On 1/22/2024 1:16 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/22/24 20:08, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/22/2024 1:00 PM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 1/22/24 19:39, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-01-22 02:18:35 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 8:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 02:43, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 7:38 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 02:04, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:50 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 01:37, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:27 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 01:13, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:04 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 23:56, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski didn't understand that the correct
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation of the Liar Paradox requires
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an infinite cycle in the directed graph
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of its evaluation sequence.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You don't understand the difference between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagonalization and infinite recursion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you think the real numbers are countable?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diagonalization is a process by which we know that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x is unprovable in L that makes sure to ignore the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason why x is unprovable in L.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So are the real numbers countable? Isn't Cantor's number
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pathologically self-referential, making his argument
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invalid?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correctly determines that LP is unprovable
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> BECAUSE the directed graph of its evaluation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence contains an infinite cycle.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Provability doesn't give a flying fuck about evaluation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cycles, whatever those are.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It sure does in Prolog.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then Prolog is wrong.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> That Prolog pays attention to details that other systems
>>>>>>>>>>>> ignore make it wrong is like saying that ignorance is
>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge and knowledge is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog handles SIMPLE logic system and problems. It rejects
>>>>>>>>>>> ALL cycles, even if they don't cause logical issues (as I
>>>>>>>>>>> understand it)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> As you fail to understand it.
>>>>>>>>>> I took 18 months creating Minimal Type Theory that
>>>>>>>>>> automatically generated the directed graph of the
>>>>>>>>>> evaluation sequence of any of its expressions.
>>>>>>>>>> It sued syntax similar to FOL yet is as expressive
>>>>>>>>>> as HOL. I encode a SOL expression in MTT.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You are rebutting the infinite formulas such as
>>>>>>>>> ¬True(¬True(¬True(...)))
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But this is already in the standard theory. Infinite formulas
>>>>>>>>> such as ¬True(¬True(¬True(...))) are already not valid.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Olcott doesn't understand that diagonalization is not the same
>>>>>>>>> as infinite recursion.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Finally a reply that is not nonsense.
>>>>>>>> Diagonalization only knows that for some reason or another
>>>>>>>> x is unprovable in L.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I dispute the notion of "reasons". It's just a fact that it's
>>>>>>> unprovable. There are different ways to find out that it's
>>>>>>> unprovable, or different ways to understand that it's unprovable,
>>>>>>> but not reasons why it's unprovable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If the reason that x is unprovable in L is that x
>>>>>> is semantically incorrect in L then instead of saying
>>>>>> that x is undecidable in L the decider rejects x
>>>>>> as invalid input.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This what Tarski should have done.
>>>>>
>>>>> In a formal theory nothing is semantically anything.
>>>>
>>>> That it the reason why formal theories get confused
>>>> and make semantic errors that are invisible to them.
>>>
>>> Nobody is talking about semantics except for you.
>> *That is their mistake*
>>
>>> What is the formal truth value of x?
>>
>> Something that seems over your head is the self-contradictory
>> sentences cannot possibly have a truth value.
>>
>>
> Every logical formula has a truth value.

LP := ~True(LP)
specifies an infinite evaluation sequence as shown
in cycle of the directed graph of this sequence.
G := ~Provable(G) has the exact same issue.

That you don't comprehend these things is no rebuttal what-so-ever.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/22/2024 1:17 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/22/24 20:01, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/22/2024 10:19 AM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 1/22/24 16:51, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/2024 2:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-01-21 19:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 1:49 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 20:24, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 1:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but
>>>>>>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>>>> for-
>>>>>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does
>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>> exist as
>>>>>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>>>>>>>> paradox.
>>>>>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>>>>>>>> Computer
>>>>>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>>>>>>>>> halting
>>>>>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> He is one of three authors that agree on this.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It is known that if you restrict the halting problem to programs
>>>>>>> with a certain memory limit, it can be solved by a halting
>>>>>>> decider which uses more memory than the limit. When a program has
>>>>>>> limited memory, it has to  halt or loop within a certain number
>>>>>>> of steps (2 to the power of the number of bits of memory
>>>>>>> available, including the program counter/state number). The Linz
>>>>>>> counterexample program doesn't lead to a contradiction, because
>>>>>>> it uses more memory than the limit, so the halting decider is
>>>>>>> unable to analyze it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Stoddart has the same idea as Olcott: there's a hidden variable
>>>>>>> which tells the program whether it's already in a simulation, and
>>>>>>> the program does something different if it's in a simulation than
>>>>>>> if it isn't.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Professor Stoddart doesn't say anything like this*
>>>>>> You didn't read what he said you only guessed what he said.
>>>>>
>>>>> In the section 4.1 of the article:
>>>>> "Implementation of H₁ requires it to determine whether it is being
>>>>> invoked
>>>>> from within S₁."
>>>>>
>>>>> Mikko
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> S ≙ if H(S) then Loop end.
>>>>
>>>> He did not use that for a solution.
>>>> He did use it to reject pathological inputs:
>>>
>>> A halting decider works for ABSOLUTELY ALL PROGRAMS WITH ABSOLUTELY
>>> ZERO EXCEPTIONS, so he hasn't disproved the halting problem.
>>
>> You can't even understand that the Liar Paradox is neither true nor
>> false.
>>
> You can't even understand that a halting decoder works for ABSOLUTELY
> ALL PROGRAMS WITH ABSOLUTELY NO EXCEPTIONS.

It has been proven otherwise and the proof is simply over your head.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/22/2024 1:18 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/22/24 20:04, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/22/2024 9:36 AM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 1/22/24 16:29, olcott wrote:
>>>> Can Carol correctly answer “no” to this [yes/no] question?
>>>
>>> Can you express this question mathematically?
>>
>> It is exactly isomorphic to the HP decider/input pair,
>> that <is> its mathematical formalization.
>>
>> The context of who is asked Carol's question changes
>> the meaning of the question in the same way that the
>> context of who is asked this question:
>> Are you a little girl?
>> has different answers depending on who is asked.
>>
>
> Can you express the question mathematically?

You can't simply ignore my answer and ask the same question again.
I won't tolerate that.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/22/24 20:49, olcott wrote:
> On 1/22/2024 1:18 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 1/22/24 20:04, olcott wrote:
>>> On 1/22/2024 9:36 AM, immibis wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/24 16:29, olcott wrote:
>>>>> Can Carol correctly answer “no” to this [yes/no] question?
>>>>
>>>> Can you express this question mathematically?
>>>
>>> It is exactly isomorphic to the HP decider/input pair,
>>> that <is> its mathematical formalization.
>>>
>>> The context of who is asked Carol's question changes
>>> the meaning of the question in the same way that the
>>> context of who is asked this question:
>>> Are you a little girl?
>>> has different answers depending on who is asked.
>>>
>>
>> Can you express the question mathematically?
>
> You can't simply ignore my answer and ask the same question again.
> I won't tolerate that.
>

State the contradictory question as a mathematical formula.

On 1/22/24 20:44, olcott wrote:
> On 1/22/2024 1:16 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 1/22/24 19:53, olcott wrote:
>>> On 1/22/2024 10:22 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>>>> Op 22.jan.2024 om 17:07 schreef olcott:
>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> As I have already proved countless times when D has been
>>>>> intentionally defined to do the opposite of whatever
>>>>> Boolean value that H returns the question:
>>>>>
>>>>> D does halt on its input?
>>>>> Is an incorrect question when posed to H because both true
>>>>> and false are the wrong answer when this question is posed to H.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Why is it so difficult for olcott to see that not both answers are
>>>> wrong?
>>> Three PhD computer science professors agree with me.
>>>
>>> This is the easiest paper to understand.
>>> https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hehner/OSS.pdf
>>> Can Carol correctly answer “no” to this [yes/no] question?
>>> Is 100% exactly isomorphic to the HP decider/input pair.
>>>
>>> Professor Hehner proves that the question posed to Carol
>>> is incorrect because both yes and no are the wrong answer.
>>
>> Then Professor Hehner doesn't understand that the domain of a halting
>> decider is ALL PROGRAMS WITH ABSOLUTELY NO EXCEPTIONS WHAT-SO-EVER.
>>
>
> He is a full professor of computer science and has been
> for decades.

Then he should understand that the domain of a halting decider is ALL
PROGRAMS WITH ABSOLUTELY NO EXCEPTIONS WHAT-SO-EVER.

> When the halting question is posed to H or Carol's
> question is posed to Carol both yes and no are the
> wrong answer.

Wrong.

>
> When these question are posed to anyone else that
> changes their meaning in the same way that the
> question: Are you a little girl?
> has a different answer depending on who is asked.

Can you express this question as a mathematical formula?

On 1/22/24 20:48, olcott wrote:
> On 1/22/2024 1:17 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 1/22/24 20:01, olcott wrote:
>>> On 1/22/2024 10:19 AM, immibis wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/24 16:51, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 1/22/2024 2:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-01-21 19:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 1:49 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 20:24, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 1:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>>>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but
>>>>>>>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>>>>> for-
>>>>>>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and
>>>>>>>>>> does not
>>>>>>>>>> exist as
>>>>>>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>>>>>>>>> paradox.
>>>>>>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>>>>>>>>> Computer
>>>>>>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> halting
>>>>>>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing
>>>>>>>>>> something?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> He is one of three authors that agree on this.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It is known that if you restrict the halting problem to programs
>>>>>>>> with a certain memory limit, it can be solved by a halting
>>>>>>>> decider which uses more memory than the limit. When a program
>>>>>>>> has limited memory, it has to  halt or loop within a certain
>>>>>>>> number of steps (2 to the power of the number of bits of memory
>>>>>>>> available, including the program counter/state number). The Linz
>>>>>>>> counterexample program doesn't lead to a contradiction, because
>>>>>>>> it uses more memory than the limit, so the halting decider is
>>>>>>>> unable to analyze it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Stoddart has the same idea as Olcott: there's a hidden variable
>>>>>>>> which tells the program whether it's already in a simulation,
>>>>>>>> and the program does something different if it's in a simulation
>>>>>>>> than if it isn't.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Professor Stoddart doesn't say anything like this*
>>>>>>> You didn't read what he said you only guessed what he said.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the section 4.1 of the article:
>>>>>> "Implementation of H₁ requires it to determine whether it is being
>>>>>> invoked
>>>>>> from within S₁."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Mikko
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S ≙ if H(S) then Loop end.
>>>>>
>>>>> He did not use that for a solution.
>>>>> He did use it to reject pathological inputs:
>>>>
>>>> A halting decider works for ABSOLUTELY ALL PROGRAMS WITH ABSOLUTELY
>>>> ZERO EXCEPTIONS, so he hasn't disproved the halting problem.
>>>
>>> You can't even understand that the Liar Paradox is neither true nor
>>> false.
>>>
>> You can't even understand that a halting decoder works for ABSOLUTELY
>> ALL PROGRAMS WITH ABSOLUTELY NO EXCEPTIONS.
>
> It has been proven otherwise and the proof is simply over your head.
>

You cannot refute a stipulative definition.

On 1/22/24 20:47, olcott wrote:
> On 1/22/2024 1:16 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 1/22/24 20:08, olcott wrote:
>>> On 1/22/2024 1:00 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/24 19:39, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 1/22/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-01-22 02:18:35 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 8:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 02:43, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 7:38 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 02:04, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:50 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 01:37, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:27 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 01:13, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:04 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 23:56, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski didn't understand that the correct
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation of the Liar Paradox requires
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an infinite cycle in the directed graph
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of its evaluation sequence.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You don't understand the difference between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagonalization and infinite recursion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you think the real numbers are countable?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diagonalization is a process by which we know that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x is unprovable in L that makes sure to ignore the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason why x is unprovable in L.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So are the real numbers countable? Isn't Cantor's number
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pathologically self-referential, making his argument
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invalid?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correctly determines that LP is unprovable
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> BECAUSE the directed graph of its evaluation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence contains an infinite cycle.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Provability doesn't give a flying fuck about evaluation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cycles, whatever those are.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It sure does in Prolog.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then Prolog is wrong.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> That Prolog pays attention to details that other systems
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignore make it wrong is like saying that ignorance is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge and knowledge is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog handles SIMPLE logic system and problems. It rejects
>>>>>>>>>>>> ALL cycles, even if they don't cause logical issues (as I
>>>>>>>>>>>> understand it)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> As you fail to understand it.
>>>>>>>>>>> I took 18 months creating Minimal Type Theory that
>>>>>>>>>>> automatically generated the directed graph of the
>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation sequence of any of its expressions.
>>>>>>>>>>> It sued syntax similar to FOL yet is as expressive
>>>>>>>>>>> as HOL. I encode a SOL expression in MTT.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You are rebutting the infinite formulas such as
>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(¬True(¬True(...)))
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But this is already in the standard theory. Infinite formulas
>>>>>>>>>> such as ¬True(¬True(¬True(...))) are already not valid.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Olcott doesn't understand that diagonalization is not the same
>>>>>>>>>> as infinite recursion.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Finally a reply that is not nonsense.
>>>>>>>>> Diagonalization only knows that for some reason or another
>>>>>>>>> x is unprovable in L.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I dispute the notion of "reasons". It's just a fact that it's
>>>>>>>> unprovable. There are different ways to find out that it's
>>>>>>>> unprovable, or different ways to understand that it's
>>>>>>>> unprovable, but not reasons why it's unprovable.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If the reason that x is unprovable in L is that x
>>>>>>> is semantically incorrect in L then instead of saying
>>>>>>> that x is undecidable in L the decider rejects x
>>>>>>> as invalid input.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This what Tarski should have done.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In a formal theory nothing is semantically anything.
>>>>>
>>>>> That it the reason why formal theories get confused
>>>>> and make semantic errors that are invisible to them.
>>>>
>>>> Nobody is talking about semantics except for you.
>>> *That is their mistake*
>>>
>>>> What is the formal truth value of x?
>>>
>>> Something that seems over your head is the self-contradictory
>>> sentences cannot possibly have a truth value.
>>>
>>>
>> Every logical formula has a truth value.
>
> LP := ~True(LP)

True(LP) is not a logical formula. Gödel proved that.

On 1/22/2024 1:56 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/22/24 20:47, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/22/2024 1:16 PM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 1/22/24 20:08, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/2024 1:00 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>> On 1/22/24 19:39, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-01-22 02:18:35 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 8:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 02:43, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 7:38 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 02:04, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:50 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 01:37, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:27 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 01:13, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:04 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 23:56, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski didn't understand that the correct
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation of the Liar Paradox requires
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an infinite cycle in the directed graph
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of its evaluation sequence.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You don't understand the difference between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagonalization and infinite recursion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you think the real numbers are countable?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diagonalization is a process by which we know that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x is unprovable in L that makes sure to ignore the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason why x is unprovable in L.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So are the real numbers countable? Isn't Cantor's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number pathologically self-referential, making his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argument invalid?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correctly determines that LP is unprovable
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> BECAUSE the directed graph of its evaluation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence contains an infinite cycle.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Provability doesn't give a flying fuck about evaluation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cycles, whatever those are.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It sure does in Prolog.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then Prolog is wrong.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That Prolog pays attention to details that other systems
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignore make it wrong is like saying that ignorance is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge and knowledge is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog handles SIMPLE logic system and problems. It rejects
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ALL cycles, even if they don't cause logical issues (as I
>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand it)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> As you fail to understand it.
>>>>>>>>>>>> I took 18 months creating Minimal Type Theory that
>>>>>>>>>>>> automatically generated the directed graph of the
>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation sequence of any of its expressions.
>>>>>>>>>>>> It sued syntax similar to FOL yet is as expressive
>>>>>>>>>>>> as HOL. I encode a SOL expression in MTT.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You are rebutting the infinite formulas such as
>>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(¬True(¬True(...)))
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> But this is already in the standard theory. Infinite formulas
>>>>>>>>>>> such as ¬True(¬True(¬True(...))) are already not valid.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott doesn't understand that diagonalization is not the
>>>>>>>>>>> same as infinite recursion.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Finally a reply that is not nonsense.
>>>>>>>>>> Diagonalization only knows that for some reason or another
>>>>>>>>>> x is unprovable in L.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I dispute the notion of "reasons". It's just a fact that it's
>>>>>>>>> unprovable. There are different ways to find out that it's
>>>>>>>>> unprovable, or different ways to understand that it's
>>>>>>>>> unprovable, but not reasons why it's unprovable.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If the reason that x is unprovable in L is that x
>>>>>>>> is semantically incorrect in L then instead of saying
>>>>>>>> that x is undecidable in L the decider rejects x
>>>>>>>> as invalid input.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This what Tarski should have done.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In a formal theory nothing is semantically anything.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That it the reason why formal theories get confused
>>>>>> and make semantic errors that are invisible to them.
>>>>>
>>>>> Nobody is talking about semantics except for you.
>>>> *That is their mistake*
>>>>
>>>>> What is the formal truth value of x?
>>>>
>>>> Something that seems over your head is the self-contradictory
>>>> sentences cannot possibly have a truth value.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Every logical formula has a truth value.
>>
>> LP := ~True(LP)
>
> True(LP) is not a logical formula. Gödel proved that.
>
>

He proved no such thing.

He proved that G cannot be proved in PA yet can be proved in
metamathematics.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/22/2024 1:55 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/22/24 20:48, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/22/2024 1:17 PM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 1/22/24 20:01, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/2024 10:19 AM, immibis wrote:
>>>>> On 1/22/24 16:51, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 2:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-01-21 19:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 1:49 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 20:24, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 1:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>>>>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>>>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but
>>>>>>>>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>>>>>> for-
>>>>>>>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and
>>>>>>>>>>> does not
>>>>>>>>>>> exist as
>>>>>>>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads
>>>>>>>>>>> to a
>>>>>>>>>>> paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>>>>>>>>>> Computer
>>>>>>>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner
>>>>>>>>>>> claims the
>>>>>>>>>>> halting
>>>>>>>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing
>>>>>>>>>>> something?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> He is one of three authors that agree on this.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It is known that if you restrict the halting problem to
>>>>>>>>> programs with a certain memory limit, it can be solved by a
>>>>>>>>> halting decider which uses more memory than the limit. When a
>>>>>>>>> program has limited memory, it has to  halt or loop within a
>>>>>>>>> certain number of steps (2 to the power of the number of bits
>>>>>>>>> of memory available, including the program counter/state
>>>>>>>>> number). The Linz counterexample program doesn't lead to a
>>>>>>>>> contradiction, because it uses more memory than the limit, so
>>>>>>>>> the halting decider is unable to analyze it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Stoddart has the same idea as Olcott: there's a hidden variable
>>>>>>>>> which tells the program whether it's already in a simulation,
>>>>>>>>> and the program does something different if it's in a
>>>>>>>>> simulation than if it isn't.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Professor Stoddart doesn't say anything like this*
>>>>>>>> You didn't read what he said you only guessed what he said.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the section 4.1 of the article:
>>>>>>> "Implementation of H₁ requires it to determine whether it is
>>>>>>> being invoked
>>>>>>> from within S₁."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Mikko
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> S ≙ if H(S) then Loop end.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> He did not use that for a solution.
>>>>>> He did use it to reject pathological inputs:
>>>>>
>>>>> A halting decider works for ABSOLUTELY ALL PROGRAMS WITH ABSOLUTELY
>>>>> ZERO EXCEPTIONS, so he hasn't disproved the halting problem.
>>>>
>>>> You can't even understand that the Liar Paradox is neither true nor
>>>> false.
>>>>
>>> You can't even understand that a halting decoder works for ABSOLUTELY
>>> ALL PROGRAMS WITH ABSOLUTELY NO EXCEPTIONS.
>>
>> It has been proven otherwise and the proof is simply over your head.
>>
>
> You cannot refute a stipulative definition.

ZFC did show that the definition stipulated by naive set theory of the
term {set} was incoherent.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/22/24 21:30, olcott wrote:
> On 1/22/2024 1:56 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 1/22/24 20:47, olcott wrote:
>>> On 1/22/2024 1:16 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/24 20:08, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 1/22/2024 1:00 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/22/24 19:39, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2024-01-22 02:18:35 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 8:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 02:43, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 7:38 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 02:04, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:50 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 01:37, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:27 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 01:13, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:04 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 23:56, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski didn't understand that the correct
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation of the Liar Paradox requires
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an infinite cycle in the directed graph
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of its evaluation sequence.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You don't understand the difference between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagonalization and infinite recursion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you think the real numbers are countable?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diagonalization is a process by which we know that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x is unprovable in L that makes sure to ignore the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason why x is unprovable in L.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So are the real numbers countable? Isn't Cantor's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number pathologically self-referential, making his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argument invalid?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correctly determines that LP is unprovable
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> BECAUSE the directed graph of its evaluation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence contains an infinite cycle.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Provability doesn't give a flying fuck about
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation cycles, whatever those are.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It sure does in Prolog.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then Prolog is wrong.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That Prolog pays attention to details that other systems
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignore make it wrong is like saying that ignorance is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge and knowledge is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog handles SIMPLE logic system and problems. It
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rejects ALL cycles, even if they don't cause logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> issues (as I understand it)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> As you fail to understand it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I took 18 months creating Minimal Type Theory that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> automatically generated the directed graph of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation sequence of any of its expressions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It sued syntax similar to FOL yet is as expressive
>>>>>>>>>>>>> as HOL. I encode a SOL expression in MTT.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You are rebutting the infinite formulas such as
>>>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(¬True(¬True(...)))
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> But this is already in the standard theory. Infinite
>>>>>>>>>>>> formulas such as ¬True(¬True(¬True(...))) are already not
>>>>>>>>>>>> valid.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott doesn't understand that diagonalization is not the
>>>>>>>>>>>> same as infinite recursion.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Finally a reply that is not nonsense.
>>>>>>>>>>> Diagonalization only knows that for some reason or another
>>>>>>>>>>> x is unprovable in L.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I dispute the notion of "reasons". It's just a fact that it's
>>>>>>>>>> unprovable. There are different ways to find out that it's
>>>>>>>>>> unprovable, or different ways to understand that it's
>>>>>>>>>> unprovable, but not reasons why it's unprovable.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If the reason that x is unprovable in L is that x
>>>>>>>>> is semantically incorrect in L then instead of saying
>>>>>>>>> that x is undecidable in L the decider rejects x
>>>>>>>>> as invalid input.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This what Tarski should have done.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In a formal theory nothing is semantically anything.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That it the reason why formal theories get confused
>>>>>>> and make semantic errors that are invisible to them.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nobody is talking about semantics except for you.
>>>>> *That is their mistake*
>>>>>
>>>>>> What is the formal truth value of x?
>>>>>
>>>>> Something that seems over your head is the self-contradictory
>>>>> sentences cannot possibly have a truth value.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> Every logical formula has a truth value.
>>>
>>> LP := ~True(LP)
>>
>> True(LP) is not a logical formula. Gödel proved that.
>>
>>
>
> He proved no such thing.
>
> He proved that G cannot be proved in PA yet can be proved in
> metamathematics.
>

On 1/22/24 22:40, olcott wrote:
> On 1/22/2024 1:55 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 1/22/24 20:48, olcott wrote:
>>> On 1/22/2024 1:17 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/24 20:01, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 1/22/2024 10:19 AM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/22/24 16:51, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 2:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2024-01-21 19:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 1:49 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 20:24, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 1:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>>>>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but
>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>>>>>>> for-
>>>>>>>>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and
>>>>>>>>>>>> does not
>>>>>>>>>>>> exist as
>>>>>>>>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads
>>>>>>>>>>>> to a
>>>>>>>>>>>> paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university
>>>>>>>>>>>> courses on
>>>>>>>>>>>> Computer
>>>>>>>>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner
>>>>>>>>>>>> claims the
>>>>>>>>>>>> halting
>>>>>>>>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing
>>>>>>>>>>>> something?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> He is one of three authors that agree on this.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It is known that if you restrict the halting problem to
>>>>>>>>>> programs with a certain memory limit, it can be solved by a
>>>>>>>>>> halting decider which uses more memory than the limit. When a
>>>>>>>>>> program has limited memory, it has to  halt or loop within a
>>>>>>>>>> certain number of steps (2 to the power of the number of bits
>>>>>>>>>> of memory available, including the program counter/state
>>>>>>>>>> number). The Linz counterexample program doesn't lead to a
>>>>>>>>>> contradiction, because it uses more memory than the limit, so
>>>>>>>>>> the halting decider is unable to analyze it.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Stoddart has the same idea as Olcott: there's a hidden
>>>>>>>>>> variable which tells the program whether it's already in a
>>>>>>>>>> simulation, and the program does something different if it's
>>>>>>>>>> in a simulation than if it isn't.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Professor Stoddart doesn't say anything like this*
>>>>>>>>> You didn't read what he said you only guessed what he said.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In the section 4.1 of the article:
>>>>>>>> "Implementation of H₁ requires it to determine whether it is
>>>>>>>> being invoked
>>>>>>>> from within S₁."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Mikko
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> S ≙ if H(S) then Loop end.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> He did not use that for a solution.
>>>>>>> He did use it to reject pathological inputs:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A halting decider works for ABSOLUTELY ALL PROGRAMS WITH
>>>>>> ABSOLUTELY ZERO EXCEPTIONS, so he hasn't disproved the halting
>>>>>> problem.
>>>>>
>>>>> You can't even understand that the Liar Paradox is neither true nor
>>>>> false.
>>>>>
>>>> You can't even understand that a halting decoder works for
>>>> ABSOLUTELY ALL PROGRAMS WITH ABSOLUTELY NO EXCEPTIONS.
>>>
>>> It has been proven otherwise and the proof is simply over your head.
>>>
>>
>> You cannot refute a stipulative definition.
>
> ZFC did show that the definition stipulated by naive set theory of the
> term {set} was incoherent.
>
No, Russell proved that naive set theory was inconsistent.

On 1/22/2024 5:20 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/22/24 21:30, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/22/2024 1:56 PM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 1/22/24 20:47, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/2024 1:16 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>> On 1/22/24 20:08, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 1:00 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 19:39, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2024-01-22 02:18:35 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 8:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 02:43, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 7:38 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 02:04, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:50 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 01:37, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:27 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 01:13, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:04 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 23:56, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski didn't understand that the correct
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation of the Liar Paradox requires
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an infinite cycle in the directed graph
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of its evaluation sequence.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You don't understand the difference between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagonalization and infinite recursion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you think the real numbers are countable?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diagonalization is a process by which we know that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x is unprovable in L that makes sure to ignore the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason why x is unprovable in L.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So are the real numbers countable? Isn't Cantor's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number pathologically self-referential, making his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argument invalid?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correctly determines that LP is unprovable
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> BECAUSE the directed graph of its evaluation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence contains an infinite cycle.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Provability doesn't give a flying fuck about
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation cycles, whatever those are.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It sure does in Prolog.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then Prolog is wrong.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That Prolog pays attention to details that other systems
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignore make it wrong is like saying that ignorance is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge and knowledge is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog handles SIMPLE logic system and problems. It
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rejects ALL cycles, even if they don't cause logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> issues (as I understand it)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As you fail to understand it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I took 18 months creating Minimal Type Theory that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> automatically generated the directed graph of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation sequence of any of its expressions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It sued syntax similar to FOL yet is as expressive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as HOL. I encode a SOL expression in MTT.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You are rebutting the infinite formulas such as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(¬True(¬True(...)))
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> But this is already in the standard theory. Infinite
>>>>>>>>>>>>> formulas such as ¬True(¬True(¬True(...))) are already not
>>>>>>>>>>>>> valid.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott doesn't understand that diagonalization is not the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> same as infinite recursion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Finally a reply that is not nonsense.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Diagonalization only knows that for some reason or another
>>>>>>>>>>>> x is unprovable in L.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I dispute the notion of "reasons". It's just a fact that it's
>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable. There are different ways to find out that it's
>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable, or different ways to understand that it's
>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable, but not reasons why it's unprovable.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If the reason that x is unprovable in L is that x
>>>>>>>>>> is semantically incorrect in L then instead of saying
>>>>>>>>>> that x is undecidable in L the decider rejects x
>>>>>>>>>> as invalid input.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This what Tarski should have done.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In a formal theory nothing is semantically anything.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That it the reason why formal theories get confused
>>>>>>>> and make semantic errors that are invisible to them.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Nobody is talking about semantics except for you.
>>>>>> *That is their mistake*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What is the formal truth value of x?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Something that seems over your head is the self-contradictory
>>>>>> sentences cannot possibly have a truth value.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> Every logical formula has a truth value.
>>>>
>>>> LP := ~True(LP)
>>>
>>> True(LP) is not a logical formula. Gödel proved that.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> He proved no such thing.
>>
>> He proved that G cannot be proved in PA yet can be proved in
>> metamathematics.
>>
>
> I don't think you get this. Every system has a G that can't be proved in
> that system,

On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 10:28 +0200, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-01-21 19:22:22 +0000, wij said:
>
> > I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
> > https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
> >
> > In the conclusion section:
> > The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot
> > be
> > for-
> > malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
> > exist as
> > a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
> > paradox.
> > The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
> > Computer
> > Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
> > halting
> > problem is misconceived......
> >
> > It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>
> The error in the article is the claim that an "inconsistent"
> specification
> is somehow invalid. But it is not.
>
> A problem is a request to find at least one thing that satisfies the
> requirements of the problem or to prove that no such thing can be
> found.
> The problem is well posed if for every thing it is possible to check
> whether it satisfies all requirements.
>
> The halting problem is solved: a proof that no Turing machine
> satisfies
> the requirements is known (and nothing else satisfies the requirement
> that it must be a Turing machine).
>
> It is a matter of opinion whether the usual presentation of the
> halting theorem is the best one. If one does not like the usual
> statement one may instead use:
>   For every universal Turing machine U and every Turing machine H
>   there is an input string S so that
>   either T(S) halts but H(S) does not accept
>   or T(S) does not halt but H(S) accepts.
>
> This formulation has the disadvantage that it uses the concept of
> "univesal Turing machine", and therefore depends on the existence
> of one.
>
> Mikko
>

Thanks for the explanation.
It looked to me it is the statement of Halting Problem proved neither
T nor F bugged these people (including olcott). 
There is also a status of proposition called contingency,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy)

On 1/23/24 00:31, olcott wrote:
> On 1/22/2024 5:20 PM, immibis wrote:
>> On 1/22/24 21:30, olcott wrote:
>>> On 1/22/2024 1:56 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/24 20:47, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 1/22/2024 1:16 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/22/24 20:08, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 1:00 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 19:39, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-01-22 02:18:35 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 8:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 02:43, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 7:38 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 02:04, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:50 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 01:37, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:27 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 01:13, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:04 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 23:56, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski didn't understand that the correct
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation of the Liar Paradox requires
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an infinite cycle in the directed graph
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of its evaluation sequence.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You don't understand the difference between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagonalization and infinite recursion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you think the real numbers are countable?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diagonalization is a process by which we know that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x is unprovable in L that makes sure to ignore the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason why x is unprovable in L.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So are the real numbers countable? Isn't Cantor's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number pathologically self-referential, making his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argument invalid?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correctly determines that LP is unprovable
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> BECAUSE the directed graph of its evaluation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence contains an infinite cycle.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Provability doesn't give a flying fuck about
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation cycles, whatever those are.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It sure does in Prolog.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then Prolog is wrong.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That Prolog pays attention to details that other systems
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignore make it wrong is like saying that ignorance is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge and knowledge is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog handles SIMPLE logic system and problems. It
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rejects ALL cycles, even if they don't cause logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> issues (as I understand it)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As you fail to understand it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I took 18 months creating Minimal Type Theory that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> automatically generated the directed graph of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation sequence of any of its expressions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It sued syntax similar to FOL yet is as expressive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as HOL. I encode a SOL expression in MTT.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You are rebutting the infinite formulas such as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(¬True(¬True(...)))
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But this is already in the standard theory. Infinite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formulas such as ¬True(¬True(¬True(...))) are already not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> valid.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott doesn't understand that diagonalization is not the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same as infinite recursion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Finally a reply that is not nonsense.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diagonalization only knows that for some reason or another
>>>>>>>>>>>>> x is unprovable in L.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I dispute the notion of "reasons". It's just a fact that
>>>>>>>>>>>> it's unprovable. There are different ways to find out that
>>>>>>>>>>>> it's unprovable, or different ways to understand that it's
>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable, but not reasons why it's unprovable.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If the reason that x is unprovable in L is that x
>>>>>>>>>>> is semantically incorrect in L then instead of saying
>>>>>>>>>>> that x is undecidable in L the decider rejects x
>>>>>>>>>>> as invalid input.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> This what Tarski should have done.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In a formal theory nothing is semantically anything.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That it the reason why formal theories get confused
>>>>>>>>> and make semantic errors that are invisible to them.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Nobody is talking about semantics except for you.
>>>>>>> *That is their mistake*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> What is the formal truth value of x?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Something that seems over your head is the self-contradictory
>>>>>>> sentences cannot possibly have a truth value.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Every logical formula has a truth value.
>>>>>
>>>>> LP := ~True(LP)
>>>>
>>>> True(LP) is not a logical formula. Gödel proved that.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> He proved no such thing.
>>>
>>> He proved that G cannot be proved in PA yet can be proved in
>>> metamathematics.
>>>
>>
>> I don't think you get this. Every system has a G that can't be proved
>> in that system,
>
> Yet can be proved in metamathematics.
>
Is metamathematics a system?

On 1/22/2024 6:10 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/23/24 00:31, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/22/2024 5:20 PM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 1/22/24 21:30, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/2024 1:56 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>> On 1/22/24 20:47, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 1:16 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 20:08, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 1:00 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 19:39, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-01-22 02:18:35 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 8:07 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 02:43, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 7:38 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 02:04, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 7:54 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:50 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 01:37, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:27 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 01:13, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 6:04 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 23:56, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski didn't understand that the correct
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation of the Liar Paradox requires
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an infinite cycle in the directed graph
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of its evaluation sequence.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You don't understand the difference between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagonalization and infinite recursion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you think the real numbers are countable?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diagonalization is a process by which we know that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x is unprovable in L that makes sure to ignore the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason why x is unprovable in L.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So are the real numbers countable? Isn't Cantor's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number pathologically self-referential, making his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argument invalid?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correctly determines that LP is unprovable
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> BECAUSE the directed graph of its evaluation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence contains an infinite cycle.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Provability doesn't give a flying fuck about
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation cycles, whatever those are.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It sure does in Prolog.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then Prolog is wrong.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That Prolog pays attention to details that other systems
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignore make it wrong is like saying that ignorance is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge and knowledge is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog handles SIMPLE logic system and problems. It
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rejects ALL cycles, even if they don't cause logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> issues (as I understand it)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As you fail to understand it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I took 18 months creating Minimal Type Theory that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> automatically generated the directed graph of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation sequence of any of its expressions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It sued syntax similar to FOL yet is as expressive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as HOL. I encode a SOL expression in MTT.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You are rebutting the infinite formulas such as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(¬True(¬True(...)))
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But this is already in the standard theory. Infinite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formulas such as ¬True(¬True(¬True(...))) are already not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> valid.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott doesn't understand that diagonalization is not the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same as infinite recursion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Finally a reply that is not nonsense.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diagonalization only knows that for some reason or another
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x is unprovable in L.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I dispute the notion of "reasons". It's just a fact that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> it's unprovable. There are different ways to find out that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> it's unprovable, or different ways to understand that it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable, but not reasons why it's unprovable.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> If the reason that x is unprovable in L is that x
>>>>>>>>>>>> is semantically incorrect in L then instead of saying
>>>>>>>>>>>> that x is undecidable in L the decider rejects x
>>>>>>>>>>>> as invalid input.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> This what Tarski should have done.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In a formal theory nothing is semantically anything.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That it the reason why formal theories get confused
>>>>>>>>>> and make semantic errors that are invisible to them.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Nobody is talking about semantics except for you.
>>>>>>>> *That is their mistake*
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> What is the formal truth value of x?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Something that seems over your head is the self-contradictory
>>>>>>>> sentences cannot possibly have a truth value.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Every logical formula has a truth value.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> LP := ~True(LP)
>>>>>
>>>>> True(LP) is not a logical formula. Gödel proved that.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> He proved no such thing.
>>>>
>>>> He proved that G cannot be proved in PA yet can be proved in
>>>> metamathematics.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't think you get this. Every system has a G that can't be proved
>>> in that system,
>>
>> Yet can be proved in metamathematics.
>>
> Is metamathematics a system?

On 1/22/2024 5:21 PM, immibis wrote:
> On 1/22/24 22:40, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/22/2024 1:55 PM, immibis wrote:
>>> On 1/22/24 20:48, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/2024 1:17 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>> On 1/22/24 20:01, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 10:19 AM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>> On 1/22/24 16:51, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 2:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2024-01-21 19:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 1:49 PM, immibis wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/24 20:24, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/21/2024 1:22 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>>>>>>>> for-
>>>>>>>>>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not
>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence
>>>>>>>>>>>>> leads to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university
>>>>>>>>>>>>> courses on
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Computer
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner
>>>>>>>>>>>>> claims the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting
>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing
>>>>>>>>>>>>> something?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> He is one of three authors that agree on this.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It is known that if you restrict the halting problem to
>>>>>>>>>>> programs with a certain memory limit, it can be solved by a
>>>>>>>>>>> halting decider which uses more memory than the limit. When a
>>>>>>>>>>> program has limited memory, it has to  halt or loop within a
>>>>>>>>>>> certain number of steps (2 to the power of the number of bits
>>>>>>>>>>> of memory available, including the program counter/state
>>>>>>>>>>> number). The Linz counterexample program doesn't lead to a
>>>>>>>>>>> contradiction, because it uses more memory than the limit, so
>>>>>>>>>>> the halting decider is unable to analyze it.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Stoddart has the same idea as Olcott: there's a hidden
>>>>>>>>>>> variable which tells the program whether it's already in a
>>>>>>>>>>> simulation, and the program does something different if it's
>>>>>>>>>>> in a simulation than if it isn't.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *Professor Stoddart doesn't say anything like this*
>>>>>>>>>> You didn't read what he said you only guessed what he said.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In the section 4.1 of the article:
>>>>>>>>> "Implementation of H₁ requires it to determine whether it is
>>>>>>>>> being invoked
>>>>>>>>> from within S₁."
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Mikko
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> S ≙ if H(S) then Loop end.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> He did not use that for a solution.
>>>>>>>> He did use it to reject pathological inputs:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A halting decider works for ABSOLUTELY ALL PROGRAMS WITH
>>>>>>> ABSOLUTELY ZERO EXCEPTIONS, so he hasn't disproved the halting
>>>>>>> problem.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You can't even understand that the Liar Paradox is neither true
>>>>>> nor false.
>>>>>>
>>>>> You can't even understand that a halting decoder works for
>>>>> ABSOLUTELY ALL PROGRAMS WITH ABSOLUTELY NO EXCEPTIONS.
>>>>
>>>> It has been proven otherwise and the proof is simply over your head.
>>>>
>>>
>>> You cannot refute a stipulative definition.
>>
>> ZFC did show that the definition stipulated by naive set theory of the
>> term {set} was incoherent.
>>
> No, Russell proved that naive set theory was inconsistent.

Specifically that the definition of a {set} was inconsistent/incoherent.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 1/22/2024 6:09 PM, wij wrote:
> On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 10:28 +0200, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-01-21 19:22:22 +0000, wij said:
>>
>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>
>>> In the conclusion section:
>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot
>>> be
>>> for-
>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not
>>> exist as
>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a
>>> paradox.
>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses on
>>> Computer
>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the
>>> halting
>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>
>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing something?
>>
>> The error in the article is the claim that an "inconsistent"
>> specification
>> is somehow invalid. But it is not.
>>
>> A problem is a request to find at least one thing that satisfies the
>> requirements of the problem or to prove that no such thing can be
>> found.
>> The problem is well posed if for every thing it is possible to check
>> whether it satisfies all requirements.
>>
>> The halting problem is solved: a proof that no Turing machine
>> satisfies
>> the requirements is known (and nothing else satisfies the requirement
>> that it must be a Turing machine).
>>
>> It is a matter of opinion whether the usual presentation of the
>> halting theorem is the best one. If one does not like the usual
>> statement one may instead use:
>>   For every universal Turing machine U and every Turing machine H
>>   there is an input string S so that
>>   either T(S) halts but H(S) does not accept
>>   or T(S) does not halt but H(S) accepts.
>>
>> This formulation has the disadvantage that it uses the concept of
>> "univesal Turing machine", and therefore depends on the existence
>> of one.
>>
>> Mikko
>>
>
> Thanks for the explanation.
> It looked to me it is the statement of Halting Problem proved neither
> T nor F bugged these people (including olcott).
> There is also a status of proposition called contingency,
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy)

Ultimately all these things boil down to the fact that
self-contradictory questions must be rejected as incorrect
questions. Hehner's paper explains this the best:
https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hehner/OSS.pdf

The key part that non-technical people can understand is
Carol's question:
Can Carol correctly answer “no” to this [yes/no] question?

That question is self-contradictory when posed to Carol
and has the correct answer of "no" when posed to anyone else.

Carol's question actually originates from my own conversation:

On 6/25/2004 6:30 PM, Daryl McCullough wrote: (USENET sci.logic)
> You ask someone (we'll call him "Jack") to give a truthful
> yes/no answer to the following question:
>
> Will Jack's answer to this question be no?

was addressed to me in 2004.
Hehner had no way of knowing this I repeated this
same question as Bill's question hundreds of times
until I tracked down the original author.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 18:39 -0600, olcott wrote:
> On 1/22/2024 6:09 PM, wij wrote:
> > On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 10:28 +0200, Mikko wrote:
> > > On 2024-01-21 19:22:22 +0000, wij said:
> > >
> > > > I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
> > > > https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
> > > >
> > > > In the conclusion section:
> > > > The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but
> > > > cannot
> > > > be
> > > > for-
> > > > malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does
> > > > not
> > > > exist as
> > > > a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to
> > > > a
> > > > paradox.
> > > > The halting problem is universally used in university courses
> > > > on
> > > > Computer
> > > > Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims
> > > > the
> > > > halting
> > > > problem is misconceived......
> > > >
> > > > It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing
> > > > something?
> > >
> > > The error in the article is the claim that an "inconsistent"
> > > specification
> > > is somehow invalid. But it is not.
> > >
> > > A problem is a request to find at least one thing that satisfies
> > > the
> > > requirements of the problem or to prove that no such thing can be
> > > found.
> > > The problem is well posed if for every thing it is possible to
> > > check
> > > whether it satisfies all requirements.
> > >
> > > The halting problem is solved: a proof that no Turing machine
> > > satisfies
> > > the requirements is known (and nothing else satisfies the
> > > requirement
> > > that it must be a Turing machine).
> > >
> > > It is a matter of opinion whether the usual presentation of the
> > > halting theorem is the best one. If one does not like the usual
> > > statement one may instead use:
> > >    For every universal Turing machine U and every Turing machine
> > > H
> > >    there is an input string S so that
> > >    either T(S) halts but H(S) does not accept
> > >    or T(S) does not halt but H(S) accepts.
> > >
> > > This formulation has the disadvantage that it uses the concept of
> > > "univesal Turing machine", and therefore depends on the existence
> > > of one.
> > >
> > > Mikko
> > >
> >
> > Thanks for the explanation.
> > It looked to me it is the statement of Halting Problem proved
> > neither
> > T nor F bugged these people (including olcott).
> > There is also a status of proposition called contingency,
> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy)
>
> Ultimately all these things boil down to the fact that
> self-contradictory questions must be rejected as incorrect
> questions. Hehner's paper explains this the best:
> https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hehner/OSS.pdf
>
> The key part that non-technical people can understand is
> Carol's question:
> Can Carol correctly answer “no” to this [yes/no] question?
>
> That question is self-contradictory when posed to Carol
> and has the correct answer of "no" when posed to anyone else.
>
> Carol's question actually originates from my own conversation:
>
> On 6/25/2004 6:30 PM, Daryl McCullough wrote:  (USENET sci.logic)
>  > You ask someone (we'll call him "Jack") to give a truthful
>  > yes/no answer to the following question:
>  >
>  >  Will Jack's answer to this question be no?
>
> was addressed to me in 2004.
> Hehner had no way of knowing this I repeated this
> same question as Bill's question hundreds of times
> until I tracked down the original author.
>

The HP is asking (equivalent) for A PROGRAM that takes another program
as its argument and decides whether or not that given program
will terminate.

The HP is not asking the evaluation of "HP Theorem" (the conclusion) 
to be true or false!!!

On 1/22/2024 6:57 PM, wij wrote:
> On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 18:39 -0600, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/22/2024 6:09 PM, wij wrote:
>>> On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 10:28 +0200, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-01-21 19:22:22 +0000, wij said:
>>>>
>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>
>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but
>>>>> cannot
>>>>> be
>>>>> for-
>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does
>>>>> not
>>>>> exist as
>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to
>>>>> a
>>>>> paradox.
>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university courses
>>>>> on
>>>>> Computer
>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims
>>>>> the
>>>>> halting
>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>
>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing
>>>>> something?
>>>>
>>>> The error in the article is the claim that an "inconsistent"
>>>> specification
>>>> is somehow invalid. But it is not.
>>>>
>>>> A problem is a request to find at least one thing that satisfies
>>>> the
>>>> requirements of the problem or to prove that no such thing can be
>>>> found.
>>>> The problem is well posed if for every thing it is possible to
>>>> check
>>>> whether it satisfies all requirements.
>>>>
>>>> The halting problem is solved: a proof that no Turing machine
>>>> satisfies
>>>> the requirements is known (and nothing else satisfies the
>>>> requirement
>>>> that it must be a Turing machine).
>>>>
>>>> It is a matter of opinion whether the usual presentation of the
>>>> halting theorem is the best one. If one does not like the usual
>>>> statement one may instead use:
>>>>    For every universal Turing machine U and every Turing machine
>>>> H
>>>>    there is an input string S so that
>>>>    either T(S) halts but H(S) does not accept
>>>>    or T(S) does not halt but H(S) accepts.
>>>>
>>>> This formulation has the disadvantage that it uses the concept of
>>>> "univesal Turing machine", and therefore depends on the existence
>>>> of one.
>>>>
>>>> Mikko
>>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks for the explanation.
>>> It looked to me it is the statement of Halting Problem proved
>>> neither
>>> T nor F bugged these people (including olcott).
>>> There is also a status of proposition called contingency,
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy)
>>
>> Ultimately all these things boil down to the fact that
>> self-contradictory questions must be rejected as incorrect
>> questions. Hehner's paper explains this the best:
>> https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hehner/OSS.pdf
>>
>> The key part that non-technical people can understand is
>> Carol's question:
>> Can Carol correctly answer “no” to this [yes/no] question?
>>
>> That question is self-contradictory when posed to Carol
>> and has the correct answer of "no" when posed to anyone else.
>>
>> Carol's question actually originates from my own conversation:
>>
>> On 6/25/2004 6:30 PM, Daryl McCullough wrote:  (USENET sci.logic)
>>  > You ask someone (we'll call him "Jack") to give a truthful
>>  > yes/no answer to the following question:
>>  >
>>  >  Will Jack's answer to this question be no?
>>
>> was addressed to me in 2004.
>> Hehner had no way of knowing this I repeated this
>> same question as Bill's question hundreds of times
>> until I tracked down the original author.
>>
>
> The HP is asking (equivalent) for A PROGRAM that takes another program
> as its argument and decides whether or not that given program
> will terminate.
>
> The HP is not asking the evaluation of "HP Theorem" (the conclusion)
> to be true or false!!!

The HP uses a counter-example D that does the opposite
of whatever value that H returns, thus making the question
Does D halt? a self-contradictory question for H.

Professor Hehner understood this exactly the same way with his:
Can Carol correctly answer “no” to this [yes/no] question?

Richard deserves credit for finding a loophole in the
version in Hehner's paper.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 19:19 -0600, olcott wrote:
> On 1/22/2024 6:57 PM, wij wrote:
> > On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 18:39 -0600, olcott wrote:
> > > On 1/22/2024 6:09 PM, wij wrote:
> > > > On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 10:28 +0200, Mikko wrote:
> > > > > On 2024-01-21 19:22:22 +0000, wij said:
> > > > >
> > > > > > I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
> > > > > > https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
> > > > > >
> > > > > > In the conclusion section:
> > > > > > The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but
> > > > > > cannot
> > > > > > be
> > > > > > for-
> > > > > > malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and
> > > > > > does
> > > > > > not
> > > > > > exist as
> > > > > > a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence
> > > > > > leads to
> > > > > > a
> > > > > > paradox.
> > > > > > The halting problem is universally used in university
> > > > > > courses
> > > > > > on
> > > > > > Computer
> > > > > > Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner
> > > > > > claims
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > halting
> > > > > > problem is misconceived......
> > > > > >
> > > > > > It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing
> > > > > > something?
> > > > >
> > > > > The error in the article is the claim that an "inconsistent"
> > > > > specification
> > > > > is somehow invalid. But it is not.
> > > > >
> > > > > A problem is a request to find at least one thing that
> > > > > satisfies
> > > > > the
> > > > > requirements of the problem or to prove that no such thing
> > > > > can be
> > > > > found.
> > > > > The problem is well posed if for every thing it is possible
> > > > > to
> > > > > check
> > > > > whether it satisfies all requirements.
> > > > >
> > > > > The halting problem is solved: a proof that no Turing machine
> > > > > satisfies
> > > > > the requirements is known (and nothing else satisfies the
> > > > > requirement
> > > > > that it must be a Turing machine).
> > > > >
> > > > > It is a matter of opinion whether the usual presentation of
> > > > > the
> > > > > halting theorem is the best one. If one does not like the
> > > > > usual
> > > > > statement one may instead use:
> > > > >     For every universal Turing machine U and every Turing
> > > > > machine
> > > > > H
> > > > >     there is an input string S so that
> > > > >     either T(S) halts but H(S) does not accept
> > > > >     or T(S) does not halt but H(S) accepts.
> > > > >
> > > > > This formulation has the disadvantage that it uses the
> > > > > concept of
> > > > > "univesal Turing machine", and therefore depends on the
> > > > > existence
> > > > > of one.
> > > > >
> > > > > Mikko
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > Thanks for the explanation.
> > > > It looked to me it is the statement of Halting Problem proved
> > > > neither
> > > > T nor F bugged these people (including olcott).
> > > > There is also a status of proposition called contingency,
> > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy)
> > >
> > > Ultimately all these things boil down to the fact that
> > > self-contradictory questions must be rejected as incorrect
> > > questions. Hehner's paper explains this the best:
> > > https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hehner/OSS.pdf
> > >
> > > The key part that non-technical people can understand is
> > > Carol's question:
> > > Can Carol correctly answer “no” to this [yes/no] question?
> > >
> > > That question is self-contradictory when posed to Carol
> > > and has the correct answer of "no" when posed to anyone else.
> > >
> > > Carol's question actually originates from my own conversation:
> > >
> > > On 6/25/2004 6:30 PM, Daryl McCullough wrote:  (USENET sci.logic)
> > >   > You ask someone (we'll call him "Jack") to give a truthful
> > >   > yes/no answer to the following question:
> > >   >
> > >   >  Will Jack's answer to this question be no?
> > >
> > > was addressed to me in 2004.
> > > Hehner had no way of knowing this I repeated this
> > > same question as Bill's question hundreds of times
> > > until I tracked down the original author.
> > >
> >
> > The HP is asking (equivalent) for A PROGRAM that takes another
> > program
> > as its argument and decides whether or not that given program
> > will terminate.
> >
> > The HP is not asking the evaluation of "HP Theorem" (the
> > conclusion)
> > to be true or false!!!

> The HP uses a counter-example D that does the opposite
> of whatever value that H returns, thus making the question
> Does D halt? a self-contradictory question for H.

It seems you took it as:
Proposition P="A program that decides whether another program halts or
not is undecidable".

Q: Is P true or false?

If P is true -> P is decidable
If P is false -> P is undecidable

----
There is a logical error above.
And. the HP is not asking about D but a GIVEN program, not a program
you can directly type in the program of POOH.

> Professor Hehner understood this exactly the same way with his:
> Can Carol correctly answer “no” to this [yes/no] question?
>
> Richard deserves credit for finding a loophole in the
> version in Hehner's paper.
>

On 1/22/2024 7:44 PM, wij wrote:
> On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 19:19 -0600, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/22/2024 6:57 PM, wij wrote:
>>> On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 18:39 -0600, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/2024 6:09 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 10:28 +0200, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-01-21 19:22:22 +0000, wij said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but
>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>> for-
>>>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and
>>>>>>> does
>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>> exist as
>>>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence
>>>>>>> leads to
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>> paradox.
>>>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university
>>>>>>> courses
>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>> Computer
>>>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner
>>>>>>> claims
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> halting
>>>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing
>>>>>>> something?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The error in the article is the claim that an "inconsistent"
>>>>>> specification
>>>>>> is somehow invalid. But it is not.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A problem is a request to find at least one thing that
>>>>>> satisfies
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> requirements of the problem or to prove that no such thing
>>>>>> can be
>>>>>> found.
>>>>>> The problem is well posed if for every thing it is possible
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> check
>>>>>> whether it satisfies all requirements.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The halting problem is solved: a proof that no Turing machine
>>>>>> satisfies
>>>>>> the requirements is known (and nothing else satisfies the
>>>>>> requirement
>>>>>> that it must be a Turing machine).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is a matter of opinion whether the usual presentation of
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> halting theorem is the best one. If one does not like the
>>>>>> usual
>>>>>> statement one may instead use:
>>>>>>     For every universal Turing machine U and every Turing
>>>>>> machine
>>>>>> H
>>>>>>     there is an input string S so that
>>>>>>     either T(S) halts but H(S) does not accept
>>>>>>     or T(S) does not halt but H(S) accepts.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This formulation has the disadvantage that it uses the
>>>>>> concept of
>>>>>> "univesal Turing machine", and therefore depends on the
>>>>>> existence
>>>>>> of one.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Mikko
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks for the explanation.
>>>>> It looked to me it is the statement of Halting Problem proved
>>>>> neither
>>>>> T nor F bugged these people (including olcott).
>>>>> There is also a status of proposition called contingency,
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy)
>>>>
>>>> Ultimately all these things boil down to the fact that
>>>> self-contradictory questions must be rejected as incorrect
>>>> questions. Hehner's paper explains this the best:
>>>> https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hehner/OSS.pdf
>>>>
>>>> The key part that non-technical people can understand is
>>>> Carol's question:
>>>> Can Carol correctly answer “no” to this [yes/no] question?
>>>>
>>>> That question is self-contradictory when posed to Carol
>>>> and has the correct answer of "no" when posed to anyone else.
>>>>
>>>> Carol's question actually originates from my own conversation:
>>>>
>>>> On 6/25/2004 6:30 PM, Daryl McCullough wrote:  (USENET sci.logic)
>>>>   > You ask someone (we'll call him "Jack") to give a truthful
>>>>   > yes/no answer to the following question:
>>>>   >
>>>>   >  Will Jack's answer to this question be no?
>>>>
>>>> was addressed to me in 2004.
>>>> Hehner had no way of knowing this I repeated this
>>>> same question as Bill's question hundreds of times
>>>> until I tracked down the original author.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The HP is asking (equivalent) for A PROGRAM that takes another
>>> program
>>> as its argument and decides whether or not that given program
>>> will terminate.
>>>
>>> The HP is not asking the evaluation of "HP Theorem" (the
>>> conclusion)
>>> to be true or false!!!
>
>> The HP uses a counter-example D that does the opposite
>> of whatever value that H returns, thus making the question
>> Does D halt? a self-contradictory question for H.
>
> It seems you took it as:
> Proposition P="A program that decides whether another program halts or
> not is undecidable".
>

I have gone over these details many many thousands of times since 2004.
That actual question for H is this:

"What correct Boolean value does H return when D is defined to do the
opposite of whatever value that H returns?"

*immibis came up with the exact isomorphism of the Barber Paradox*
On 1/6/2024 1:54 PM, immibis wrote:
> "Does a barber who shaves every man who does not shave himself shave
> himself?" has no correct answer.

Stoddart proposes the same method that I came up
with for making a halting decidability decider.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 20:05 -0600, olcott wrote:
> On 1/22/2024 7:44 PM, wij wrote:
> > On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 19:19 -0600, olcott wrote:
> > > On 1/22/2024 6:57 PM, wij wrote:
> > > > On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 18:39 -0600, olcott wrote:
> > > > > On 1/22/2024 6:09 PM, wij wrote:
> > > > > > On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 10:28 +0200, Mikko wrote:
> > > > > > > On 2024-01-21 19:22:22 +0000, wij said:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
> > > > > > > > https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > In the conclusion section:
> > > > > > > > The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable,
> > > > > > > > but
> > > > > > > > cannot
> > > > > > > > be
> > > > > > > > for-
> > > > > > > > malised as a consistent specification. It has no model
> > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > does
> > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > exist as
> > > > > > > > a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence
> > > > > > > > leads to
> > > > > > > > a
> > > > > > > > paradox.
> > > > > > > > The halting problem is universally used in university
> > > > > > > > courses
> > > > > > > > on
> > > > > > > > Computer
> > > > > > > > Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner
> > > > > > > > claims
> > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > halting
> > > > > > > > problem is misconceived......
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing
> > > > > > > > something?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > The error in the article is the claim that an
> > > > > > > "inconsistent"
> > > > > > > specification
> > > > > > > is somehow invalid. But it is not.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > A problem is a request to find at least one thing that
> > > > > > > satisfies
> > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > requirements of the problem or to prove that no such
> > > > > > > thing
> > > > > > > can be
> > > > > > > found.
> > > > > > > The problem is well posed if for every thing it is
> > > > > > > possible
> > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > check
> > > > > > > whether it satisfies all requirements.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > The halting problem is solved: a proof that no Turing
> > > > > > > machine
> > > > > > > satisfies
> > > > > > > the requirements is known (and nothing else satisfies the
> > > > > > > requirement
> > > > > > > that it must be a Turing machine).
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > It is a matter of opinion whether the usual presentation
> > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > halting theorem is the best one. If one does not like the
> > > > > > > usual
> > > > > > > statement one may instead use:
> > > > > > >      For every universal Turing machine U and every
> > > > > > > Turing
> > > > > > > machine
> > > > > > > H
> > > > > > >      there is an input string S so that
> > > > > > >      either T(S) halts but H(S) does not accept
> > > > > > >      or T(S) does not halt but H(S) accepts.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > This formulation has the disadvantage that it uses the
> > > > > > > concept of
> > > > > > > "univesal Turing machine", and therefore depends on the
> > > > > > > existence
> > > > > > > of one.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Mikko
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Thanks for the explanation.
> > > > > > It looked to me it is the statement of Halting Problem
> > > > > > proved
> > > > > > neither
> > > > > > T nor F bugged these people (including olcott).
> > > > > > There is also a status of proposition called contingency,
> > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy)
> > > > >
> > > > > Ultimately all these things boil down to the fact that
> > > > > self-contradictory questions must be rejected as incorrect
> > > > > questions. Hehner's paper explains this the best:
> > > > > https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hehner/OSS.pdf
> > > > >
> > > > > The key part that non-technical people can understand is
> > > > > Carol's question:
> > > > > Can Carol correctly answer “no” to this [yes/no] question?
> > > > >
> > > > > That question is self-contradictory when posed to Carol
> > > > > and has the correct answer of "no" when posed to anyone else.
> > > > >
> > > > > Carol's question actually originates from my own
> > > > > conversation:
> > > > >
> > > > > On 6/25/2004 6:30 PM, Daryl McCullough wrote:  (USENET
> > > > > sci.logic)
> > > > >    > You ask someone (we'll call him "Jack") to give a
> > > > > truthful
> > > > >    > yes/no answer to the following question:
> > > > >    >
> > > > >    >  Will Jack's answer to this question be no?
> > > > >
> > > > > was addressed to me in 2004.
> > > > > Hehner had no way of knowing this I repeated this
> > > > > same question as Bill's question hundreds of times
> > > > > until I tracked down the original author.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > The HP is asking (equivalent) for A PROGRAM that takes another
> > > > program
> > > > as its argument and decides whether or not that given program
> > > > will terminate.
> > > >
> > > > The HP is not asking the evaluation of "HP Theorem" (the
> > > > conclusion)
> > > > to be true or false!!!
> >
> > > The HP uses a counter-example D that does the opposite
> > > of whatever value that H returns, thus making the question
> > > Does D halt? a self-contradictory question for H.
> >
> > It seems you took it as:
> > Proposition P="A program that decides whether another program halts
> > or
> > not is undecidable".
> >
>
> I have gone over these details many many thousands of times since
> 2004.
> That actual question for H is this:
>
> "What correct Boolean value does H return when D is defined to do the
>   opposite of whatever value that H returns?"

As you already have seen: The H would be stock in an infinite recursive
call. I.e. H is not implementable.

The result as know it that you deliberately fabricate D in way to say
whatever you want to say, this is invalid.

> *immibis came up with the exact isomorphism of the Barber Paradox*
> On 1/6/2024 1:54 PM, immibis wrote:
>  > "Does a barber who shaves every man who does not shave himself
> shave
>  > himself?" has no correct answer.
>
> Stoddart proposes the same method that I came up
> with for making a halting decidability decider.
>

On 1/22/2024 8:13 PM, wij wrote:
> On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 20:05 -0600, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/22/2024 7:44 PM, wij wrote:
>>> On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 19:19 -0600, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/2024 6:57 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 18:39 -0600, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 6:09 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>>>> On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 10:28 +0200, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2024-01-21 19:22:22 +0000, wij said:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable,
>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>>> for-
>>>>>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no model
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> does
>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>> exist as
>>>>>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence
>>>>>>>>> leads to
>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>> paradox.
>>>>>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in university
>>>>>>>>> courses
>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>> Computer
>>>>>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner
>>>>>>>>> claims
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> halting
>>>>>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I missing
>>>>>>>>> something?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The error in the article is the claim that an
>>>>>>>> "inconsistent"
>>>>>>>> specification
>>>>>>>> is somehow invalid. But it is not.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A problem is a request to find at least one thing that
>>>>>>>> satisfies
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> requirements of the problem or to prove that no such
>>>>>>>> thing
>>>>>>>> can be
>>>>>>>> found.
>>>>>>>> The problem is well posed if for every thing it is
>>>>>>>> possible
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> check
>>>>>>>> whether it satisfies all requirements.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The halting problem is solved: a proof that no Turing
>>>>>>>> machine
>>>>>>>> satisfies
>>>>>>>> the requirements is known (and nothing else satisfies the
>>>>>>>> requirement
>>>>>>>> that it must be a Turing machine).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It is a matter of opinion whether the usual presentation
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> halting theorem is the best one. If one does not like the
>>>>>>>> usual
>>>>>>>> statement one may instead use:
>>>>>>>>      For every universal Turing machine U and every
>>>>>>>> Turing
>>>>>>>> machine
>>>>>>>> H
>>>>>>>>      there is an input string S so that
>>>>>>>>      either T(S) halts but H(S) does not accept
>>>>>>>>      or T(S) does not halt but H(S) accepts.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This formulation has the disadvantage that it uses the
>>>>>>>> concept of
>>>>>>>> "univesal Turing machine", and therefore depends on the
>>>>>>>> existence
>>>>>>>> of one.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Mikko
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks for the explanation.
>>>>>>> It looked to me it is the statement of Halting Problem
>>>>>>> proved
>>>>>>> neither
>>>>>>> T nor F bugged these people (including olcott).
>>>>>>> There is also a status of proposition called contingency,
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ultimately all these things boil down to the fact that
>>>>>> self-contradictory questions must be rejected as incorrect
>>>>>> questions. Hehner's paper explains this the best:
>>>>>> https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hehner/OSS.pdf
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The key part that non-technical people can understand is
>>>>>> Carol's question:
>>>>>> Can Carol correctly answer “no” to this [yes/no] question?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That question is self-contradictory when posed to Carol
>>>>>> and has the correct answer of "no" when posed to anyone else.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Carol's question actually originates from my own
>>>>>> conversation:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 6/25/2004 6:30 PM, Daryl McCullough wrote:  (USENET
>>>>>> sci.logic)
>>>>>>    > You ask someone (we'll call him "Jack") to give a
>>>>>> truthful
>>>>>>    > yes/no answer to the following question:
>>>>>>    >
>>>>>>    >  Will Jack's answer to this question be no?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> was addressed to me in 2004.
>>>>>> Hehner had no way of knowing this I repeated this
>>>>>> same question as Bill's question hundreds of times
>>>>>> until I tracked down the original author.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The HP is asking (equivalent) for A PROGRAM that takes another
>>>>> program
>>>>> as its argument and decides whether or not that given program
>>>>> will terminate.
>>>>>
>>>>> The HP is not asking the evaluation of "HP Theorem" (the
>>>>> conclusion)
>>>>> to be true or false!!!
>>>
>>>> The HP uses a counter-example D that does the opposite
>>>> of whatever value that H returns, thus making the question
>>>> Does D halt? a self-contradictory question for H.
>>>
>>> It seems you took it as:
>>> Proposition P="A program that decides whether another program halts
>>> or
>>> not is undecidable".
>>>
>>
>> I have gone over these details many many thousands of times since
>> 2004.
>> That actual question for H is this:
>>
>> "What correct Boolean value does H return when D is defined to do the
>>   opposite of whatever value that H returns?"
>
> As you already have seen: The H would be stock in an infinite recursive
> call. I.e. H is not implementable.
>

You mean "stuck" not "stock".

https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm
I spent 1.5 years making sure that H does not get stuck it has been
fully operational code for several years now.

> The result as know it that you deliberately fabricate D in way to say
> whatever you want to say, this is invalid.
>

https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/Halt7.c
int D(int (*x)())
{ int Halt_Status = H(x, x);
if (Halt_Status)
HERE: goto HERE;
return Halt_Status;
}

is on lines 935-941 of FULLY OPERATIONAL CODE

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 20:20 -0600, olcott wrote:
> On 1/22/2024 8:13 PM, wij wrote:
> > On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 20:05 -0600, olcott wrote:
> > > On 1/22/2024 7:44 PM, wij wrote:
> > > > On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 19:19 -0600, olcott wrote:
> > > > > On 1/22/2024 6:57 PM, wij wrote:
> > > > > > On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 18:39 -0600, olcott wrote:
> > > > > > > On 1/22/2024 6:09 PM, wij wrote:
> > > > > > > > On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 10:28 +0200, Mikko wrote:
> > > > > > > > > On 2024-01-21 19:22:22 +0000, wij said:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
> > > > > > > > > > https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > In the conclusion section:
> > > > > > > > > > The idea of a universal halting test seems
> > > > > > > > > > reasonable,
> > > > > > > > > > but
> > > > > > > > > > cannot
> > > > > > > > > > be
> > > > > > > > > > for-
> > > > > > > > > > malised as a consistent specification. It has no
> > > > > > > > > > model
> > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > does
> > > > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > > > exist as
> > > > > > > > > > a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual
> > > > > > > > > > existence
> > > > > > > > > > leads to
> > > > > > > > > > a
> > > > > > > > > > paradox.
> > > > > > > > > > The halting problem is universally used in
> > > > > > > > > > university
> > > > > > > > > > courses
> > > > > > > > > > on
> > > > > > > > > > Computer
> > > > > > > > > > Science to illustrate the limits of computation.
> > > > > > > > > > Hehner
> > > > > > > > > > claims
> > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > halting
> > > > > > > > > > problem is misconceived......
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I
> > > > > > > > > > missing
> > > > > > > > > > something?
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > The error in the article is the claim that an
> > > > > > > > > "inconsistent"
> > > > > > > > > specification
> > > > > > > > > is somehow invalid. But it is not.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > A problem is a request to find at least one thing
> > > > > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > > satisfies
> > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > requirements of the problem or to prove that no such
> > > > > > > > > thing
> > > > > > > > > can be
> > > > > > > > > found.
> > > > > > > > > The problem is well posed if for every thing it is
> > > > > > > > > possible
> > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > check
> > > > > > > > > whether it satisfies all requirements.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > The halting problem is solved: a proof that no Turing
> > > > > > > > > machine
> > > > > > > > > satisfies
> > > > > > > > > the requirements is known (and nothing else satisfies
> > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > requirement
> > > > > > > > > that it must be a Turing machine).
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > It is a matter of opinion whether the usual
> > > > > > > > > presentation
> > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > halting theorem is the best one. If one does not like
> > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > usual
> > > > > > > > > statement one may instead use:
> > > > > > > > >       For every universal Turing machine U and every
> > > > > > > > > Turing
> > > > > > > > > machine
> > > > > > > > > H
> > > > > > > > >       there is an input string S so that
> > > > > > > > >       either T(S) halts but H(S) does not accept
> > > > > > > > >       or T(S) does not halt but H(S) accepts.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > This formulation has the disadvantage that it uses
> > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > concept of
> > > > > > > > > "univesal Turing machine", and therefore depends on
> > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > existence
> > > > > > > > > of one.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Mikko
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Thanks for the explanation.
> > > > > > > > It looked to me it is the statement of Halting Problem
> > > > > > > > proved
> > > > > > > > neither
> > > > > > > > T nor F bugged these people (including olcott).
> > > > > > > > There is also a status of proposition called
> > > > > > > > contingency,
> > > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy)
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Ultimately all these things boil down to the fact that
> > > > > > > self-contradictory questions must be rejected as
> > > > > > > incorrect
> > > > > > > questions. Hehner's paper explains this the best:
> > > > > > > https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hehner/OSS.pdf
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > The key part that non-technical people can understand is
> > > > > > > Carol's question:
> > > > > > > Can Carol correctly answer “no” to this [yes/no]
> > > > > > > question?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > That question is self-contradictory when posed to Carol
> > > > > > > and has the correct answer of "no" when posed to anyone
> > > > > > > else.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Carol's question actually originates from my own
> > > > > > > conversation:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On 6/25/2004 6:30 PM, Daryl McCullough wrote:  (USENET
> > > > > > > sci.logic)
> > > > > > >     > You ask someone (we'll call him "Jack") to give a
> > > > > > > truthful
> > > > > > >     > yes/no answer to the following question:
> > > > > > >     >
> > > > > > >     >  Will Jack's answer to this question be no?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > was addressed to me in 2004.
> > > > > > > Hehner had no way of knowing this I repeated this
> > > > > > > same question as Bill's question hundreds of times
> > > > > > > until I tracked down the original author.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The HP is asking (equivalent) for A PROGRAM that takes
> > > > > > another
> > > > > > program
> > > > > > as its argument and decides whether or not that given
> > > > > > program
> > > > > > will terminate.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The HP is not asking the evaluation of "HP Theorem" (the
> > > > > > conclusion)
> > > > > > to be true or false!!!
> > > >
> > > > > The HP uses a counter-example D that does the opposite
> > > > > of whatever value that H returns, thus making the question
> > > > > Does D halt? a self-contradictory question for H.
> > > >
> > > > It seems you took it as:
> > > > Proposition P="A program that decides whether another program
> > > > halts
> > > > or
> > > > not is undecidable".
> > > >
> > >
> > > I have gone over these details many many thousands of times since
> > > 2004.
> > > That actual question for H is this:
> > >
> > > "What correct Boolean value does H return when D is defined to do
> > > the
> > >    opposite of whatever value that H returns?"
> >
> > As you already have seen: The H would be stock in an infinite
> > recursive
> > call. I.e. H is not implementable.
> >
>
> You mean "stuck" not "stock".
>
> https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm
> I spent 1.5 years making sure that H does not get stuck it has been
> fully operational code for several years now.
>
> > The result as know it that you deliberately fabricate D in way to
> > say
> > whatever you want to say, this is invalid.
> >
>
> https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/Halt7.c
> int D(int (*x)())
> {
>    int Halt_Status = H(x, x);
>    if (Halt_Status)
>      HERE: goto HERE;
>    return Halt_Status;
> }
>
> is on lines 935-941 of FULLY OPERATIONAL CODE
>

On 1/22/2024 8:27 PM, wij wrote:
> On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 20:20 -0600, olcott wrote:
>> On 1/22/2024 8:13 PM, wij wrote:
>>> On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 20:05 -0600, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 1/22/2024 7:44 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 19:19 -0600, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 6:57 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>>>> On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 18:39 -0600, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 1/22/2024 6:09 PM, wij wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On Mon, 2024-01-22 at 10:28 +0200, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-01-21 19:22:22 +0000, wij said:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I just found an article about the Halting Problem.
>>>>>>>>>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In the conclusion section:
>>>>>>>>>>> The idea of a universal halting test seems
>>>>>>>>>>> reasonable,
>>>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>>>>> for-
>>>>>>>>>>> malised as a consistent specification. It has no
>>>>>>>>>>> model
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> does
>>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>> exist as
>>>>>>>>>>> a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual
>>>>>>>>>>> existence
>>>>>>>>>>> leads to
>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>> paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>> The halting problem is universally used in
>>>>>>>>>>> university
>>>>>>>>>>> courses
>>>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>>> Computer
>>>>>>>>>>> Science to illustrate the limits of computation.
>>>>>>>>>>> Hehner
>>>>>>>>>>> claims
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> halting
>>>>>>>>>>> problem is misconceived......
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It looks like what olcott now is claiming. Am I
>>>>>>>>>>> missing
>>>>>>>>>>> something?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The error in the article is the claim that an
>>>>>>>>>> "inconsistent"
>>>>>>>>>> specification
>>>>>>>>>> is somehow invalid. But it is not.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A problem is a request to find at least one thing
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> satisfies
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> requirements of the problem or to prove that no such
>>>>>>>>>> thing
>>>>>>>>>> can be
>>>>>>>>>> found.
>>>>>>>>>> The problem is well posed if for every thing it is
>>>>>>>>>> possible
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> check
>>>>>>>>>> whether it satisfies all requirements.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The halting problem is solved: a proof that no Turing
>>>>>>>>>> machine
>>>>>>>>>> satisfies
>>>>>>>>>> the requirements is known (and nothing else satisfies
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> requirement
>>>>>>>>>> that it must be a Turing machine).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It is a matter of opinion whether the usual
>>>>>>>>>> presentation
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> halting theorem is the best one. If one does not like
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> usual
>>>>>>>>>> statement one may instead use:
>>>>>>>>>>       For every universal Turing machine U and every
>>>>>>>>>> Turing
>>>>>>>>>> machine
>>>>>>>>>> H
>>>>>>>>>>       there is an input string S so that
>>>>>>>>>>       either T(S) halts but H(S) does not accept
>>>>>>>>>>       or T(S) does not halt but H(S) accepts.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This formulation has the disadvantage that it uses
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> concept of
>>>>>>>>>> "univesal Turing machine", and therefore depends on
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> existence
>>>>>>>>>> of one.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Mikko
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Thanks for the explanation.
>>>>>>>>> It looked to me it is the statement of Halting Problem
>>>>>>>>> proved
>>>>>>>>> neither
>>>>>>>>> T nor F bugged these people (including olcott).
>>>>>>>>> There is also a status of proposition called
>>>>>>>>> contingency,
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Ultimately all these things boil down to the fact that
>>>>>>>> self-contradictory questions must be rejected as
>>>>>>>> incorrect
>>>>>>>> questions. Hehner's paper explains this the best:
>>>>>>>> https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hehner/OSS.pdf
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The key part that non-technical people can understand is
>>>>>>>> Carol's question:
>>>>>>>> Can Carol correctly answer “no” to this [yes/no]
>>>>>>>> question?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That question is self-contradictory when posed to Carol
>>>>>>>> and has the correct answer of "no" when posed to anyone
>>>>>>>> else.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Carol's question actually originates from my own
>>>>>>>> conversation:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 6/25/2004 6:30 PM, Daryl McCullough wrote:  (USENET
>>>>>>>> sci.logic)
>>>>>>>>     > You ask someone (we'll call him "Jack") to give a
>>>>>>>> truthful
>>>>>>>>     > yes/no answer to the following question:
>>>>>>>>     >
>>>>>>>>     >  Will Jack's answer to this question be no?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> was addressed to me in 2004.
>>>>>>>> Hehner had no way of knowing this I repeated this
>>>>>>>> same question as Bill's question hundreds of times
>>>>>>>> until I tracked down the original author.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The HP is asking (equivalent) for A PROGRAM that takes
>>>>>>> another
>>>>>>> program
>>>>>>> as its argument and decides whether or not that given
>>>>>>> program
>>>>>>> will terminate.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The HP is not asking the evaluation of "HP Theorem" (the
>>>>>>> conclusion)
>>>>>>> to be true or false!!!
>>>>>
>>>>>> The HP uses a counter-example D that does the opposite
>>>>>> of whatever value that H returns, thus making the question
>>>>>> Does D halt? a self-contradictory question for H.
>>>>>
>>>>> It seems you took it as:
>>>>> Proposition P="A program that decides whether another program
>>>>> halts
>>>>> or
>>>>> not is undecidable".
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I have gone over these details many many thousands of times since
>>>> 2004.
>>>> That actual question for H is this:
>>>>
>>>> "What correct Boolean value does H return when D is defined to do
>>>> the
>>>>    opposite of whatever value that H returns?"
>>>
>>> As you already have seen: The H would be stock in an infinite
>>> recursive
>>> call. I.e. H is not implementable.
>>>
>>
>> You mean "stuck" not "stock".
>>
>> https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm
>> I spent 1.5 years making sure that H does not get stuck it has been
>> fully operational code for several years now.
>>
>>> The result as know it that you deliberately fabricate D in way to
>>> say
>>> whatever you want to say, this is invalid.
>>>
>>
>> https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/Halt7.c
>> int D(int (*x)())
>> {
>>    int Halt_Status = H(x, x);
>>    if (Halt_Status)
>>      HERE: goto HERE;
>>    return Halt_Status;
>> }
>>
>> is on lines 935-941 of FULLY OPERATIONAL CODE
>>
>
> You have been through this for a long time. I would suggest
> reading something about quantum computing, then, you will
> become expert soon (because you are a genius), not many people
> reading by rote can disagree with you with those age old
> theories.