I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf

In the conclusion section:
The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
for-
malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
exist as
a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
paradox.
The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
Computer
Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
halting
problem is misconceived......

It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?

On 1/21/2024 1:22 PM, wij wrote:
> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>
> In the conclusion section:
> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
> for-
> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
> exist as
> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
> paradox.
> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
> Computer
> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
> halting
> problem is misconceived......
>
> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>
>

He is one of three authors that agree on this.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/21/24 20:24, olcott wrote:
> On 1/21/2024 1:22 PM, wij wrote:
>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>
>> In the conclusion section:
>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>> for-
>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
>> exist as
>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>> paradox.
>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>> Computer
>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>> halting
>> problem is misconceived......
>>
>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>
>>
>
> He is one of three authors that agree on this.
>

It is known that if you restrict the halting problem to programs with a
certain memory limit, it can be solved by a halting decider which uses
more memory than the limit. When a program has limited memory, it has to
halt or loop within a certain number of steps (2 to the power of the
number of bits of memory available, including the program counter/state
number). The Linz counterexample program doesn't lead to a
contradiction, because it uses more memory than the limit, so the
halting decider is unable to analyze it.

Stoddart has the same idea as Olcott: there's a hidden variable which
tells the program whether it's already in a simulation, and the program
does something different if it's in a simulation than if it isn't.
However, this is just dishonesty and lies, because we have not written
all of the input as the input. If we honestly write all of the input to
a function as the input to the function, instead of dishonestly hiding
it, then the mistake is obvious:

H(p, InS1) = ....
S = if H(S, true) then Loop end.
Question: what is H(S, false)?

the above is not Linz's counterexample.

On 1/21/2024 1:49 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/21/24 20:24, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/21/2024 1:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>
>>> In the conclusion section:
>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>>> for-
>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
>>> exist as
>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>> paradox.
>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>> Computer
>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>>> halting
>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>
>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>>
>>>
>>
>> He is one of three authors that agree on this.
>>
>
> It is known that if you restrict the halting problem to programs with a
> certain memory limit, it can be solved by a halting decider which uses
> more memory than the limit. When a program has limited memory, it has to
>  halt or loop within a certain number of steps (2 to the power of the
> number of bits of memory available, including the program counter/state
> number). The Linz counterexample program doesn't lead to a
> contradiction, because it uses more memory than the limit, so the
> halting decider is unable to analyze it.
>
> Stoddart has the same idea as Olcott: there's a hidden variable which
> tells the program whether it's already in a simulation, and the program
> does something different if it's in a simulation than if it isn't.

*Professor Stoddart doesn't say anything like this*
You didn't read what he said you only guessed what he said.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/21/24 2:22 PM, wij wrote:
> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>
> In the conclusion section:
> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
> for-
> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
> exist as
> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
> paradox.
> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
> Computer
> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
> halting
> problem is misconceived......
>
> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>
>

I think the problem he is seeing is that the property of "Halting" can
not be uniformly determined in Finite Time.

That is all that I can get from his statement of:

The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
formalised as a consistent specification.

There certainly CAN be defined formal test that define Halting, the
issue is that non-halting is defined by the non-existence of a number N
for the number of steps needed to reach a final state.

Some people just don't like the fact that it can be absolutely provable
what the answer is (and thus unknowable), even if we know from the
definition, that it must be one or the other.

This leads us to a great divide in logics. The classical branch accepts
that some truth is only established by infinite chains of connections,
and thus can not be proven with a finite proof, and thus is unknowable.

Others don't accept that, and require Truth to be only established by
Finite chains. The problem then is, such logic system need to greatly
limit the domain they attempt to cover, as otherwise you get into
endless chains of asking if a question can be asked, at which point you
need to ask if you can even ask about asking the questions. Only when
the domain is restricted in a way that the answer MUST be determinable
with finite work, can we break the cycle.

For instance, if we limit ourselves to Finite State Machines (which
could be Turing Machines with a fixed finite tape, or a classical
program in a computer with limited memory) then we can be sure that the
answer is determinable with a finite amount of work.

On 1/21/2024 2:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 1/21/24 2:22 PM, wij wrote:
>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>
>> In the conclusion section:
>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>> for-
>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
>> exist as
>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>> paradox.
>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>> Computer
>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>> halting
>> problem is misconceived......
>>
>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>
>>
>
> I think the problem he is seeing is that the property of "Halting" can
> not be uniformly determined in Finite Time.
>
> That is all that I can get from his statement of:
>
> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
> formalised as a consistent specification.
>
> There certainly CAN be defined formal test that define Halting, the
> issue is that non-halting is defined by the non-existence of a number N
> for the number of steps needed to reach a final state.
>
> Some people just don't like the fact that it can be absolutely provable
> what the answer is (and thus unknowable), even if we know from the
> definition, that it must be one or the other.
>
> This leads us to a great divide in logics. The classical branch accepts
> that some truth is only established by infinite chains of connections,
> and thus can not be proven with a finite proof, and thus is unknowable.
>
> Others don't accept that, and require Truth to be only established by
> Finite chains. The problem then is, such logic system need to greatly
> limit the domain they attempt to cover, as otherwise you get into
> endless chains of asking if a question can be asked, at which point you
> need to ask if you can even ask about asking the questions. Only when
> the domain is restricted in a way that the answer MUST be determinable
> with finite work, can we break the cycle.
>
> For instance, if we limit ourselves to Finite State Machines (which
> could be Turing Machines with a fixed finite tape, or a classical
> program in a computer with limited memory) then we can be sure that the
> answer is determinable with a finite amount of work.

Tarski did not understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer
thus cannot possibly be true or false. His ignorance got him so confused
that he thought that he proved that True(L,x) cannot be defined because
True(Tarski_theory, LP) does not work.

Three computer science professors agree with this same reasoning when
it is applied to the halting problem computer-example input. I wrote
a paper unifying their views on this. I can't publish it on most
pre-print servers because academic journal will not accept any paper
that is published on the pre-print servers that I have access to.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/21/24 3:15 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 1/21/2024 2:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 1/21/24 2:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>
>>> In the conclusion section:
>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>>> for-
>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
>>> exist as
>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>> paradox.
>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>> Computer
>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>>> halting
>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>
>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>>
>>>
>>
>> I think the problem he is seeing is that the property of "Halting" can
>> not be uniformly determined in Finite Time.
>>
>> That is all that I can get from his statement of:
>>
>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>> formalised as a consistent specification.
>>
>> There certainly CAN be defined formal test that define Halting, the
>> issue is that non-halting is defined by the non-existence of a number
>> N for the number of steps needed to reach a final state.
>>
>> Some people just don't like the fact that it can be absolutely
>> provable what the answer is (and thus unknowable), even if we know
>> from the definition, that it must be one or the other.
>>
>> This leads us to a great divide in logics. The classical branch
>> accepts that some truth is only established by infinite chains of
>> connections, and thus can not be proven with a finite proof, and thus
>> is unknowable.
>>
>> Others don't accept that, and require Truth to be only established by
>> Finite chains. The problem then is, such logic system need to greatly
>> limit the domain they attempt to cover, as otherwise you get into
>> endless chains of asking if a question can be asked, at which point
>> you need to ask if you can even ask about asking the questions. Only
>> when the domain is restricted in a way that the answer MUST be
>> determinable with finite work, can we break the cycle.
>>
>> For instance, if we limit ourselves to Finite State Machines (which
>> could be Turing Machines with a fixed finite tape, or a classical
>> program in a computer with limited memory) then we can be sure that
>> the answer is determinable with a finite amount of work.
>
> Tarski did not understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer
> thus cannot possibly be true or false. His ignorance got him so confused
> that he thought that he proved that True(L,x) cannot be defined because
> True(Tarski_theory, LP) does not work.

I'll ask one more time, exactly WHERE in the proof did he do this? He
shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true
statement, but not what you say.

>
> Three computer science professors agree with this same reasoning when
> it is applied to the halting problem computer-example input. I wrote
> a paper unifying their views on this. I can't publish it on most
> pre-print servers because academic journal will not accept any paper
> that is published on the pre-print servers that I have access to.
>

So, why haven't you put it out to an actual peer-reviewed paper?

Is it that you know they will reject it?

Of course, since you already have a web site, you can publish anything
you want on it, but that might still run afoul of not previouslu
published requirements.

Of course, considering the level of writing you have shown so far, the
idea of rejection is probably the BETTER result, as if they did publish
it you would just be put on record as the fraud you are in the comments
section of the next issue of the journal.

On 1/21/24 20:54, olcott wrote:
> On 1/21/2024 1:49 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 1/21/24 20:24, olcott wrote:
>>> On 1/21/2024 1:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>
>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>>>> for-
>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
>>>> exist as
>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>>> paradox.
>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>>> Computer
>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>>>> halting
>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>
>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> He is one of three authors that agree on this.
>>>
>>
>> It is known that if you restrict the halting problem to programs with
>> a certain memory limit, it can be solved by a halting decider which
>> uses more memory than the limit. When a program has limited memory, it
>> has to   halt or loop within a certain number of steps (2 to the power
>> of the number of bits of memory available, including the program
>> counter/state number). The Linz counterexample program doesn't lead to
>> a contradiction, because it uses more memory than the limit, so the
>> halting decider is unable to analyze it.
>>
>> Stoddart has the same idea as Olcott: there's a hidden variable which
>> tells the program whether it's already in a simulation, and the
>> program does something different if it's in a simulation than if it
>> isn't.
>
> *Professor Stoddart doesn't say anything like this*
> You didn't read what he said you only guessed what he said.
>

Professor Stoddart quite literally says it. His hidden variable is
called InS1. Did you read what he wrote? I think you are lying.

On 1/21/2024 2:43 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 1/21/24 3:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/21/2024 2:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 1/21/24 2:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>
>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>>>> for-
>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
>>>> exist as
>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>>> paradox.
>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>>> Computer
>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>>>> halting
>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>
>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> I think the problem he is seeing is that the property of "Halting"
>>> can not be uniformly determined in Finite Time.
>>>
>>> That is all that I can get from his statement of:
>>>
>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>>> formalised as a consistent specification.
>>>
>>> There certainly CAN be defined formal test that define Halting, the
>>> issue is that non-halting is defined by the non-existence of a number
>>> N for the number of steps needed to reach a final state.
>>>
>>> Some people just don't like the fact that it can be absolutely
>>> provable what the answer is (and thus unknowable), even if we know
>>> from the definition, that it must be one or the other.
>>>
>>> This leads us to a great divide in logics. The classical branch
>>> accepts that some truth is only established by infinite chains of
>>> connections, and thus can not be proven with a finite proof, and thus
>>> is unknowable.
>>>
>>> Others don't accept that, and require Truth to be only established by
>>> Finite chains. The problem then is, such logic system need to greatly
>>> limit the domain they attempt to cover, as otherwise you get into
>>> endless chains of asking if a question can be asked, at which point
>>> you need to ask if you can even ask about asking the questions. Only
>>> when the domain is restricted in a way that the answer MUST be
>>> determinable with finite work, can we break the cycle.
>>>
>>> For instance, if we limit ourselves to Finite State Machines (which
>>> could be Turing Machines with a fixed finite tape, or a classical
>>> program in a computer with limited memory) then we can be sure that
>>> the answer is determinable with a finite amount of work.
>>
>> Tarski did not understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer
>> thus cannot possibly be true or false. His ignorance got him so confused
>> that he thought that he proved that True(L,x) cannot be defined because
>> True(Tarski_theory, LP) does not work.
>
> I'll ask one more time, exactly WHERE in the proof did he do this? He
> shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true
> statement, but not what you say.

"He shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true."

That is a perfect paraphrase of my position of what he said.

Why this is nutty on his part requires you to understand a term
that is not in logic or math, it is only in philosophy of logic:
{truth bearer}.

When Tarski tried to show that the Liar Paradox is true or
false we have the exact same situation as this question:
What time is it (yes or no)?

Self-contradictory statements like the like the Liar Paradox
and questions do not have a truth value because they are
not {truth bearers}.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/21/2024 2:43 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 1/21/24 3:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/21/2024 2:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 1/21/24 2:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>
>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>>>> for-
>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
>>>> exist as
>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>>> paradox.
>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>>> Computer
>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>>>> halting
>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>
>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> I think the problem he is seeing is that the property of "Halting"
>>> can not be uniformly determined in Finite Time.
>>>
>>> That is all that I can get from his statement of:
>>>
>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>>> formalised as a consistent specification.
>>>
>>> There certainly CAN be defined formal test that define Halting, the
>>> issue is that non-halting is defined by the non-existence of a number
>>> N for the number of steps needed to reach a final state.
>>>
>>> Some people just don't like the fact that it can be absolutely
>>> provable what the answer is (and thus unknowable), even if we know
>>> from the definition, that it must be one or the other.
>>>
>>> This leads us to a great divide in logics. The classical branch
>>> accepts that some truth is only established by infinite chains of
>>> connections, and thus can not be proven with a finite proof, and thus
>>> is unknowable.
>>>
>>> Others don't accept that, and require Truth to be only established by
>>> Finite chains. The problem then is, such logic system need to greatly
>>> limit the domain they attempt to cover, as otherwise you get into
>>> endless chains of asking if a question can be asked, at which point
>>> you need to ask if you can even ask about asking the questions. Only
>>> when the domain is restricted in a way that the answer MUST be
>>> determinable with finite work, can we break the cycle.
>>>
>>> For instance, if we limit ourselves to Finite State Machines (which
>>> could be Turing Machines with a fixed finite tape, or a classical
>>> program in a computer with limited memory) then we can be sure that
>>> the answer is determinable with a finite amount of work.
>>
>> Tarski did not understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer
>> thus cannot possibly be true or false. His ignorance got him so confused
>> that he thought that he proved that True(L,x) cannot be defined because
>> True(Tarski_theory, LP) does not work.
>
> I'll ask one more time, exactly WHERE in the proof did he do this? He
> shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true
> statement, but not what you say.
>
>>
>> Three computer science professors agree with this same reasoning when
>> it is applied to the halting problem computer-example input. I wrote
>> a paper unifying their views on this. I can't publish it on most
>> pre-print servers because academic journal will not accept any paper
>> that is published on the pre-print servers that I have access to.
>>
>
> So, why haven't you put it out to an actual peer-reviewed paper?
>
> Is it that you know they will reject it?

It was rejected on the basis that the summary and unification
of the views of three computer science professors does not
include anything new.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/21/24 21:51, olcott wrote:
> On 1/21/2024 2:43 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 1/21/24 3:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 1/21/2024 2:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 1/21/24 2:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>
>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>>>>> for-
>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
>>>>> exist as
>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>>>> paradox.
>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>>>> Computer
>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>>>>> halting
>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>
>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think the problem he is seeing is that the property of "Halting"
>>>> can not be uniformly determined in Finite Time.
>>>>
>>>> That is all that I can get from his statement of:
>>>>
>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>>>> formalised as a consistent specification.
>>>>
>>>> There certainly CAN be defined formal test that define Halting, the
>>>> issue is that non-halting is defined by the non-existence of a
>>>> number N for the number of steps needed to reach a final state.
>>>>
>>>> Some people just don't like the fact that it can be absolutely
>>>> provable what the answer is (and thus unknowable), even if we know
>>>> from the definition, that it must be one or the other.
>>>>
>>>> This leads us to a great divide in logics. The classical branch
>>>> accepts that some truth is only established by infinite chains of
>>>> connections, and thus can not be proven with a finite proof, and
>>>> thus is unknowable.
>>>>
>>>> Others don't accept that, and require Truth to be only established
>>>> by Finite chains. The problem then is, such logic system need to
>>>> greatly limit the domain they attempt to cover, as otherwise you get
>>>> into endless chains of asking if a question can be asked, at which
>>>> point you need to ask if you can even ask about asking the
>>>> questions. Only when the domain is restricted in a way that the
>>>> answer MUST be determinable with finite work, can we break the cycle.
>>>>
>>>> For instance, if we limit ourselves to Finite State Machines (which
>>>> could be Turing Machines with a fixed finite tape, or a classical
>>>> program in a computer with limited memory) then we can be sure that
>>>> the answer is determinable with a finite amount of work.
>>>
>>> Tarski did not understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer
>>> thus cannot possibly be true or false. His ignorance got him so confused
>>> that he thought that he proved that True(L,x) cannot be defined because
>>> True(Tarski_theory, LP) does not work.
>>
>> I'll ask one more time, exactly WHERE in the proof did he do this? He
>> shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true
>> statement, but not what you say.
>
> "He shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true."
>
> That is a perfect paraphrase of my position of what he said.
>
> Why this is nutty on his part requires you to understand a term
> that is not in logic or math, it is only in philosophy of logic:
> {truth bearer}.
>

You agree it's not in logic or math. Well he talked about logic and
math, not philosophy. So you agree that in logic and math, the liar
paradox is true?

On 1/21/24 21:53, olcott wrote:
> On 1/21/2024 2:43 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 1/21/24 3:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 1/21/2024 2:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 1/21/24 2:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>
>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>>>>> for-
>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
>>>>> exist as
>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>>>> paradox.
>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>>>> Computer
>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>>>>> halting
>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>
>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think the problem he is seeing is that the property of "Halting"
>>>> can not be uniformly determined in Finite Time.
>>>>
>>>> That is all that I can get from his statement of:
>>>>
>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>>>> formalised as a consistent specification.
>>>>
>>>> There certainly CAN be defined formal test that define Halting, the
>>>> issue is that non-halting is defined by the non-existence of a
>>>> number N for the number of steps needed to reach a final state.
>>>>
>>>> Some people just don't like the fact that it can be absolutely
>>>> provable what the answer is (and thus unknowable), even if we know
>>>> from the definition, that it must be one or the other.
>>>>
>>>> This leads us to a great divide in logics. The classical branch
>>>> accepts that some truth is only established by infinite chains of
>>>> connections, and thus can not be proven with a finite proof, and
>>>> thus is unknowable.
>>>>
>>>> Others don't accept that, and require Truth to be only established
>>>> by Finite chains. The problem then is, such logic system need to
>>>> greatly limit the domain they attempt to cover, as otherwise you get
>>>> into endless chains of asking if a question can be asked, at which
>>>> point you need to ask if you can even ask about asking the
>>>> questions. Only when the domain is restricted in a way that the
>>>> answer MUST be determinable with finite work, can we break the cycle.
>>>>
>>>> For instance, if we limit ourselves to Finite State Machines (which
>>>> could be Turing Machines with a fixed finite tape, or a classical
>>>> program in a computer with limited memory) then we can be sure that
>>>> the answer is determinable with a finite amount of work.
>>>
>>> Tarski did not understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer
>>> thus cannot possibly be true or false. His ignorance got him so confused
>>> that he thought that he proved that True(L,x) cannot be defined because
>>> True(Tarski_theory, LP) does not work.
>>
>> I'll ask one more time, exactly WHERE in the proof did he do this? He
>> shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true
>> statement, but not what you say.
>>
>>>
>>> Three computer science professors agree with this same reasoning when
>>> it is applied to the halting problem computer-example input. I wrote
>>> a paper unifying their views on this. I can't publish it on most
>>> pre-print servers because academic journal will not accept any paper
>>> that is published on the pre-print servers that I have access to.
>>>
>>
>> So, why haven't you put it out to an actual peer-reviewed paper?
>>
>> Is it that you know they will reject it?
>
> It was rejected on the basis that the summary and unification
> of the views of three computer science professors does not
> include anything new.
>
Isn't solving the halting problem (by saying that a halting program
doesn't halt) something new?

On Sun, 2024-01-21 at 15:06 -0500, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 1/21/24 2:22 PM, wij wrote:
> > I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
> > https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
> >
> > In the conclusion section:
> > The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot
> > be
> > for-
> > malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
> > exist as
> > a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
> > paradox.
> > The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
> > Computer
> > Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
> > halting
> > problem is misconceived......
> >
> > It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
> >
> >
>
> I think the problem he is seeing is that the property of "Halting"
> can
> not be uniformly determined in Finite Time.
>
> That is all that I can get from his statement of:
>
> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
> formalised as a consistent specification.
>
> There certainly CAN be defined formal test that define Halting, the
> issue is that non-halting is defined by the non-existence of a number
> N
> for the number of steps needed to reach a final state.
>
> Some people just don't like the fact that it can be absolutely
> provable
> what the answer is (and thus unknowable), even if we know from the
> definition, that it must be one or the other.

Sorry, I can only respond with what I perceived. I cannot grasp all the
idea
you tried to say.
Q: Why can something involving infinity be reasoned and provide valid
result?
My answer is: A proposition containing something involving infinity
that cannot
be evaluated still may yield valid result. Because there are Tautology/
Contradiction in logic expression.
E.g. Some sub-propositions like (A OR ~A), (A AND A~) can be evaluated,
if we
are lucky, those A's involving infinity can be evaluated. Of course,
there still lots inconsistency in the understanding of 'infinity'.

> This leads us to a great divide in logics. The classical branch
> accepts
> that some truth is only established by infinite chains of
> connections,
> and thus can not be proven with a finite proof, and thus is
> unknowable.
>
> Others don't accept that, and require Truth to be only established by
> Finite chains. The problem then is, such logic system need to greatly
> limit the domain they attempt to cover, as otherwise you get into
> endless chains of asking if a question can be asked, at which point
> you
> need to ask if you can even ask about asking the questions. Only when
> the domain is restricted in a way that the answer MUST be
> determinable
> with finite work, can we break the cycle.

IMO, a valid proof (also a 'procedure') must terminate. But from what
all those papers infinity I saw, all are messy.

> For instance, if we limit ourselves to Finite State Machines (which
> could be Turing Machines with a fixed finite tape, or a classical
> program in a computer with limited memory) then we can be sure that
> the
> answer is determinable with a finite amount of work.

Thanks for your explanation in plain English.
As said, propositions involving infinity can conditionally be solved.

On 1/21/2024 2:48 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/21/24 20:54, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/21/2024 1:49 PM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 1/21/24 20:24, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 1/21/2024 1:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>
>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>>>>> for-
>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
>>>>> exist as
>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>>>> paradox.
>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>>>> Computer
>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>>>>> halting
>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>
>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> He is one of three authors that agree on this.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It is known that if you restrict the halting problem to programs with
>>> a certain memory limit, it can be solved by a halting decider which
>>> uses more memory than the limit. When a program has limited memory,
>>> it has to   halt or loop within a certain number of steps (2 to the
>>> power of the number of bits of memory available, including the
>>> program counter/state number). The Linz counterexample program
>>> doesn't lead to a contradiction, because it uses more memory than the
>>> limit, so the halting decider is unable to analyze it.
>>>
>>> Stoddart has the same idea as Olcott: there's a hidden variable which
>>> tells the program whether it's already in a simulation, and the
>>> program does something different if it's in a simulation than if it
>>> isn't.
>>
>> *Professor Stoddart doesn't say anything like this*
>> You didn't read what he said you only guessed what he said.
>>
>
> Professor Stoddart quite literally says it. His hidden variable is
> called InS1. Did you read what he wrote? I think you are lying.
>

Good catch. That was part of his intermediate analysis
and his conclusion does not reference anything like that.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/21/2024 2:54 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/21/24 21:51, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/21/2024 2:43 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 1/21/24 3:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 1/21/2024 2:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 1/21/24 2:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>>>>>> for-
>>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
>>>>>> exist as
>>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>>>>> paradox.
>>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>>>>> Computer
>>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>>>>>> halting
>>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think the problem he is seeing is that the property of "Halting"
>>>>> can not be uniformly determined in Finite Time.
>>>>>
>>>>> That is all that I can get from his statement of:
>>>>>
>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot
>>>>> be formalised as a consistent specification.
>>>>>
>>>>> There certainly CAN be defined formal test that define Halting, the
>>>>> issue is that non-halting is defined by the non-existence of a
>>>>> number N for the number of steps needed to reach a final state.
>>>>>
>>>>> Some people just don't like the fact that it can be absolutely
>>>>> provable what the answer is (and thus unknowable), even if we know
>>>>> from the definition, that it must be one or the other.
>>>>>
>>>>> This leads us to a great divide in logics. The classical branch
>>>>> accepts that some truth is only established by infinite chains of
>>>>> connections, and thus can not be proven with a finite proof, and
>>>>> thus is unknowable.
>>>>>
>>>>> Others don't accept that, and require Truth to be only established
>>>>> by Finite chains. The problem then is, such logic system need to
>>>>> greatly limit the domain they attempt to cover, as otherwise you
>>>>> get into endless chains of asking if a question can be asked, at
>>>>> which point you need to ask if you can even ask about asking the
>>>>> questions. Only when the domain is restricted in a way that the
>>>>> answer MUST be determinable with finite work, can we break the cycle.
>>>>>
>>>>> For instance, if we limit ourselves to Finite State Machines (which
>>>>> could be Turing Machines with a fixed finite tape, or a classical
>>>>> program in a computer with limited memory) then we can be sure that
>>>>> the answer is determinable with a finite amount of work.
>>>>
>>>> Tarski did not understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer
>>>> thus cannot possibly be true or false. His ignorance got him so
>>>> confused
>>>> that he thought that he proved that True(L,x) cannot be defined because
>>>> True(Tarski_theory, LP) does not work.
>>>
>>> I'll ask one more time, exactly WHERE in the proof did he do this? He
>>> shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true
>>> statement, but not what you say.
>>
>> "He shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true."
>>
>> That is a perfect paraphrase of my position of what he said.
>>
>> Why this is nutty on his part requires you to understand a term
>> that is not in logic or math, it is only in philosophy of logic:
>> {truth bearer}.
>>
>
> You agree it's not in logic or math. Well he talked about logic and
> math, not philosophy. So you agree that in logic and math, the liar
> paradox is true?
>

I agree that it a ridiculously foolish thing to say.

The ignorance of logic and math does not derive any
sort of truth. It seems that most of your own whole
basis is that your ignorance some how derives truth.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/21/24 22:07, olcott wrote:
> On 1/21/2024 2:54 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 1/21/24 21:51, olcott wrote:
>>> On 1/21/2024 2:43 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 1/21/24 3:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 1/21/2024 2:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/21/24 2:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>>>>>>> for-
>>>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
>>>>>>> exist as
>>>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>>>>>> paradox.
>>>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>>>>>> Computer
>>>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>>>>>>> halting
>>>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think the problem he is seeing is that the property of "Halting"
>>>>>> can not be uniformly determined in Finite Time.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is all that I can get from his statement of:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot
>>>>>> be formalised as a consistent specification.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There certainly CAN be defined formal test that define Halting,
>>>>>> the issue is that non-halting is defined by the non-existence of a
>>>>>> number N for the number of steps needed to reach a final state.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Some people just don't like the fact that it can be absolutely
>>>>>> provable what the answer is (and thus unknowable), even if we know
>>>>>> from the definition, that it must be one or the other.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This leads us to a great divide in logics. The classical branch
>>>>>> accepts that some truth is only established by infinite chains of
>>>>>> connections, and thus can not be proven with a finite proof, and
>>>>>> thus is unknowable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Others don't accept that, and require Truth to be only established
>>>>>> by Finite chains. The problem then is, such logic system need to
>>>>>> greatly limit the domain they attempt to cover, as otherwise you
>>>>>> get into endless chains of asking if a question can be asked, at
>>>>>> which point you need to ask if you can even ask about asking the
>>>>>> questions. Only when the domain is restricted in a way that the
>>>>>> answer MUST be determinable with finite work, can we break the cycle.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For instance, if we limit ourselves to Finite State Machines
>>>>>> (which could be Turing Machines with a fixed finite tape, or a
>>>>>> classical program in a computer with limited memory) then we can
>>>>>> be sure that the answer is determinable with a finite amount of work.
>>>>>
>>>>> Tarski did not understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer
>>>>> thus cannot possibly be true or false. His ignorance got him so
>>>>> confused
>>>>> that he thought that he proved that True(L,x) cannot be defined
>>>>> because
>>>>> True(Tarski_theory, LP) does not work.
>>>>
>>>> I'll ask one more time, exactly WHERE in the proof did he do this?
>>>> He shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true
>>>> statement, but not what you say.
>>>
>>> "He shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true."
>>>
>>> That is a perfect paraphrase of my position of what he said.
>>>
>>> Why this is nutty on his part requires you to understand a term
>>> that is not in logic or math, it is only in philosophy of logic:
>>> {truth bearer}.
>>>
>>
>> You agree it's not in logic or math. Well he talked about logic and
>> math, not philosophy. So you agree that in logic and math, the liar
>> paradox is true?
>>
>
> I agree that it a ridiculously foolish thing to say.
>
> The ignorance of logic and math does not derive any
> sort of truth.

So math does not prove that 1+1=2?

On 1/21/2024 2:57 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/21/24 21:53, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/21/2024 2:43 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 1/21/24 3:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 1/21/2024 2:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 1/21/24 2:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be
>>>>>> for-
>>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
>>>>>> exist as
>>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>>>>> paradox.
>>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>>>>> Computer
>>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>>>>>> halting
>>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think the problem he is seeing is that the property of "Halting"
>>>>> can not be uniformly determined in Finite Time.
>>>>>
>>>>> That is all that I can get from his statement of:
>>>>>
>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot
>>>>> be formalised as a consistent specification.
>>>>>
>>>>> There certainly CAN be defined formal test that define Halting, the
>>>>> issue is that non-halting is defined by the non-existence of a
>>>>> number N for the number of steps needed to reach a final state.
>>>>>
>>>>> Some people just don't like the fact that it can be absolutely
>>>>> provable what the answer is (and thus unknowable), even if we know
>>>>> from the definition, that it must be one or the other.
>>>>>
>>>>> This leads us to a great divide in logics. The classical branch
>>>>> accepts that some truth is only established by infinite chains of
>>>>> connections, and thus can not be proven with a finite proof, and
>>>>> thus is unknowable.
>>>>>
>>>>> Others don't accept that, and require Truth to be only established
>>>>> by Finite chains. The problem then is, such logic system need to
>>>>> greatly limit the domain they attempt to cover, as otherwise you
>>>>> get into endless chains of asking if a question can be asked, at
>>>>> which point you need to ask if you can even ask about asking the
>>>>> questions. Only when the domain is restricted in a way that the
>>>>> answer MUST be determinable with finite work, can we break the cycle.
>>>>>
>>>>> For instance, if we limit ourselves to Finite State Machines (which
>>>>> could be Turing Machines with a fixed finite tape, or a classical
>>>>> program in a computer with limited memory) then we can be sure that
>>>>> the answer is determinable with a finite amount of work.
>>>>
>>>> Tarski did not understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer
>>>> thus cannot possibly be true or false. His ignorance got him so
>>>> confused
>>>> that he thought that he proved that True(L,x) cannot be defined because
>>>> True(Tarski_theory, LP) does not work.
>>>
>>> I'll ask one more time, exactly WHERE in the proof did he do this? He
>>> shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true
>>> statement, but not what you say.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Three computer science professors agree with this same reasoning when
>>>> it is applied to the halting problem computer-example input. I wrote
>>>> a paper unifying their views on this. I can't publish it on most
>>>> pre-print servers because academic journal will not accept any paper
>>>> that is published on the pre-print servers that I have access to.
>>>>
>>>
>>> So, why haven't you put it out to an actual peer-reviewed paper?
>>>
>>> Is it that you know they will reject it?
>>
>> It was rejected on the basis that the summary and unification
>> of the views of three computer science professors does not
>> include anything new.
>>
> Isn't solving the halting problem (by saying that a halting program
> doesn't halt) something new?

I was very careful to not add any new material to what these
three professors said, thus preventing a crank rejection.

They seemed to agree that the halting problem itself is incorrect.
That is certainly the case when one expects H to report on the
direct execution of D(D) and thus ignore the actual behavior
that it actually sees.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/21/24 22:04, olcott wrote:
> On 1/21/2024 2:48 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 1/21/24 20:54, olcott wrote:
>>> *Professor Stoddart doesn't say anything like this*
>>> You didn't read what he said you only guessed what he said.
>>>
>>
>> Professor Stoddart quite literally says it. His hidden variable is
>> called InS1. Did you read what he wrote? I think you are lying.
>>
>
> Good catch. That was part of his intermediate analysis
> and his conclusion does not reference anything like that.
>

If you are talking about section 5, he says that S (which is what he
calls D) does not exist.

Do you think that D does not exist?

There is a well-defined procedure to construct Turing machine D (or S).
What happens if we follow the procedure? Does our hand always get a
cramp, so that we can't write down D because it doesn't exist?

It is like saying that a blahrg is 4 squares next to each other, and a
blahrg does not exist. So what happens if I draw 4 squares next to each
other? Isn't that a blahrg?

On 1/21/2024 3:09 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/21/24 22:07, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/21/2024 2:54 PM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 1/21/24 21:51, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 1/21/2024 2:43 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 1/21/24 3:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 2:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 2:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but
>>>>>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>>> for-
>>>>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
>>>>>>>> exist as
>>>>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>>>>>>> paradox.
>>>>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>>>>>>> Computer
>>>>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>>>>>>>> halting
>>>>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think the problem he is seeing is that the property of
>>>>>>> "Halting" can not be uniformly determined in Finite Time.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That is all that I can get from his statement of:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot
>>>>>>> be formalised as a consistent specification.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There certainly CAN be defined formal test that define Halting,
>>>>>>> the issue is that non-halting is defined by the non-existence of
>>>>>>> a number N for the number of steps needed to reach a final state.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Some people just don't like the fact that it can be absolutely
>>>>>>> provable what the answer is (and thus unknowable), even if we
>>>>>>> know from the definition, that it must be one or the other.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This leads us to a great divide in logics. The classical branch
>>>>>>> accepts that some truth is only established by infinite chains of
>>>>>>> connections, and thus can not be proven with a finite proof, and
>>>>>>> thus is unknowable.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Others don't accept that, and require Truth to be only
>>>>>>> established by Finite chains. The problem then is, such logic
>>>>>>> system need to greatly limit the domain they attempt to cover, as
>>>>>>> otherwise you get into endless chains of asking if a question can
>>>>>>> be asked, at which point you need to ask if you can even ask
>>>>>>> about asking the questions. Only when the domain is restricted in
>>>>>>> a way that the answer MUST be determinable with finite work, can
>>>>>>> we break the cycle.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For instance, if we limit ourselves to Finite State Machines
>>>>>>> (which could be Turing Machines with a fixed finite tape, or a
>>>>>>> classical program in a computer with limited memory) then we can
>>>>>>> be sure that the answer is determinable with a finite amount of
>>>>>>> work.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Tarski did not understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer
>>>>>> thus cannot possibly be true or false. His ignorance got him so
>>>>>> confused
>>>>>> that he thought that he proved that True(L,x) cannot be defined
>>>>>> because
>>>>>> True(Tarski_theory, LP) does not work.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'll ask one more time, exactly WHERE in the proof did he do this?
>>>>> He shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true
>>>>> statement, but not what you say.
>>>>
>>>> "He shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true."
>>>>
>>>> That is a perfect paraphrase of my position of what he said.
>>>>
>>>> Why this is nutty on his part requires you to understand a term
>>>> that is not in logic or math, it is only in philosophy of logic:
>>>> {truth bearer}.
>>>>
>>>
>>> You agree it's not in logic or math. Well he talked about logic and
>>> math, not philosophy. So you agree that in logic and math, the liar
>>> paradox is true?
>>>
>>
>> I agree that it a ridiculously foolish thing to say.
>>
>> The ignorance of logic and math does not derive any
>> sort of truth.
>
> So math does not prove that 1+1=2?
>

Always with the strawman deception.
Do you want me to start calling you a liar?

If you don't want me to start calling you a liar
then quit using the strawman deception.

It was pointed out that logic and math are clueless
about the Liar Paradox.

By providing an example of what logic and math are
not clueless about as your rebuttal you switched to
the strawman deception. Please quit that !!!

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/21/24 22:11, olcott wrote:
>
> I was very careful to not add any new material to what these
> three professors said, thus preventing a crank rejection.

I see. You are right, that would not be material for a peer-reviewed
paper. They are expected to contain new knowledge that is not already
obvious to everyone in the field.

>
> They seemed to agree that the halting problem itself is incorrect.
> That is certainly the case when one expects H to report on the
> direct execution of D(D) and thus ignore the actual behavior
> that it actually sees.
>

If H used an ARM simulator instead of an x86 one, but the program was
still written for x86, and the first x86 instruction of D was (by
coincidence) the same as a return instruction in ARM, would the correct
return value be 1?

On 1/21/2024 3:13 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/21/24 22:04, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/21/2024 2:48 PM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 1/21/24 20:54, olcott wrote:
>>>> *Professor Stoddart doesn't say anything like this*
>>>> You didn't read what he said you only guessed what he said.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Professor Stoddart quite literally says it. His hidden variable is
>>> called InS1. Did you read what he wrote? I think you are lying.
>>>
>>
>> Good catch. That was part of his intermediate analysis
>> and his conclusion does not reference anything like that.
>>
>
> If you are talking about section 5, he says that S (which is what he
> calls D) does not exist.

*Read Stoddart's conclusion*
*Read Stoddart's conclusion*
*Read Stoddart's conclusion*
*Read Stoddart's conclusion*

I and wij are talking about the fact that three computer science
professors agree that the halting problem itself is wrong.

wij only referred to Stoddart's view, yet also quoted Professor
Hehner's agreement. This is two of the three.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/21/2024 3:18 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/21/24 22:11, olcott wrote:
>>
>> I was very careful to not add any new material to what these
>> three professors said, thus preventing a crank rejection.
>
> I see. You are right, that would not be material for a peer-reviewed
> paper. They are expected to contain new knowledge that is not already
> obvious to everyone in the field.

The fact that three computer science professor's
agree that the halting problem itself is incorrect
was new to these same computer science professors.

It is certainly not obvious to everyone in the field
that the halting problem itself is incorrect.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/21/24 22:15, olcott wrote:
> On 1/21/2024 3:09 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 1/21/24 22:07, olcott wrote:
>>> On 1/21/2024 2:54 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>> On 1/21/24 21:51, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 1/21/2024 2:43 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/21/24 3:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 2:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 2:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but
>>>>>>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>>>> for-
>>>>>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does
>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>> exist as
>>>>>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>>>>>>>> paradox.
>>>>>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>>>>>>>> Computer
>>>>>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>>>>>>>>> halting
>>>>>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think the problem he is seeing is that the property of
>>>>>>>> "Halting" can not be uniformly determined in Finite Time.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That is all that I can get from his statement of:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but
>>>>>>>> cannot be formalised as a consistent specification.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There certainly CAN be defined formal test that define Halting,
>>>>>>>> the issue is that non-halting is defined by the non-existence of
>>>>>>>> a number N for the number of steps needed to reach a final state.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Some people just don't like the fact that it can be absolutely
>>>>>>>> provable what the answer is (and thus unknowable), even if we
>>>>>>>> know from the definition, that it must be one or the other.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This leads us to a great divide in logics. The classical branch
>>>>>>>> accepts that some truth is only established by infinite chains
>>>>>>>> of connections, and thus can not be proven with a finite proof,
>>>>>>>> and thus is unknowable.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Others don't accept that, and require Truth to be only
>>>>>>>> established by Finite chains. The problem then is, such logic
>>>>>>>> system need to greatly limit the domain they attempt to cover,
>>>>>>>> as otherwise you get into endless chains of asking if a question
>>>>>>>> can be asked, at which point you need to ask if you can even ask
>>>>>>>> about asking the questions. Only when the domain is restricted
>>>>>>>> in a way that the answer MUST be determinable with finite work,
>>>>>>>> can we break the cycle.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> For instance, if we limit ourselves to Finite State Machines
>>>>>>>> (which could be Turing Machines with a fixed finite tape, or a
>>>>>>>> classical program in a computer with limited memory) then we can
>>>>>>>> be sure that the answer is determinable with a finite amount of
>>>>>>>> work.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Tarski did not understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth
>>>>>>> bearer
>>>>>>> thus cannot possibly be true or false. His ignorance got him so
>>>>>>> confused
>>>>>>> that he thought that he proved that True(L,x) cannot be defined
>>>>>>> because
>>>>>>> True(Tarski_theory, LP) does not work.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'll ask one more time, exactly WHERE in the proof did he do this?
>>>>>> He shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true
>>>>>> statement, but not what you say.
>>>>>
>>>>> "He shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true."
>>>>>
>>>>> That is a perfect paraphrase of my position of what he said.
>>>>>
>>>>> Why this is nutty on his part requires you to understand a term
>>>>> that is not in logic or math, it is only in philosophy of logic:
>>>>> {truth bearer}.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You agree it's not in logic or math. Well he talked about logic and
>>>> math, not philosophy. So you agree that in logic and math, the liar
>>>> paradox is true?
>>>>
>>>
>>> I agree that it a ridiculously foolish thing to say.
>>>
>>> The ignorance of logic and math does not derive any
>>> sort of truth.
>>
>> So math does not prove that 1+1=2?
>>
>
> Always with the strawman deception.
> Do you want me to start calling you a liar?
>
> If you don't want me to start calling you a liar
> then quit using the strawman deception.
>
> It was pointed out that logic and math are clueless
> about the Liar Paradox.

Didn't Tarski translate the Liar Paradox into logic and mathematics?

On 1/21/24 22:20, olcott wrote:
> On 1/21/2024 3:13 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 1/21/24 22:04, olcott wrote:
>>> On 1/21/2024 2:48 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>> On 1/21/24 20:54, olcott wrote:
>>>>> *Professor Stoddart doesn't say anything like this*
>>>>> You didn't read what he said you only guessed what he said.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Professor Stoddart quite literally says it. His hidden variable is
>>>> called InS1. Did you read what he wrote? I think you are lying.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Good catch. That was part of his intermediate analysis
>>> and his conclusion does not reference anything like that.
>>>
>>
>> If you are talking about section 5, he says that S (which is what he
>> calls D) does not exist.
>
> *Read Stoddart's conclusion*
> *Read Stoddart's conclusion*
> *Read Stoddart's conclusion*
> *Read Stoddart's conclusion*
>
> I and wij are talking about the fact that three computer science
> professors agree that the halting problem itself is wrong.
>
> wij only referred to Stoddart's view, yet also quoted Professor
> Hehner's agreement. This is two of the three.
>

You dishonestly ignored the question part of the post you replied to.

On 1/21/2024 3:46 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/21/24 22:15, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/21/2024 3:09 PM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 1/21/24 22:07, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 1/21/2024 2:54 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>> On 1/21/24 21:51, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 2:43 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 3:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 2:06 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 2:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>>>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but
>>>>>>>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>>>>> for-
>>>>>>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and
>>>>>>>>>> does not
>>>>>>>>>> exist as
>>>>>>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>>>>>>>>> paradox.
>>>>>>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>>>>>>>>> Computer
>>>>>>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> halting
>>>>>>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing
>>>>>>>>>> something?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I think the problem he is seeing is that the property of
>>>>>>>>> "Halting" can not be uniformly determined in Finite Time.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That is all that I can get from his statement of:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but
>>>>>>>>> cannot be formalised as a consistent specification.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There certainly CAN be defined formal test that define Halting,
>>>>>>>>> the issue is that non-halting is defined by the non-existence
>>>>>>>>> of a number N for the number of steps needed to reach a final
>>>>>>>>> state.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Some people just don't like the fact that it can be absolutely
>>>>>>>>> provable what the answer is (and thus unknowable), even if we
>>>>>>>>> know from the definition, that it must be one or the other.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This leads us to a great divide in logics. The classical branch
>>>>>>>>> accepts that some truth is only established by infinite chains
>>>>>>>>> of connections, and thus can not be proven with a finite proof,
>>>>>>>>> and thus is unknowable.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Others don't accept that, and require Truth to be only
>>>>>>>>> established by Finite chains. The problem then is, such logic
>>>>>>>>> system need to greatly limit the domain they attempt to cover,
>>>>>>>>> as otherwise you get into endless chains of asking if a
>>>>>>>>> question can be asked, at which point you need to ask if you
>>>>>>>>> can even ask about asking the questions. Only when the domain
>>>>>>>>> is restricted in a way that the answer MUST be determinable
>>>>>>>>> with finite work, can we break the cycle.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> For instance, if we limit ourselves to Finite State Machines
>>>>>>>>> (which could be Turing Machines with a fixed finite tape, or a
>>>>>>>>> classical program in a computer with limited memory) then we
>>>>>>>>> can be sure that the answer is determinable with a finite
>>>>>>>>> amount of work.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Tarski did not understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth
>>>>>>>> bearer
>>>>>>>> thus cannot possibly be true or false. His ignorance got him so
>>>>>>>> confused
>>>>>>>> that he thought that he proved that True(L,x) cannot be defined
>>>>>>>> because
>>>>>>>> True(Tarski_theory, LP) does not work.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'll ask one more time, exactly WHERE in the proof did he do
>>>>>>> this? He shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is
>>>>>>> a true statement, but not what you say.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "He shows that if True(L, x) exists that the Liar Paradox is a true."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is a perfect paraphrase of my position of what he said.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Why this is nutty on his part requires you to understand a term
>>>>>> that is not in logic or math, it is only in philosophy of logic:
>>>>>> {truth bearer}.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You agree it's not in logic or math. Well he talked about logic and
>>>>> math, not philosophy. So you agree that in logic and math, the liar
>>>>> paradox is true?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I agree that it a ridiculously foolish thing to say.
>>>>
>>>> The ignorance of logic and math does not derive any
>>>> sort of truth.
>>>
>>> So math does not prove that 1+1=2?
>>>
>>
>> Always with the strawman deception.
>> Do you want me to start calling you a liar?
>>
>> If you don't want me to start calling you a liar
>> then quit using the strawman deception.
>>
>> It was pointed out that logic and math are clueless
>> about the Liar Paradox.
>
> Didn't Tarski translate the Liar Paradox into logic and mathematics?
>

The key thing that Tarski missed is that expressions of language
that are not truth bearers cannot possibly have any truth value.
*This was his fatal mistake*

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer