I am merely using different notational conventions that are easier to
understand because they are more conventional. Linz uses Wm as the
finite string Turing machine description of some arbitrary machine M.

// *Linz Turing machine H --- M applied to w*
// --- Does M halt on w?
H.q0 Wm w ⊢* H.qy // M applied to w halts
H.q0 Wm w ⊢* H.qn // M applied to w does not halt

// *Linz Turing machine H --- M applied to w* (different encoding)
// --- Does M halt on w?
H.q0 ⟨M⟩ w ⊢* H.qy // M applied to w halts
H.q0 ⟨M⟩ w ⊢* H.qn // M applied to w does not halt

// *Linz Turing machine H --- M applied to* ⟨M⟩
// --- Does M halt on ⟨M⟩ ?
H.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* H.qy // M applied to ⟨M⟩ halts
H.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* H.qn // M applied to ⟨M⟩ does not halt

I am applying the Linz H' and Linz Ĥ in reverse order first transforming
H into Olcott Ȟ as the one parameter version of Linz H where a machine
is applied to its own Turing machine description.

embedded_H ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ means H.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ shown above.

// *Olcott Turing machine Ȟ --- Ȟ applied to* ⟨M⟩
// --- Does M halt on its own Turing Machine Description?
Ȟ.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qy // M applied to ⟨M⟩ halts
Ȟ.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qn // M applied to ⟨M⟩ does not halt

// *Olcott Turing machine Ȟ --- Ȟ applied to* ⟨Ȟ⟩
// --- Do you halt on your own Turing Machine Description?
Ȟ.q0 ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qy // Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩ halts
Ȟ.q0 ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qn // Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩ does not halt
Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩ simply correctly transitions to Ĥ.qy

Linz Turing machine Turing machine Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ is the self-
contradictory form of Olcott Turing machine Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩

// *Linz Turing machine Ĥ --- Ĥ applied to* ⟨Ĥ⟩
// --- Do you halt on your own Turing Machine Description?
Ĥ.q0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qy ∞ // Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ halts
Ĥ.q0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qn // Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ does not halt
Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ cannot correctly transition to Ĥ.qy or Ĥ.qn
because Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ is self contradictory.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/16/24 12:22 PM, olcott wrote:
> I am merely using different notational conventions that are easier to
> understand because they are more conventional. Linz uses Wm as the
> finite string Turing machine description of some arbitrary machine M.
>
> // *Linz Turing machine H --- M applied to w*
> // --- Does M halt on w?
> H.q0 Wm w ⊢* H.qy // M applied to w halts
> H.q0 Wm w ⊢* H.qn // M applied to w does not halt
>
> // *Linz Turing machine H --- M applied to w* (different encoding)
> // --- Does M halt on w?
> H.q0 ⟨M⟩ w ⊢* H.qy // M applied to w halts
> H.q0 ⟨M⟩ w ⊢* H.qn // M applied to w does not halt
>
> // *Linz Turing machine H --- M applied to* ⟨M⟩
> // --- Does M halt on ⟨M⟩ ?
> H.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* H.qy // M applied to ⟨M⟩ halts
> H.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* H.qn // M applied to ⟨M⟩ does not halt
>
> I am applying the Linz H' and Linz Ĥ in reverse order first transforming
> H into Olcott Ȟ as the one parameter version of Linz H where a machine
> is applied to its own Turing machine description.

Which is something you have never said before.

>
> embedded_H ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ means H.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ shown above.

And why can't you just say H.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ instead of embedded_H ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩?

Answer: Because you will try to make embedded_H do something that H
doesn't do.

>
> // *Olcott Turing machine  Ȟ --- Ȟ applied to* ⟨M⟩
> // --- Does M halt on its own Turing Machine Description?
> Ȟ.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qy     // M applied to ⟨M⟩ halts
> Ȟ.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qn    // M applied to ⟨M⟩ does not halt
>
> // *Olcott Turing machine  Ȟ --- Ȟ applied to* ⟨Ȟ⟩
> // --- Do you halt on your own Turing Machine Description?
> Ȟ.q0 ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qy     // Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩ halts
> Ȟ.q0 ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qn    // Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩ does not halt
> Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩ simply correctly transitions to  Ĥ.qy
>
> Linz Turing machine Turing machine Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ is the self-
> contradictory form of Olcott Turing machine Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩
>
> // *Linz Turing machine Ĥ --- Ĥ applied to* ⟨Ĥ⟩
> // --- Do you halt on your own Turing Machine Description?
> Ĥ.q0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qy ∞ // Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ halts
> Ĥ.q0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qn     // Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ does not
> halt
> Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ cannot correctly transition to  Ĥ.qy or Ĥ.qn
> because Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ is self contradictory.
>

Which means that no "correct" Ȟ can exist, not that the question is
invalid.

The QUESTION, does the machine described Halt or not, has a correct answer.

Thus, all you have proven, is the halting theorem, that no machine
exists that can give the answer

On 2/16/2024 11:39 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/16/24 12:22 PM, olcott wrote:
>> I am merely using different notational conventions that are easier to
>> understand because they are more conventional. Linz uses Wm as the
>> finite string Turing machine description of some arbitrary machine M.
>>
>> // *Linz Turing machine H --- M applied to w*
>> // --- Does M halt on w?
>> H.q0 Wm w ⊢* H.qy // M applied to w halts
>> H.q0 Wm w ⊢* H.qn // M applied to w does not halt
>>
>> // *Linz Turing machine H --- M applied to w* (different encoding)
>> // --- Does M halt on w?
>> H.q0 ⟨M⟩ w ⊢* H.qy // M applied to w halts
>> H.q0 ⟨M⟩ w ⊢* H.qn // M applied to w does not halt
>>
>> // *Linz Turing machine H --- M applied to* ⟨M⟩
>> // --- Does M halt on ⟨M⟩ ?
>> H.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* H.qy // M applied to ⟨M⟩ halts
>> H.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* H.qn // M applied to ⟨M⟩ does not halt
>>
>> I am applying the Linz H' and Linz Ĥ in reverse order first
>> transforming H into Olcott Ȟ as the one parameter version of Linz H
>> where a machine is applied to its own Turing machine description.
>
> Which is something you have never said before.
>
>>
>> embedded_H ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ means H.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ shown above.
>
> And why can't you just say H.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ instead of embedded_H ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩?
>

Ȟ:embedded_H is a state of Ȟ and reminds people what it is.
H.q0 is not a state of Ȟ and confuses people what it is.
Both are better than the Linz: Ĥq0 wM wM

> Answer: Because you will try to make embedded_H do something that H
> doesn't do.
>
>>
>> // *Olcott Turing machine  Ȟ --- Ȟ applied to* ⟨M⟩
>> // --- Does M halt on its own Turing Machine Description?
>> Ȟ.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qy     // M applied to ⟨M⟩ halts
>> Ȟ.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qn    // M applied to ⟨M⟩ does not
>> halt
>>
>> // *Olcott Turing machine  Ȟ --- Ȟ applied to* ⟨Ȟ⟩
>> // --- Do you halt on your own Turing Machine Description?
>> Ȟ.q0 ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qy     // Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩ halts
>> Ȟ.q0 ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qn    // Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩ does not
>> halt
>> Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩ simply correctly transitions to  Ĥ.qy
>>
>> Linz Turing machine Turing machine Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ is the self-
>> contradictory form of Olcott Turing machine Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩
>>
>> // *Linz Turing machine Ĥ --- Ĥ applied to* ⟨Ĥ⟩
>> // --- Do you halt on your own Turing Machine Description?
>> Ĥ.q0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qy ∞ // Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ halts
>> Ĥ.q0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qn     // Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ does
>> not halt
>> Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ cannot correctly transition to  Ĥ.qy or Ĥ.qn
>> because Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ is self contradictory.
>>
>
> Which means that no "correct" Ȟ can exist, not that the question is
> invalid.

Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
can exist that correctly answers this question:

Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?

It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
expressions.

Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
because there is no square-root of an actual banana.

ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
root of an actual banana.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/16/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/16/2024 11:39 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/16/24 12:22 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> I am merely using different notational conventions that are easier to
>>> understand because they are more conventional. Linz uses Wm as the
>>> finite string Turing machine description of some arbitrary machine M.
>>>
>>> // *Linz Turing machine H --- M applied to w*
>>> // --- Does M halt on w?
>>> H.q0 Wm w ⊢* H.qy // M applied to w halts
>>> H.q0 Wm w ⊢* H.qn // M applied to w does not halt
>>>
>>> // *Linz Turing machine H --- M applied to w* (different encoding)
>>> // --- Does M halt on w?
>>> H.q0 ⟨M⟩ w ⊢* H.qy // M applied to w halts
>>> H.q0 ⟨M⟩ w ⊢* H.qn // M applied to w does not halt
>>>
>>> // *Linz Turing machine H --- M applied to* ⟨M⟩
>>> // --- Does M halt on ⟨M⟩ ?
>>> H.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* H.qy // M applied to ⟨M⟩ halts
>>> H.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* H.qn // M applied to ⟨M⟩ does not halt
>>>
>>> I am applying the Linz H' and Linz Ĥ in reverse order first
>>> transforming H into Olcott Ȟ as the one parameter version of Linz H
>>> where a machine is applied to its own Turing machine description.
>>
>> Which is something you have never said before.
>>
>>>
>>> embedded_H ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ means H.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ shown above.
>>
>> And why can't you just say H.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ instead of embedded_H ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩?
>>
>
> Ȟ:embedded_H is a state of Ȟ and reminds people what it is.
> H.q0 is not a state of Ȟ and confuses people what it is.
> Both are better than the Linz: Ĥq0 wM wM

But H.q0 iS a state of Ȟ since it included its own copy of H in it.

Youy don't seem to understand the DEFINITION of a program, it includes
ALL the algorithm that is part of it. The "sub-machines" are still part
of it.

Ȟ isn't just a "template" that uses things not part of it, it is an
actual program that has pulled in that code into it.

>
>> Answer: Because you will try to make embedded_H do something that H
>> doesn't do.
>>
>>>
>>> // *Olcott Turing machine  Ȟ --- Ȟ applied to* ⟨M⟩
>>> // --- Does M halt on its own Turing Machine Description?
>>> Ȟ.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qy     // M applied to ⟨M⟩ halts
>>> Ȟ.q0 ⟨M⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨M⟩ ⟨M⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qn    // M applied to ⟨M⟩ does
>>> not halt
>>>
>>> // *Olcott Turing machine  Ȟ --- Ȟ applied to* ⟨Ȟ⟩
>>> // --- Do you halt on your own Turing Machine Description?
>>> Ȟ.q0 ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qy     // Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩ halts
>>> Ȟ.q0 ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⟨Ȟ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qn    // Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩ does
>>> not halt
>>> Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩ simply correctly transitions to  Ĥ.qy
>>>
>>> Linz Turing machine Turing machine Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ is the self-
>>> contradictory form of Olcott Turing machine Ȟ applied to ⟨Ȟ⟩
>>>
>>> // *Linz Turing machine Ĥ --- Ĥ applied to* ⟨Ĥ⟩
>>> // --- Do you halt on your own Turing Machine Description?
>>> Ĥ.q0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qy ∞ // Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ halts
>>> Ĥ.q0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* embedded_H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.qn     // Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ does
>>> not halt
>>> Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ cannot correctly transition to  Ĥ.qy or Ĥ.qn
>>> because Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ is self contradictory.
>>>
>>
>> Which means that no "correct" Ȟ can exist, not that the question is
>> invalid.
>
> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>
> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>
> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
> expressions.
>
> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>
> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
> root of an actual banana.
>

Except you can't show where they actually do what you claim, because you
are just too ignorant of the logic they are using.

You see words in isolation, and don't understand their context, which
actually proves your assertions to be wrong.

On 16/02/24 18:22, olcott wrote:
> [the exact same thing as before but written with mathematical symbols because everything that is written with mathematical symbols is correct]

In your x86utm version of the problem, the reason it cannot correctly
transition to qy is because it isn't programmed to do that transition.
The reason it can't correctly transition to qn is because that
transition is incorrect since the input halts.

On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>
> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>
> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?

He is correct. It can't.

>
> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
> expressions.

So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question, or
is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?

>
> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.

no

>
> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
> root of an actual banana.
>

The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You are
invited to find some domains where the halting problem is solvable.

On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>
>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>
>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>
> He is correct. It can't.
>
>>
>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>> expressions.
>
> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question, or
> is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>
>>
>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>
> no
>
>>
>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>> root of an actual banana.
>>
>
> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You are
> invited to find some domains where the halting problem is solvable.

Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
you will continue to babble on with your false assumption
that I must be incorrect.

That I am correct about Tarski established my credibility.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/16/24 8:13 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>
>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>
>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>
>> He is correct. It can't.
>>
>>>
>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>> expressions.
>>
>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question, or
>> is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>
>>>
>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>
>> no
>>
>>>
>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>
>>
>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You are
>> invited to find some domains where the halting problem is solvable.
>
> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
> you will continue to babble on with your false assumption
> that I must be incorrect.
>
> That I am correct about Tarski established my credibility.
>

That you misstate what Tarski said, prove your non-credibility.

On 17/02/24 02:13, olcott wrote:
> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>
>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>
>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>
>> He is correct. It can't.
>>
>>>
>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>> expressions.
>>
>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question, or
>> is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>
>>>
>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>
>> no
>>
>>>
>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>
>>
>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You are
>> invited to find some domains where the halting problem is solvable.
>
> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect

You dishonestly avoided the question. I repeat the question: Can a truth
predicate exist that correctly answers the question, or is Tarski
correct to say it can't exist?

On 2/16/2024 7:20 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/16/24 8:13 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>
>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>
>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>> expressions.
>>>
>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question,
>>> or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>
>>> no
>>>
>>>>
>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You are
>>> invited to find some domains where the halting problem is solvable.
>>
>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>> you will continue to babble on with your false assumption
>> that I must be incorrect.
>>
>> That I am correct about Tarski established my credibility.
>>
>
> That you misstate what Tarski said, prove your non-credibility.

You assume that I must be misstating Tarski on the basis
that I say that he is wrong and you assume that I am wrong.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/16/2024 7:31 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 17/02/24 02:13, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>
>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>
>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>> expressions.
>>>
>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question,
>>> or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>
>>> no
>>>
>>>>
>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You are
>>> invited to find some domains where the halting problem is solvable.
>>
>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>
> You dishonestly avoided the question. I repeat the question: Can a truth
> predicate exist that correctly answers the question, or is Tarski
> correct to say it can't exist?

A truth predicate exists in the domain of truth bearers.
Tarski was too stupid to understand this.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 17/02/24 03:38, olcott wrote:
> On 2/16/2024 7:31 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 17/02/24 02:13, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>>
>>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>>
>>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>>> expressions.
>>>>
>>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question,
>>>> or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>>
>>>> no
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You are
>>>> invited to find some domains where the halting problem is solvable.
>>>
>>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>>
>> You dishonestly avoided the question. I repeat the question: Can a
>> truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question, or is
>> Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>
> A truth predicate exists in the domain of truth bearers.
> Tarski was too stupid to understand this.
>

Can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question?

On 17/02/24 03:38, olcott wrote:
> On 2/16/2024 7:31 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 17/02/24 02:13, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>>
>>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>>
>>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>>> expressions.
>>>>
>>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question,
>>>> or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>>
>>>> no
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You are
>>>> invited to find some domains where the halting problem is solvable.
>>>
>>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>>
>> You dishonestly avoided the question. I repeat the question: Can a
>> truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question, or is
>> Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>
> A truth predicate exists in the domain of truth bearers.
> Tarski was too stupid to understand this.
>

There is a very simple answer to "Can a calculator exist that can
square-root a banana?" so why is it so hard for you to answer "Can a
truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question?"?

On 2/16/2024 8:46 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 17/02/24 03:38, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/16/2024 7:31 PM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 17/02/24 02:13, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>>>
>>>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>>>> expressions.
>>>>>
>>>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question,
>>>>> or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>>>
>>>>> no
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You are
>>>>> invited to find some domains where the halting problem is solvable.
>>>>
>>>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>>>
>>> You dishonestly avoided the question. I repeat the question: Can a
>>> truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question, or is
>>> Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>
>> A truth predicate exists in the domain of truth bearers.
>> Tarski was too stupid to understand this.
>>
>
> Can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question?

You are just playing head games.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/16/24 9:36 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/16/2024 7:20 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/16/24 8:13 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>>
>>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>>
>>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>>> expressions.
>>>>
>>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question,
>>>> or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>>
>>>> no
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You are
>>>> invited to find some domains where the halting problem is solvable.
>>>
>>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>>> you will continue to babble on with your false assumption
>>> that I must be incorrect.
>>>
>>> That I am correct about Tarski established my credibility.
>>>
>>
>> That you misstate what Tarski said, prove your non-credibility.
>
> You assume that I must be misstating Tarski on the basis
> that I say that he is wrong and you assume that I am wrong.
>
>

No, because you can't point out where he makes his assumption, but keep
on pointing at CONCLUSIONS.

On 2/16/24 9:38 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/16/2024 7:31 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 17/02/24 02:13, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>>
>>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>>
>>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>>> expressions.
>>>>
>>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question,
>>>> or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>>
>>>> no
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You are
>>>> invited to find some domains where the halting problem is solvable.
>>>
>>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>>
>> You dishonestly avoided the question. I repeat the question: Can a
>> truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question, or is
>> Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>
> A truth predicate exists in the domain of truth bearers.
> Tarski was too stupid to understand this.
>

How do you know that a COMPUTABLE truth predicate exists?

You don't understand what computable means, because YOU are the one that
is too stupid.

It seems you don't understand his meaning for a "Definition of Truth",
which is just par for the course with you.

For someone who likes to base things on "the meaning of the words" you
do aweful bad with knowing the applicable "meaning of the words".

(In part because you don't understand how term-of-art definitions work.

On 2/16/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/16/24 9:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/16/2024 7:20 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 2/16/24 8:13 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>>>
>>>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>>>> expressions.
>>>>>
>>>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question,
>>>>> or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>>>
>>>>> no
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You are
>>>>> invited to find some domains where the halting problem is solvable.
>>>>
>>>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>>>> you will continue to babble on with your false assumption
>>>> that I must be incorrect.
>>>>
>>>> That I am correct about Tarski established my credibility.
>>>>
>>>
>>> That you misstate what Tarski said, prove your non-credibility.
>>
>> You assume that I must be misstating Tarski on the basis
>> that I say that he is wrong and you assume that I am wrong.
>>
>>
>
> No, because you can't point out where he makes his assumption, but keep
> on pointing at CONCLUSIONS.

You too are only playing head games.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/16/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/16/24 9:38 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/16/2024 7:31 PM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 17/02/24 02:13, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>>>
>>>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>>>> expressions.
>>>>>
>>>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question,
>>>>> or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>>>
>>>>> no
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You are
>>>>> invited to find some domains where the halting problem is solvable.
>>>>
>>>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>>>
>>> You dishonestly avoided the question. I repeat the question: Can a
>>> truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question, or is
>>> Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>
>> A truth predicate exists in the domain of truth bearers.
>> Tarski was too stupid to understand this.
>>
>
> How do you know that a COMPUTABLE truth predicate exists?

I can see the details of how this all works.
You have already agreed to these details.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/16/24 10:19 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/16/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/16/24 9:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/16/2024 7:20 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 2/16/24 8:13 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>>>>> expressions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the
>>>>>> question, or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> no
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You
>>>>>> are invited to find some domains where the halting problem is
>>>>>> solvable.
>>>>>
>>>>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>>>>> you will continue to babble on with your false assumption
>>>>> that I must be incorrect.
>>>>>
>>>>> That I am correct about Tarski established my credibility.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That you misstate what Tarski said, prove your non-credibility.
>>>
>>> You assume that I must be misstating Tarski on the basis
>>> that I say that he is wrong and you assume that I am wrong.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> No, because you can't point out where he makes his assumption, but
>> keep on pointing at CONCLUSIONS.
>
> You too are only playing head games.
>

Says the person who can't actually prove anything they say.

You are continue to prove your stupidity, and your failure to show the
requested evidence just proves it. If you had ANY grounds for you
claims, you could provide it, instead, you base you logic on unfounded
assumptions and baseless claims.

Then you have the gaul to claim your goal it to make it impossible to
make baseless claims.

On 2/16/24 10:24 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/16/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/16/24 9:38 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/16/2024 7:31 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>> On 17/02/24 02:13, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>>>>> expressions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the
>>>>>> question, or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> no
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You
>>>>>> are invited to find some domains where the halting problem is
>>>>>> solvable.
>>>>>
>>>>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>>>>
>>>> You dishonestly avoided the question. I repeat the question: Can a
>>>> truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question, or is
>>>> Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>
>>> A truth predicate exists in the domain of truth bearers.
>>> Tarski was too stupid to understand this.
>>>
>>
>> How do you know that a COMPUTABLE truth predicate exists?
>
> I can see the details of how this all works.
> You have already agreed to these details.
>

WHERE?

You are just blowing smoke out of your ass.

You have shown that you just don't have the understanding of this sort
of material, after all, you have claimed that ENGLISH is a formal logic
system, which just shows how ignorant you are of what things actually mean.

On 2/16/2024 9:33 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/16/24 10:24 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/16/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 2/16/24 9:38 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 2/16/2024 7:31 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>> On 17/02/24 02:13, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>>>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>>>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>>>>>> expressions.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the
>>>>>>> question, or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>>>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>>>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>>>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You
>>>>>>> are invited to find some domains where the halting problem is
>>>>>>> solvable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>>>>>
>>>>> You dishonestly avoided the question. I repeat the question: Can a
>>>>> truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question, or is
>>>>> Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>
>>>> A truth predicate exists in the domain of truth bearers.
>>>> Tarski was too stupid to understand this.
>>>>
>>>
>>> How do you know that a COMPUTABLE truth predicate exists?
>>
>> I can see the details of how this all works.
>> You have already agreed to these details.
>>
>
>
> WHERE?
>
> You are just blowing smoke out of your ass.
>
> You have shown that you just don't have the understanding of this sort
> of material, after all, you have claimed that ENGLISH is a formal logic
> system, which just shows how ignorant you are of what things actually mean.

The only reason that any analytic expression of language
is true is that it is semantically linked through a finite
or infinite sequence of steps to the semantic meanings that
make it true.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/16/24 10:41 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/16/2024 9:33 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/16/24 10:24 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/16/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 2/16/24 9:38 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 2/16/2024 7:31 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>> On 17/02/24 02:13, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>>>>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>>>>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>>>>>>> expressions.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the
>>>>>>>> question, or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>>>>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>>>>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>>>>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You
>>>>>>>> are invited to find some domains where the halting problem is
>>>>>>>> solvable.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You dishonestly avoided the question. I repeat the question: Can a
>>>>>> truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question, or is
>>>>>> Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>>
>>>>> A truth predicate exists in the domain of truth bearers.
>>>>> Tarski was too stupid to understand this.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> How do you know that a COMPUTABLE truth predicate exists?
>>>
>>> I can see the details of how this all works.
>>> You have already agreed to these details.
>>>
>>
>>
>> WHERE?
>>
>> You are just blowing smoke out of your ass.
>>
>> You have shown that you just don't have the understanding of this sort
>> of material, after all, you have claimed that ENGLISH is a formal
>> logic system, which just shows how ignorant you are of what things
>> actually mean.
>
> The only reason that any analytic expression of language
> is true is that it is semantically linked through a finite
> or infinite sequence of steps to the semantic meanings that
> make it true.
>

And determining if such string of steps exists is not computable.

This is especially obvious if the chain of links is infinite, as you
can't step through the infinite chain in the required finite number of
steps and be computable.

So, it is clear that you don't understand something about this.

On 17/02/24 04:19, olcott wrote:
> On 2/16/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/16/24 9:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/16/2024 7:20 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 2/16/24 8:13 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>>>>> expressions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the
>>>>>> question, or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> no
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You
>>>>>> are invited to find some domains where the halting problem is
>>>>>> solvable.
>>>>>
>>>>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>>>>> you will continue to babble on with your false assumption
>>>>> that I must be incorrect.
>>>>>
>>>>> That I am correct about Tarski established my credibility.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That you misstate what Tarski said, prove your non-credibility.
>>>
>>> You assume that I must be misstating Tarski on the basis
>>> that I say that he is wrong and you assume that I am wrong.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> No, because you can't point out where he makes his assumption, but
>> keep on pointing at CONCLUSIONS.
>
> You too are only playing head games.
>
He is right. You have not pointed to any actual mistake. You have only
said you don't like the result.

On 17/02/24 03:49, olcott wrote:
> On 2/16/2024 8:46 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 17/02/24 03:38, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/16/2024 7:31 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>> On 17/02/24 02:13, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>>>>> expressions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the
>>>>>> question, or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> no
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You
>>>>>> are invited to find some domains where the halting problem is
>>>>>> solvable.
>>>>>
>>>>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>>>>
>>>> You dishonestly avoided the question. I repeat the question: Can a
>>>> truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question, or is
>>>> Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>
>>> A truth predicate exists in the domain of truth bearers.
>>> Tarski was too stupid to understand this.
>>>
>>
>> Can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question?
>
> You are just playing head games.

Can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the question?

On 2/16/24 11:00 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 17/02/24 04:19, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/16/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 2/16/24 9:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 2/16/2024 7:20 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 2/16/24 8:13 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/16/2024 7:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>> On 16/02/24 19:26, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Likewise Tarski concluded that no truth predicate
>>>>>>>> can exist that correctly answers this question:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Is this sentence: "this sentence is not true" true or false?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> He is correct. It can't.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It never occurred to Tarski or Gödel that the domain of truth
>>>>>>>> predicates and formal proofs does not include self-contradictory
>>>>>>>> expressions.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So can a truth predicate exist that correctly answers the
>>>>>>> question, or is Tarski correct to say it can't exist?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Using this same reasoning we can say math is incomplete
>>>>>>>> because there is no square-root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ONLY when we restrict the domain of math functions to numbers
>>>>>>>> can we understand that there is not supposed to be any square
>>>>>>>> root of an actual banana.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The halting problem is solvable on some restricted domains. You
>>>>>>> are invited to find some domains where the halting problem is
>>>>>>> solvable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Until you understand how and why Tarski is incorrect
>>>>>> you will continue to babble on with your false assumption
>>>>>> that I must be incorrect.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That I am correct about Tarski established my credibility.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That you misstate what Tarski said, prove your non-credibility.
>>>>
>>>> You assume that I must be misstating Tarski on the basis
>>>> that I say that he is wrong and you assume that I am wrong.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> No, because you can't point out where he makes his assumption, but
>>> keep on pointing at CONCLUSIONS.
>>
>> You too are only playing head games.
>>
> He is right. You have not pointed to any actual mistake. You have only
> said you don't like the result.

I have pointed out that he can't point out the mistakd he claims.

HE claims that Tarski and Godel make incorrect statements, but can't
actually point out where they make them.

For Tarski, he points to a conclusion that is made from previous parts
of the proof, and tries to say that the statement is non-sense, but
can't show any actual error in the logic that got him there.

For Godel, Godel makes an off-hand comment that the proof could be
extended by using the form of other epistemological antinomies which PO
assumes means that the truth of such an statement is critical to the
proof. When asked to show where he actually did that, he can't.

Thus, Peter's claim is the equivalent to Russel's teapot, that because
the teapot exists, they must be wrong, but he can't actually show that
the statements that would make them wrong actually exist in the proof.