Nym messages are infinitely more secure than a central server based
model such as Tutanota.

Nyms are created anonymously. It would be non-trivial for a
powerful adversary to even determine
who established a nym.

A nym message is sent through a series of remailer chains. As the
message traverses through the chains
the message is encrypted to the PGP key of each individual
remailer. The message is passed on to the next
remailer in the chain and is encrypted to that key corresponding to
that remailer. And so on and so on.
Each remailer in the chain strips away any identifying metadata
from the previous remailer.

Thus a single message is encrypted multiple times. The subject line
of the message is also encrypted. Tutanota
does not encrypt subject lines.

Remailers are considered non-traceable.

Now at that point, the remailer message arrives at the nymserver.
It is then encrypted to the key
of the nymserver. It is impossible for the nymserver to know the
source of the message, in addition to the fact that most users use
Tor as an injection point for their messages. From there, the
nymserver
passes along the message along.

All messages are received through an anonymous, common, Usenet
mailbox which is alt.anonymous.messages and not delivered directly
to the recipient. It would be non-trivial albeit impossible for an
adversary to even determine which recipient is picking what
messages.

Can Tutanota claim to even be in the same league as nyms? It
absolutely cannot.

Nyms are arguably the most powerful messaging system on the planet.

It would be an insult to even begin to compare Tutanota to the Nym
messaging system

On Mon, 17 Jul 2023 20:17:37 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio <nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
>Nym messages are infinitely more secure than a central server based
>model such as Tutanota.
>Nyms are created anonymously. It would be non-trivial for a
>powerful adversary to even determine
>who established a nym.
>A nym message is sent through a series of remailer chains. As the
>message traverses through the chains
>the message is encrypted to the PGP key of each individual
>remailer. The message is passed on to the next
>remailer in the chain and is encrypted to that key corresponding to
>that remailer. And so on and so on.
>Each remailer in the chain strips away any identifying metadata
>from the previous remailer.
>Thus a single message is encrypted multiple times. The subject line
>of the message is also encrypted. Tutanota
>does not encrypt subject lines.
>Remailers are considered non-traceable.
>Now at that point, the remailer message arrives at the nymserver.
>It is then encrypted to the key
>of the nymserver. It is impossible for the nymserver to know the
>source of the message, in addition to the fact that most users use
>Tor as an injection point for their messages. From there, the
>nymserver
>passes along the message along.
>All messages are received through an anonymous, common, Usenet
>mailbox which is alt.anonymous.messages and not delivered directly
>to the recipient. It would be non-trivial albeit impossible for an
>adversary to even determine which recipient is picking what
>messages.
>Can Tutanota claim to even be in the same league as nyms? It
>absolutely cannot.
>Nyms are arguably the most powerful messaging system on the planet.
>It would be an insult to even begin to compare Tutanota to the Nym
>messaging system

I've never used nyms, and not much spam comes from nym servers, but
the "tutanota" spam (tutaspam) flooding a.p.a-s for over two months
proves that these shameless and obviously desperate tutanota shills
are in cahoots with provocateurs. OmniMix v2.6.8 (2022-11-27) could
be the easiest way not only to use mix and yamn remailers using tor,
but also for other tasks, such as setting up and using nyms, to wit:

https://www.danner-net.de/om.htm
https://www.danner-net.de/omom/index.htm
https://www.danner-net.de/om/OmniMix_2.6.8_Uno_Setup.exe
http://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutornym.htm
>OmniMix * Tutorial * Nyms
http://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutornymsetup.htm
>OmniMix * Tutorial * Nyms * Setting Up A Nym Account
http://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutornymmaintain.htm
>Maintaining A Working Nym Account
http://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutornymsend.htm
>Sending Nym Messages
http://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutornymreceive.htm
>Receiving Nym Messages
>http://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutornymtroubleshooting.htm
>Nym Related Troubleshooting
http://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutornympassphrase.htm
>Passphrase Creation For Reply Blocks
>http://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutorwme.htm
>Whole Message Encryption (WME)

On Mon, 17 Jul 2023 20:17:37 +0200 (CEST)
Nomen Nescio <nobody@dizum.com> wrote:

Bitmessage is superior to nymservers: https://bitmessage.org. Escape
the mixmaster plantation and find crypto asylum in Bitmessage.

> Nym messages are infinitely more secure than a central server based
> model such as Tutanota.

Bitmessage messages are infinitely more secure than a traceable chain
based model such as mixmaster or mixminion remailers. Metadata and
sender data is unlinked even before a message enters the Bitmessage
network. The nym protocol cannot boast this level of security and
untraceability.
> Nyms are created anonymously. It would be non-trivial for a
> powerful adversary to even determine
> who established a nym.

Bitmessage requires no nyms and is simply anonymous by nature rather
than by obfuscation. It would be impossible for a powerful adversary
to even know that a secret bitmessage identity exists, which is far more
secure than the difficulty of establishing nym identity. The only
identity truly immune to unmasking is the identity that does not exist
to begin with.
> A nym message is sent through a series of remailer chains.

In Bitmessage a encrypted object is injected through a dandelion mix to
all peers, so there is no path to reconstruct from hostile remailers.

> As the
> message traverses through the chains
> the message is encrypted to the PGP key of each individual
> remailer.

As a Bitmessage message traverses through the network the message is
encrypted only to the recipient, so hostile nyms cannot even have the
possibility of reconstructing an injection path.

> The message is passed
> on to the next
> remailer in the chain and is encrypted to that key corresponding to
> that remailer. And so on and so on.
> Each remailer in the chain strips away any identifying metadata
> from the previous remailer.

In Bitmessage every peer receives every object and anonymity is
guaranteed by the single encryption of each object, which only ever can
be decrypted by the legitimate recipient.
> Thus a single message is encrypted multiple times. The subject line
> of the message is also encrypted. Tutanota
> does not encrypt subject lines.
>
> Remailers are considered non-traceable.

Being 'considered' not-traceable and actually being non-traceable are
two different things. A set of hostile remailers can unmask a nym. And
the mixminion network only has a small handful of reliable peers, so
that even a few hostile peers can unmask most nyms on the network. If
you had dozens of peers, and could somehow guarantee that many of them
were not hostile, only then could you make such security claims.
> Now at that point, the remailer message arrives at the nymserver.
> It is then encrypted to the key
> of the nymserver. It is impossible for the nymserver to know the
> source of the message, in addition to the fact that most users use
> Tor as an injection point for their messages.

Not true. You are assuming that the nymservers are not hostile. If
nymservers are hostile servers run in collaboration by hostile actors,
unmasking senders becomes trivial. Try to prove your three reliable
peers are not hostile.

> From there, the
> nymserver
> passes along the message along.

In Bitmessage each peer passes along messages to every peer it contacts
in random order, which does truly obfuscate origin of a message.
Mixminion cannot claim this level of security.
> All messages are received through an anonymous, common, Usenet
> mailbox which is alt.anonymous.messages and not delivered directly
> to the recipient. It would be non-trivial albeit impossible for an
> adversary to even determine which recipient is picking what
> messages.

All bitmessage objects are forwarded to all peers and it is impossible
for any peer to know which peer is the destination for an object.
> Can Tutanota claim to even be in the same league as nyms? It
> absolutely cannot.

Can nymservers claim to be in the same league as Bitmessage? No, they
absolutely can not.
> Nyms are arguably the most powerful messaging system on the planet.

This is not true. Nyms are not the most powerful messaging
system on the planet. Bitmessage cuts out the nymserver middle man,
requiring no nymserver and thus the messages have no path at all.
Because the message objects are not encrypted to any particular
nymserver but rather enter directly into the flood protocol, it is an
order of magnitude more secure than using unreliable and potentially
hostile nymservers.

Get Bitmessage if you want real mix security.
> It would be an insult to even begin to compare Tutanota to the Nym
> messaging system

It would be an insult to even begin to compare mixminion to the
Bitmessage messaging system.

Bitmessage is superior to nymservers: https://bitmessage.org. Escape
the mixmaster plantation and find crypto asylum in Bitmessage.

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On Mon, 17 Jul 2023 17:42:45 -0500, Pig Milk <sooeee@oink.oink> wrote:
>injection path
John Wayne Gacy was born to John Stanley & Marion Elaine Robison-Gacy
at Edgewater Hospital 5700 N Ashland Ave (87W40:13,41N59:08), Chicago
Illinois on Tuesday March 17, 1942 at 12:29 AM CWT(AA/BC).