On 4/20/24 2:05 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/19/2024 6:20 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 4/19/24 2:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 4/18/24 9:11 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/18/2024 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/18/24 10:50 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/17/24 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Nope.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Just more of your LIES and STUPIDITY.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But that ISN'T the definition of "Incomplete", so you are just
>>>>>>>> LYING.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Godel showed that a statment, THAT WAS TRUE, couldn't be proven
>>>>>>>> in F.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You don't even seem to understand what the statement G actually
>>>>>>>> is, because all you look at are the "clift notes" versions, and
>>>>>>>> don't even understand that.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Remember, G is a statement about the non-existance of a number
>>>>>>>> that has a specific property. Until you understand that, your
>>>>>>>> continued talking about this is just more LIES and DECIET,
>>>>>>>> proving your absoulute STUPIDITY.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as
>>>>>>>>> the primary
>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Right, and if you don't know what the proposition is that you
>>>>>>>> are arguing about, you are just proven to be a stupid liar.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If you are going to continue to be mean and call me names I will
>>>>>>> stop
>>>>>>> talking to you. Even if you stop being mean and stop calling me
>>>>>>> names
>>>>>>> if you continue to dogmatically say that I am wrong without pointing
>>>>>>> out all of the details of my error, I will stop talking to you.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is either a civil debate and an honest dialogue or you will
>>>>>>> hear nothing form me.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I say you are WRONG, because you ARE.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You say Godel's statement that is unprovable, is unprovable
>>>>>> because it is an epistimalogical antinomy, when it isn't.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is a statement about the non-existance of a number that
>>>>>> satisfies a particular property, which will be a truth bearing
>>>>>> statement (The number must either exist or it doesn't)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> THAT MAKES YOU A LIAR.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
>>>>> *That is NOT how undecidability generically works and you know it*
>>>>
>>>> Well, Godel wasn't talking about "undecidability", but
>>>> incompletenwss, which is what the WORDS you used talked about. (Read
>>>> what you said above).
>>>>
>>>> INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements
>>>> that are true.
>>>
>>> *That is an excellent and correct foundation for what I am saying*
>>>
>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>
>> IF you want to work with a Three Value logic system, then DO SO.
>>
>> But, remember, once you make you system 3-values, you immediately
>> loose the ability to reference to anything proved in the classical
>> two-value
>>
>>>
>>> Then "This sentence is not true" has the semantic value of {Nonsense}
>>> This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" has the semantic
>>> value of {True}.
>>>
>>> Although it may be difficult to understand that is exactly the
>>> difference between Tarski's "theory" and "metatheory" simplified
>>> as much as possible.
>>
>> And, once you add that third value to logic, you can't USE Tarski, or
>> even talk about what he did, as it is OUTSIDE your frame of logic.
>>
>
> For teaching purposes it is easier to think of it as
> a third semantic value. In actuality it would be
> rejected as invalid input.
>

So make up your mind!!!

The problem is that the DEFINITION of a Halt Decider, or a Truth
Predicate is that NO INPUT is "invalid". For a Halt Decider, IT IS
DEFINED that if the input doesn't represent a Halting Computation, the
answer is NO, and for a Truth Predicate, if the statement is not True,
then the Truth Predicate says No, be it a false statement, or a
statement that is not a Truth Bearer.

Thus there is not option to "reject".

>>>
>>> This is Tarski's Liar Paradox basis
>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
>>>
>>> That he refers to in this paragraph of his actual proof
>>>    "In accordance with the first part of Th. I we can obtain
>>>     the negation of one of the sentences in condition (α) of
>>>     convention T of § 3 as a consequence of the definition of
>>>     the symbol 'Pr' (provided we replace 'Tr' in this convention
>>>     by 'Pr')." https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>>
>>> Allows his original formalized Liar Paradox:
>>>
>>> x ∉ True if and only if p
>>> where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x
>>
>> Right, He shows that this statement is EXPRESSABLE in the meta-theory
>> (something I don't think you understand)
>>
>
> I do. I understand it better than most.
> This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true.

On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>
> Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that
> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>

I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device. Whenever an
expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical operations. It
is basically invalid input.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/20/24 11:20 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>
>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>
>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that
>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>
>
> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device. Whenever an
> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical operations. It
> is basically invalid input.
>

In other words, you admit that you are being inconsistant about what you
are saying, because your whole logic system is just inconsistant.

You don't seem to understand that predicates, DEFINED to be able to work
on ALL memebers of the input domain, must IN FACT, work on all members
of that domain.

For a Halt Decider, that means the decider needs to be able to answer
about ANY machine given to it as an input, even a machine that uses a
copy of the decider and acts contrary to its answer.

If you are going to work on a different problem, you need to be honest
about that and not LIE and say you are working on the Halting Problem.

And, if you are going to talk about a "Truth Predicate", which is
defined to be able to take ANY "statement" and say if it is True or not,
with "nonsense" statements (be they self-contradictory statements, or
just nonsense) being just not-true.

ANY statement means any statement, so if we define this predicate as
True(F, x) to be true if x is a statement that is true in the field F,
then we need to be able to give this predicate the statemet:

In F de define s as NOT True(F, s)

If you claim that your logic is ACTUALLY "two-valued" then if True(F,s)
returns false, because s is a statement without a truth value, then we
have the problem that the definition of s now says that s has the value
of NOT false, which is True.

So, the True predicate was WRONG, as True of a statement that IS true,
must be true.

If True(F,s) is true, then we have that s is not defined as NOT true,
which is false, so the True predicate is again WRONG.

The predicate isn't ALLOWED to say "I reject this input" as that isn't a
truth value (since you claimed you are actually useing a two-valued
logic) and this predicate is defined to ALWAYS return a truth value.

So, it seems you have a two-valued logic system with three logical values.

Which is just A LIE!

You are just proving you are too stupid to understand what you are
talking about as you don't understand the meaning of the words you are
using, as you just studied the system by Zero order principles.

On 4/20/2024 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-04-19 02:25:48 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>
>>> Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
>>> undecidability,
>>
>> *Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
>>
>> https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
>
> On questions whether Gödel said something or not the sumpreme authority
> is not Mendelson but Gödel.
>

When some authors affirm that undecidability and incompleteness
are the exact same thing then whenever Gödel uses the term
incompleteness then he is also referring to the term undecidability.

It is common knowledge the undecidability derives incompleteness
or undecidability is incompleteness. I already posted a bunch of
links that show this.

On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements that
> are true.

Here is where Mendelson agrees with that:

An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K B and
not-⊢K ¬B.

On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements that
> are true.

*Here is where Mendelson agrees with that*

An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K ℬ and
not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/20/24 12:37 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/20/2024 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-04-19 02:25:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>
>>> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>
>>>> Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
>>>> undecidability,
>>>
>>> *Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
>>>
>>> https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
>>
>> On questions whether Gödel said something or not the sumpreme authority
>> is not Mendelson but Gödel.
>>
>
> When some authors affirm that undecidability and incompleteness
> are the exact same thing then whenever Gödel uses the term
> incompleteness then he is also referring to the term undecidability.

Nope. And the key is that they are NOT "the exact same thing" but are
interrelated and one proves the other.

>
> It is common knowledge the undecidability derives incompleteness
> or undecidability is incompleteness. I already posted a bunch of
> links that show this.

Right, the theories intertwine and either can prove the other.

That doesn't make them "the same thing".

>
> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> > INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements that
> > are true.
>
> Here is where Mendelson agrees with that:
>
> An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
> neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K B and
> not-⊢K ¬B.
>
> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> > INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements that
> > are true.
>
> *Here is where Mendelson agrees with that*
>
> An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
> neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K ℬ and
> not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)
>
>

On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>> similar
>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>
>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it
>>>>> <is>
>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>
>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>> false.
>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and
>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>
>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a
>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>> primary
>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" then
>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>> truth".
>>>>
>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>
>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe,
>>>> temporal.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>
>>>
>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>
>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>
>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>> truth.
>>>
>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>
>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>
>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>
>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>
>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>
>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>> though.
>>>>
>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>
>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>> all their applications they've held up.
>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>
>>
>
> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
> the scope to every natural language expression.
>
> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
> possibly be false.
>
> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the nature
> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>
>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>
>> Which is not all of them.
>>
>>
>

Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
not a vulgar one".

It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.

Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.

Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.

Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
account of their concrete models, their abstract models.

Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.

The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.

The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.

Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.

Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
basically that space is infinite and words finite,
there's though a space of words and words of space.

Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
theory, at all.

So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.

The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.

On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>> similar
>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it
>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and
>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a
>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>> then
>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>> truth".
>>>>>
>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>
>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe,
>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>
>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>
>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>> truth.
>>>>
>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>
>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>
>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>
>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>
>>>>> One good theory.  (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>
>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>> though.
>>>>>
>>>>> "Bigger:  not always worse."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>
>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>
>>>
>>
>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>
>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
>> possibly be false.
>>
>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the nature
>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>
>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>
>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>
>>>
>>
>
> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
> not a vulgar one".
>
> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>
> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>

A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
{true on the basis of meaning}.

We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.

>
> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>
> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>
> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>
> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>
> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>
> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>
>
> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>
> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
> theory, at all.
>
> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>
> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>
>

On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it
>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and
>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>>> then
>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe,
>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>
>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>
>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>> truth.
>>>>>
>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>
>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>
>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>
>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>
>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
>>> possibly be false.
>>>
>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the nature
>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>
>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>
>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>> not a vulgar one".
>>
>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>
>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>
>
> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>
> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>
>>
>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>
>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>
>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>
>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>
>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>
>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>
>>
>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>
>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>> theory, at all.
>>
>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>
>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>
>>
>
> A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>
> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>

On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it
>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and
>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>>> then
>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe,
>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>
>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>
>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>> truth.
>>>>>
>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>
>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>
>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>
>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>
>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
>>> possibly be false.
>>>
>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the nature
>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>
>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>
>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>> not a vulgar one".
>>
>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>
>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>
>
> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>
> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>
>>
>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>
>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>
>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>
>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>
>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>
>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>
>>
>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>
>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>> theory, at all.
>>
>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>
>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>
>>
>
> A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>
> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>

On 04/20/2024 08:41 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it
>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>
>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>
>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>
>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>> nature
>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>
>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>
>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>
>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>
>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>
>>
>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>
>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>
>>>
>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>
>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>
>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>
>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>
>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>
>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>
>>>
>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>
>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>> theory, at all.
>>>
>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>
>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>
>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>
>
> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
> it's not quasi-modal?
>
> You proved to yourself.
>
> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not invincible.
>
>
> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>
> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>
> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>
>
> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
> objectivity.
>
> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
> in some places.
>
>
> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>
>
> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
> a sort of Objectivism.
>
> What's above is as what is below,
> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>
>
>
>

On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it
>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One good theory.  (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Bigger:  not always worse."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>
>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>
>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>
>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>> nature
>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>
>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>
>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>
>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>
>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>
>>
>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>
>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>
>>>
>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>
>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>
>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>
>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>
>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>
>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>
>>>
>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>
>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>> theory, at all.
>>>
>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>
>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>
>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>
>
> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
> it's not quasi-modal?
>
> You proved to yourself.
>

On 4/21/24 1:47 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> One good theory.  (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "Bigger:  not always worse."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>
>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>
>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>>> nature
>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>
>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>
>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>
>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>
>>>
>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>
>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>
>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>
>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>
>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>
>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>
>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>
>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>
>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>
>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>>> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>
>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>
>>
>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>
>> You proved to yourself.
>>
>
> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen floor
> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on
> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.

On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>
>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>
>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>>> nature
>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>
>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>
>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>
>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>
>>>
>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>
>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>
>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>
>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>
>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>
>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>
>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>
>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>
>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>
>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>>> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>
>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>
>>
>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>
>> You proved to yourself.
>>
>
> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen floor
> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on
> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>
>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not invincible.
>>
>
>
> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
> not fifteen story office buildings.
>
>>
>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>
>
> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>
>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>
>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>
>>
>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>> objectivity.
>>
>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
>> in some places.
>>
> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>
>>
>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>
> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
> natural language would be tree walks.
>
>>
>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>
>> What's above is as what is below,
>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>

On 4/21/2024 2:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-04-20 16:37:27 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 4/20/2024 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-04-19 02:25:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>
>>>>> Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
>>>>> undecidability,
>>>>
>>>> *Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
>>>>
>>>> https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
>>>
>>> On questions whether Gödel said something or not the sumpreme authority
>>> is not Mendelson but Gödel.
>>>
>>
>> When some authors affirm that undecidability and incompleteness
>> are the exact same thing then whenever Gödel uses the term
>> incompleteness then he is also referring to the term undecidability.
>
> That does not follow. Besides, a reference to the term "undecidability"
> is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
>

In other words you deny the identity principle thus X=X is false.

An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K ℬ and
not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)

Incomplete(F) ≡ ∃x ∈ L ((L ⊬ x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x))

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/21/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>
>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that
>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>
>>
>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device. Whenever an
>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical operations. It
>> is basically invalid input.
>
> You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills. Therefore you
> don't need any teaching device.
>

That is too close to ad homimen.
If you think my reasoning is incorrect then point to the error
in my reasoning. Saying that in your opinion I am a bad teacher
is too close to ad hominem because it refers to your opinion of
me and utterly bypasses any of my reasoning.

> As you make the syntax of your language dependent on semantics
> you lose one of the greatest advantage of formal languages:
> the simplicity of determination whether a string is a well formed
> formula.
>

Not at all. By combining them together we can simultaneously determine
syntactic and semantic correctness. By keeping them separate we have
misconstrued expressions that are not even propositions as propositions
that prove incompleteness and undecidability.

A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary
bearer of truth or falsity. Propositions are also often characterized as
being the kind of thing that declarative sentences denote.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> One good theory.  (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> "Bigger:  not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of
>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that
>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>>>> nature
>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>
>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>>
>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines
>>>> the
>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>
>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>
>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>
>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>
>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>>
>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>
>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>
>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>
>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>
>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>>>> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>
>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>
>>>
>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>
>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>
>>
>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen floor
>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on
>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>
>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not invincible.
>>>
>>
>>
>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>
>>>
>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>
>>
>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>
>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>>
>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>>
>>>
>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>> objectivity.
>>>
>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
>>> in some places.
>>>
>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>
>>>
>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>
>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>
>>>
>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>
>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
>
>
> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
> in terms among common types.
>

On 4/20/2024 10:39 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 4/20/24 11:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>
>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that
>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>
>>
>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device. Whenever an
>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical operations. It
>> is basically invalid input.
>>
>
> In other words, you admit that you are being inconsistant about what you
> are saying, because your whole logic system is just inconsistant.
>

Not at all.
An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K ℬ and
not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)

The notion of incompleteness and undecidability requires non truth
bearers to be construed as truth bearers.

A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary
bearer of truth or falsity. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition

When we quit construing expressions that cannot possibly be true or
false as propositions then incompleteness and undecidability cease to
exist.

On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements that
> are true.

Truth_Bearer(F, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ F ((F ⊢ x) ∨ (F ⊢ ¬x))

....14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)

Gödel is essentially saying that expressions that are not propositions
prove that a formal system of propositions has undecidable propositions.

> You don't seem to understand that predicates, DEFINED to be able to work
> on ALL memebers of the input domain, must IN FACT, work on all members
> of that domain.
>
> For a Halt Decider, that means the decider needs to be able to answer
> about ANY machine given to it as an input, even a machine that uses a
> copy of the decider and acts contrary to its answer.
>
> If you are going to work on a different problem, you need to be honest
> about that and not LIE and say you are working on the Halting Problem.
>
> And, if you are going to talk about a "Truth Predicate", which is
> defined to be able to take ANY "statement" and say if it is True or not,
> with "nonsense" statements (be they self-contradictory statements, or
> just nonsense) being just not-true.
>
> ANY statement means any statement, so if we define this predicate as
> True(F, x) to be true if x is a statement that is true in the field F,
> then we need to be able to give this predicate the statemet:
>
> In F de define s as NOT True(F, s)
>
>
> If you claim that your logic is ACTUALLY "two-valued" then if True(F,s)
> returns false, because s is a statement without a truth value, then we
> have the problem that the definition of s now says that s has the value
> of NOT false, which is True.
>
> So, the True predicate was WRONG, as True of a statement that IS true,
> must be true.
>
> If True(F,s) is true, then we have that s is not defined as NOT true,
> which is false, so the True predicate is again WRONG.
>
> The predicate isn't ALLOWED to say "I reject this input" as that isn't a
> truth value (since you claimed you are actually useing a two-valued
> logic) and this predicate is defined to ALWAYS return a truth value.
>
> So, it seems you have a two-valued logic system with three logical values.
>
> Which is just A LIE!
>
> You are just proving you are too stupid to understand what you are
> talking about as you don't understand the meaning of the words you are
> using, as you just studied the system by Zero order principles.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its
>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of
>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of
>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that
>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto
>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>
>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> A complete
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>
>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>
>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>
>>>
>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen floor
>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on
>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>
>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>> invincible.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>
>>>
>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>
>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>>>
>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>> objectivity.
>>>>
>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
>>>> in some places.
>>>>
>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>
>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>
>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
>> in terms among common types.
>>
>
> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>
>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>> about things.
>>
>
> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
>
> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>
> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>
>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>>
>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>
>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>> non-contradictory.
>>
>
> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
> would take humans millions of man-years.
>
>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>
>
> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>
>>
>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>
> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>
>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>
> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>
> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
> to have the Boolean value of true.
>
> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>
> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
> thus no need to store
> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>
> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>
>
>
>
>

On 4/21/24 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/20/2024 10:39 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 4/20/24 11:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>
>>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>>
>>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
>>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
>>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that
>>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
>>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
>>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device. Whenever an
>>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
>>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical operations. It
>>> is basically invalid input.
>>>
>>
>> In other words, you admit that you are being inconsistant about what
>> you are saying, because your whole logic system is just inconsistant.
>>
>
>
> Not at all.
> An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
> neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K ℬ and
> not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)
>
> The notion of incompleteness and undecidability requires non truth
> bearers to be construed as truth bearers.

Nope, and you stating that just proves your stupidity.

A Theory K will define its "language" and what statements it accepts
within it. Normally that "language" excludes non-truth-bearers. This
seems to be something outside your understanding, as you don't seem to
understand anything about the nature of actual FORMAL logic systems, but
seem to be stuck

Yes, non-truth bearing statements will be undecidable,

>
> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary
> bearer of truth or falsity. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>
> When we quit construing expressions that cannot possibly be true or
> false as propositions then incompleteness and undecidability cease to
> exist.

Nope. There exist statements that are True, in that they have an
(infinite) sequence of connections from the truth makers of the system
to the statement, but are not provable, as there is no FINITE sequence
of connections that do so.

Godel's G is an example of this, stating that there does not exist a
number that matches a specific property. Since the property is
computable for all numbers, we know that G must be a truth bearer, as
either such a number exists, or it doesn't exist.

This fact can be established in F, as either it is false, because we CAN
find such a number, and the checking of the number with the relationship
provides a definite proof that G is false, or no such number exists, and
this is established by the INFINITE chain of checking every number, and
seeing that none satisfies it.

We happen to be able to reduce that infinite chain to be finite in a
partitulare meta-theory of F that understands a hidden meaning in the
relationship, and allows us to PROVE that no such number exists.

This PROVES that G is a true statement. While the proof is in Meta-F,
the proof also establishes that G is true in F.

>
> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> > INCOMPLETENESS is EXACTLY about the inability to prove statements that
> > are true.
>
> Truth_Bearer(F, x) ≡  ∃x ∈ F ((F ⊢ x) ∨ (F ⊢ ¬x))

Nope, not PROVES, but ESTABLISHES.

Truth_Bearer(F, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ F ((F ⊨ x) ∨ (F ⊨ ¬x))

Truth Bearing allows for the INFINTE sequence to establish the fact,
even if that can not be a proof of it.

>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
> undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)

Yep, you can build another proof just like the one presented based on
any epistemological antinomy. Note, the proof USES the antinomy, but
does not "derive" from it, in that its validity and soundness are not
based on the truth of the antinomy.

You don't seem to understand the syntactic transformation that was done
on the statement at the beginning, that created a NEW PROPOSITION, that
turns out to be a Truth Bearer.

"X says that X is not True in F", is an epistemological antinomy.

"X says that X is not Provable in F" is not, as the logical valuation of
X being True but not Provable is a possible valid combination of states.

>
> Gödel is essentially saying that expressions that are not propositions
> prove that a formal system of propositions has undecidable propositions.
>

Nope.

Since you don't understand what Godel did, you are just showing you
stupidity by making your claim.

That you persist is making the claim after being shown to be wrong, make
you just a stupid pathological liar, and proves you just don't
understand what Truth actually is.

>> You don't seem to understand that predicates, DEFINED to be able to
>> work on ALL memebers of the input domain, must IN FACT, work on all
>> members of that domain.
>>
>> For a Halt Decider, that means the decider needs to be able to answer
>> about ANY machine given to it as an input, even a machine that uses a
>> copy of the decider and acts contrary to its answer.
>>
>> If you are going to work on a different problem, you need to be honest
>> about that and not LIE and say you are working on the Halting Problem.
>>
>> And, if you are going to talk about a "Truth Predicate", which is
>> defined to be able to take ANY "statement" and say if it is True or
>> not, with "nonsense" statements (be they self-contradictory
>> statements, or just nonsense) being just not-true.
>>
>> ANY statement means any statement, so if we define this predicate as
>> True(F, x) to be true if x is a statement that is true in the field F,
>> then we need to be able to give this predicate the statemet:
>>
>> In F de define s as NOT True(F, s)
>>
>>
>> If you claim that your logic is ACTUALLY "two-valued" then if
>> True(F,s) returns false, because s is a statement without a truth
>> value, then we have the problem that the definition of s now says that
>> s has the value of NOT false, which is True.
>>
>> So, the True predicate was WRONG, as True of a statement that IS true,
>> must be true.
>>
>> If True(F,s) is true, then we have that s is not defined as NOT true,
>> which is false, so the True predicate is again WRONG.
>>
>> The predicate isn't ALLOWED to say "I reject this input" as that isn't
>> a truth value (since you claimed you are actually useing a two-valued
>> logic) and this predicate is defined to ALWAYS return a truth value.
>>
>> So, it seems you have a two-valued logic system with three logical
>> values.
>>
>> Which is just A LIE!
>>
>> You are just proving you are too stupid to understand what you are
>> talking about as you don't understand the meaning of the words you are
>> using, as you just studied the system by Zero order principles.
>

On 4/21/24 10:34 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/21/2024 2:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-04-20 16:37:27 +0000, olcott said:
>>
>>> On 4/20/2024 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-04-19 02:25:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>
>>>>> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>> Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
>>>>>> undecidability,
>>>>>
>>>>> *Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
>>>>>
>>>>> https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
>>>>
>>>> On questions whether Gödel said something or not the sumpreme authority
>>>> is not Mendelson but Gödel.
>>>>
>>>
>>> When some authors affirm that undecidability and incompleteness
>>> are the exact same thing then whenever Gödel uses the term
>>> incompleteness then he is also referring to the term undecidability.
>>
>> That does not follow. Besides, a reference to the term "undecidability"
>> is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
>>
>
> In other words you deny the identity principle thus X=X is false.
>
> An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
> neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K ℬ and
> not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)
>
> Incomplete(F) ≡ ∃x ∈ L ((L ⊬  x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x))
>

Except incompleteness and undecidablity are attributes of different
sorts of things.

Yes, they are related, as Incompleteness of a Theory K, is a statement
that in K there exists a theory that is accepted as a valid statement in
K (and thus, for well defined Theory K that statement has a truth value)
but that statement is not provable or refutable in the Theory K, which
in the later terminology says that statement is undecidable.

Note the different, The SYSTEM (K) is incomplete, but it is the
STATEMENT that is undecidable.

Godel focues on the SYSTEM, and shows that he can construct the
unprovable but true statement. He doesn't focus on the statement itself,
as no one is particularlly interested in that particular statement, so
it being unprovable, by itself, doesn't mean much, except that, by
existing, he shows that the full system must be incomplete, and thus
there may well exist MANY such statements that are true but unprovable.
THAT is an important fact.

Note, this is different then the Halting Problem, where even if Turing
Computation was shown to be "incomplete" in that there existed some
mappings that were not computable, being able to compute the Halting
Mapping would have extreme value, so the focus isn't on the "system" as
a whole, but that one particular problem, the computing of the Halting
Function given a description of the machine.

Thus, "Uncomputable" and "Incompleteness" while highly related and
intertwined are NOT "the same".

Your confusing the two just shows your fundamental lack of understanding
of what you are talking about.

On 4/21/24 10:34 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/21/2024 2:50 AM, Mikko wrote:

>> That does not follow. Besides, a reference to the term "undecidability"
>> is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
>>
>
> In other words you deny the identity principle thus X=X is false.
>

In other words, you fall for the error of the Treachery of Images.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Treachery_of_Images

The Word is not the Concept.

On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false
>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific
>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its
>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of
>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory.  (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger:  not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of
>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any
>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that
>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto
>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most
>>>>>> people
>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of
>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>
>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen
>>>> floor
>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on
>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>
>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>
>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>>>>
>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>
>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>
>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>
>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>
>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
>>> in terms among common types.
>>>
>>
>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>
>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>> about things.
>>>
>>
>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
>>
>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>
>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>
>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>>>
>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>
>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>> non-contradictory.
>>>
>>
>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>
>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>
>>
>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>
>>>
>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>
>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>
>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>
>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>
>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>
>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>
>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>> thus no need to store
>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>
>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
> that the premises have to be drawable as random
> draws and that it results the same deduction
> regardless the order of the draws.
>

On 04/21/2024 10:41 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive,
>>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger
>>>>>>>>>>>> logical
>>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth
>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a
>>>>>>>>>>>> model of
>>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the
>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are
>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its
>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world
>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite
>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a
>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of
>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only
>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must
>>>>>>>>> broaden
>>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any
>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that
>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto
>>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most
>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of
>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen
>>>>> floor
>>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are
>>>>> true on
>>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>>
>>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>>
>>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
>>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>>
>>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
>>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>>
>>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
>>>> in terms among common types.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>>
>>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
>>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>>> about things.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
>>>
>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
>>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>
>>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>>
>>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>>>>
>>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>>
>>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
>>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>>> non-contradictory.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
>>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
>>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
>>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>>
>>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>>
>>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>>
>>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>>
>>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>>
>>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>>
>>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
>>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
>>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>>
>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>>> thus no need to store
>>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>>
>>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
>>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
>> that the premises have to be drawable as random
>> draws and that it results the same deduction
>> regardless the order of the draws.
>>
>
> I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
> {Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
> axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>
>> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
>> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
>>
>
> This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis above:
> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>
>> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
>> has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
>> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>>
>
> If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
> directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic then we get
> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>
>>
>> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
>> Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
>> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
>> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
>> a "truth table",
>
> I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
> these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
> foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
> derive nonsense.
>
> I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
> Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary relations.
> ∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>
> They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
> possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that the
> steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>
> They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
> religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
> realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
> of logic.
>
>> with regards to why a usual "model"
>> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
>> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
>> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
>
> A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
>
>> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
>> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
>> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>>
>> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
>> bad ideas.
>>
>
> You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
> The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
> answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and Mathematicians
> have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
> are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
> fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
>
> When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
> over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
> shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
>
>> > The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
>> a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
>> then those _are not_.
>>
> Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper order
> or there is no connection between inference steps.
>
>>
>> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
>> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
>> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
>> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>>
>
> It is not actually largely bunk.
> It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>
> Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
> populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
> the actual world.
>
> This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human understanding
> that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more than yes/no
> questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
> https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>
>>
>> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
>> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
>> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>>
>
>