bemoaning how railways should be regarded as a "public service" and
>>> run  many almost empty trains just because they shouldn't be allowed
>>> to let  down that handful of passengers.
>>
>> Because since the 1920s we have taken the decision, as a nation, that
>> every form of passenger transportation should be in receipt of some
>> form of government subsidy because we recognise that effective and
>> efficient transportation is a benefit to the wider economy. In a
>> situation where the whole population, through general taxation, is
>> paying to support the industry, then it is reasonable that the whole
>> population, through elected governments, should have a say in what
>> they are getting in return for that subsidy. Before Beeching, and
>> right up until Serpel, there was a view that the railways should
>> expect to be a purely profitable enterprise.
>
> I'm having a hard time reconciling that with the Common Carrier
> provisions which it has been claimed crippled the industry which was
> being used a public service for those wanting goods delivered.

There were two strands to the regulation. One was the common carrier
obligationa and the other was legally fixing the rates that could be
charged for the carriage of freight (it wasn't a cap, it was a fixed
rate). At the rates charged, and with the traffic patterns of the time,
some of this was profitable and some of it was loss making. As a whole,
during the period of a railway monopoly, the profits from the desirable
traffic offset the losses from the undesirable traffic.

Road haulage was not subject to either the fixed rates or the common
carrier obligation. That allowed the road hauliers to undercut the
railway rates for profitable traffic, and decline to accept the
unprofitable traffic. By abstracting the profitable traffic from the
railways, the ballance of offsetting the losses on the unprofitable
traffic with the profits from the now lost profitable stuff was upset,
and the railways lost money.

While the railways were under the common carrier obligation, they had to
maintain the capability to actually handle the freight presented to them
under the common carrier obligations. That meant they needed sidings in
all kinds of places, they needed a huge fleet of wagons, they needed
marshalling yards, shunting locomotives, locomotives suited to trip
frieght workigns of wagon load trains and all that sort of stuff.
Without all of that infrastructure and overhead, they would not have
been able to meet the common carrier obligation.

The fact that actually running all that stuff was horrendously
expensive, and the traffic was being abstracted by road freight did not
absolve them of the obligation to have the capability of handling it.

One of the criticisms of the modernisation plan was the waste of money
on things like locomotives and marshalling yards for handling wagon load
freight that was in the process of being lost en masse to the roads. At
the time of the modernisation plan, due to the common carrier
obligation, the railways legally had to make provision for that freight.
They could not fail to provide for it, even if it was a single wagon per
year.

>> There is a line of thinking that all transportation provision should
>> be made on a purely commercial basis. The only way that can happen is
>> if alternatives to rail are charged for on a commercial basis. That
>> means individual road pricing for each stretch of road, with prices
>> set based on for-profit revenue generation, with busier routes and
>> busier times attracting higher fees.
>
> Oh not that hoary old one again. Roads are paid for by taxation, and the
> direct taxes on motorists (lots of it these days excise duty and VAT on
> fuel) more than pay for them. Locally maintenance is done by Highways
> Authorities (broadly speaking Counties) who get pretty much all their
> revenue from taxation, whether locally or via central grants.

It makes sense to provide for local roads in towns and cities by local
general taxation, as there are all manner of services as well as
non-motor traffic uses for the roads (postal service, emergency
services, the ability of local shops and businesses to operate).