On 04/24/2024 08:16 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/24/2024 9:41 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/24/2024 06:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/24/2024 8:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/24/2024 01:41 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/24/2024 1:58 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/24/2024 11:10 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/24/2024 12:34 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 04/24/2024 08:57 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/24/2024 10:07 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 04/23/2024 11:59 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/23/2024 12:55 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/23/2024 09:24 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/24 12:18 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/24 8:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/24 5:38 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 4:19 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/24 3:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 1:42 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/21/2024 10:41 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meant it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or false
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> determine
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-contradictory
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though X
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sensitive,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rationality
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stonger
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "silver
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> least
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two things,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> another
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statistical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modality, is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unreliable,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> own
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consistency
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> models in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entire modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assumptions, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> follow
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structural
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> without proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ultimate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> foundation of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entire body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basis
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> richer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of reason
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deduction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "attain" to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> individuals and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> numbers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We must
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> broaden
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "dead
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rat"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautology that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deeper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> insight into the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautologies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Datur,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> applies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ... on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Philosophy",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Platonist,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yet a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sophisticated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Badiou's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "First Manifesto
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> own truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> necessarily
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> accounts, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the distinction
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sameness
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modes of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth. It
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seems
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that most
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simply
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "not believe in"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {fifteen
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> story office building} only because of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from "a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> geometry of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> geometry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arises,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> makes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamentality.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstract
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> models.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> king
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> beasts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copulas,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-class.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instance of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instance of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a type.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inversion,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> each
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> words),
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finite,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> great
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bodies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-class
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstraction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> science.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> moment.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing at all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aspect of all of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> never
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be able to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sensations of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> taking your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yourself
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> elevator to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the fifteen
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> floor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argument and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rhetoric
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> without an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encompassing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology, a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignorance and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modality
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (temporal).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vienna
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> school
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Shopenhauer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Derrida
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exploring the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after-Hegel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not new
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegelians.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel's a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Platonist, too.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Heidegger as,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gadamer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arrives
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Platonist
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sense of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thirteenth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> floors, ...,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The point is that because Quine could not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we know
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> accept
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yet, in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> terms of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> given
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yours
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> considered
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lacking
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Ontological
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Commitment:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Philosophical,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Phenomenological",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formalized
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> middle is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> makes sense
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in terms among common types.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> try
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to hide their ignorance with insults and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> disparagement.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Quodlibet
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradiction
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> absolutely
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _nothing_
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Trump is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> God}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In both the principle of explosion and valid
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deductive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inference.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> takes a form
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nevertheless to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [follows]';
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pope".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> types,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was just usual analysis because "classical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quasi-modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> establish
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> office
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tower
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which effect their relations in usual enough
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is-a/has-a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> senses
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or as with regards to any other collections of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tuples in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> classes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and individuals and predicates that affect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> descriptions of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations, which of course must be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> non-circular and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> non-contradictory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> already
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the minds of most people is to provide
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computations
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> human
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> few
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> months what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> already
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> spent
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sense.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Without
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> labor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> years
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> results a quite better approach to modern
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> foudnations,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The sum total of all human general knowledge
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encoded
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in mostly in formalized natural language
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> propositions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of this must be formalized using other formal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> languages.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One can explain the details of writing C
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> programs in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> explanation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> need
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We can compress the space required for these
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> axioms
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> them much easier to process in an inheritance
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hierarchy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology. We also refrain from directly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encoding and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> facts
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world that can be derived from other facts of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thus no need to store
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is already in the knowledge ontology
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inheritance
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hierarchy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the premises have to be drawable as random
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> draws and that it results the same deduction
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> regardless the order of the draws.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inference",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> premises.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is valid deductive inference as shown by my
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analysis
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> above:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Trump is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> God}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inference,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has to be the same from any angle and any draw
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relevance
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> directly encoded into our notion of formal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> systems of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then we get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Trump is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> God}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Implication", where "Material Implication" is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> neither
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a "truth table",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I totally agree with you on this. All of the other
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> people on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these forums take the steps of logic as forming
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> own
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> foundation and thus are inherently correct even when
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> derive nonsense.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I would replace implication with is a necessary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consequence
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Making the unary operator □ also be applied to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> binary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> derive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> belief
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They then go on to assert that anyone that does not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hold
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> religious belief is totally ignorant about logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> never
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with regards to why a usual "model"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "monotonicity"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entails.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Russell's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> considered
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bad ideas.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You are almost the only one that every agreed with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> me on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The only other one the agreed that EFQ is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nonsense had
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mathematicians
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have the firmly held religious belief that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rules of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> anyone
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fully understands all of the reasoning that proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When this proof is presented to them they put their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hands
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> over their ears making sure to not hear a single
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> word
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > The premises, of deductive inference, if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they're in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a given order, _is another premise_, and when
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _not_,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then those _are not_.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every sequence of inference steps must be in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> order
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or there is no connection between inference steps.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> associated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is not actually largely bunk.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Technology like this is the only feasible way
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> populate a knowledge ontology of the general
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the actual world.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> human
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that undecidable decision problems are really
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than yes/no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What you get into is the box and circle modalities,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about when the transfer principle applies and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a heap is a heap is a heap or the Sorities,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> matter of definition, not a paradox, disambiguated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in its quantifiers by disambiguating the universal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quantifier,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into for: any/each/every/all, existential as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unique or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the result _direct implication_ carries and with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ALL of De Morgan's rules of logic, simplifies things,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and excludes any sort "paradox".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That a cat has a kingdom and a genus and species
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> vis-a-vis
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being in a class of a kingdom and genus and speciesas
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is-a,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reflects that is-a and has-a are only about the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicates
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and relations, predicate logic and the predicate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> calculus,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the resulting logic large of relations, and not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> necessarily
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be confused with Tarski's "cylindrical" bits when
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example there is algebraic GEOMETRY and ALGEBRAIC
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> geometry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and they're _two, different things_.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I usually like to frame predicates as 'has-a'
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'is-a', because, things change, and "is" just "is".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's all relations of course, predicates is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I often have said "anybody who buys or shills
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Material
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Implication
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a fool or a fraud". The _direct_ implication, or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> plain
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> old implication, first of all fills all of De
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Morgan's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rules
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both ways, and, does not need "Material Implication",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> neither,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Russell: was never, the Pope.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Things have Types. So, one should be familiar with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> C.S.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Peirce
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the Lambda Calculus, yet, in the logic of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universals
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particulars, there is the besides Type Inversion,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> well quantifier ambiguities, simply courtesy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quantification
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and schemes or schemas, to be resolved with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quantifier
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> disambiguation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the correct and adequate book-keeping of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contingency
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modality in predication the relation a stroke,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Judgment.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Bottom line that you seem to be avoiding is that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are expressions that are {true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> SOME statements are true based on their "meaning" (as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defining it), not all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Not ALL True statements are True based on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> words.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Agaim, you are falling for the fallacy of proof by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Pythagorean Theorem isn't True by the meaning of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> words,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but its truth comes out of the Truth makers of Plane
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Geometry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and a series of valid connections from them to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Theorem.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We really cannot take the elevator of a puppy to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fifteenth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> floor of this puppy and this is {true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The majority of people that were convinced there is no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as {true on the basis of meaning} on the basis that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Quine
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> utterly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> failed to understand how we know that bachelors are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unmarried
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simply wrong.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't think many people think that there are no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statements
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that are true by the nature of the meaning of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> words,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the "meaning of the words" can't be the only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> criteria.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I never restricted it this way (to the meaning of words)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> THen you DO accept that Godel's G is a true statement by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning since there does not exist any number g that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> satisfies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined Primitive Recursive Relationship?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And this can be established by the infinite sequence of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> steps of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> checking every Natural Number against that relationship,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the classical meaning of Semantically true,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And thus is can not be a epistemological antinomy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I never even restricted on on the basis of the:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Principle of compositionality*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In semantics, mathematical logic and related
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> disciplines,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> principle
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of compositionality is the principle that the meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression is determined by the meanings of its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> constituent
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the rules used to combine them.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have *always* meant the 100% perfectly totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that also includes the full discourse context.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> How does that show that the Pathagorean Theorem is true?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The question isn't determining the "Meaning of the Words"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what the full discourse context would provide, but the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the logical arguement that proves it, which is something
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> goes beyound "meaning" of the words.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you think that it is possible to:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth floor of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> puppy?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or would the total meaning of the expression make that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> impossible?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nope. WHich is a fallacy of proof by example.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note, all your examples go to the most primiative form of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which if that is all you have, can be complete because it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finite.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Maybe my example would have given Quine a clue about
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried. He is the one that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> convinced
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> most of the world that {true on the basis of meaning} is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> vacuous
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and he did this almost entirely on the basis that he
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> could not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand exactly how we know that all bachelors are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unmarried.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is only relations between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings thus excludes direct observations of things
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since none of this relates to Formal logic or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness, I will presume that you are just
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> admitting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you have no answers to the replys and are just working
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on Red
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Herring.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note, Quine doesn't say that we can't show that all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bachelors are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unmarried, but that bachelor and unmarried are not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> SYNONYMS
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> replaceable with each other, and that logic that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is too imprecise, and we need to better define the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rules of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when doing such things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The key point here is that while the classical definition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bachelor is a never married man (though some uses of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> words
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> might include a man that was married but now nolonger
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wife),
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the word "unmarried" also has ranges of meaning from
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "never
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> married" to "currently not married" and thus the two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> words
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be considered truely equivalent words.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Thanks for your apt analysis. I can't tolerate wading
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> through
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nonsense*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Once I understood that his conclusion was {true on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not viable I can't tolerate carefully examining how he
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> came up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that. He might as well have said that 2 + 3 = 5 is not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because he
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simply does not believe in numbers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Except that you don't understand what he actually said,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don;t understand the terminology, and you think because he
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> says
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> things your don't understand that he must be wrong.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, you are just too stupid to understand what he says.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I may not fully understand exact what he said.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I do know that {true on the basis of meaning} is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> completely valid.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the sense that if by the meaning of the words, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> MUST
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ALWAYS be true, then the statement should have been an axiom
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system or derivable from the axioms of the system.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes exactly. In the case of natural language semantics all of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> facts
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the world must be formalized natural language encoded in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology inheritance hierarchy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ L (L ⊢ x)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> False(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ L (L ⊢ ¬x)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ∨ False(L, ¬x))
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note, that also means that the words and definitions used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> valid in that logical system.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For instance, in a system like Mathematics, that doesn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> define
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals are, the statement "Cats are Animals" is NOT a "True
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Statement", even if a normally true statement in English,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> refers to things outs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The category of things that are cats is a proper subset of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the category of things that are animals. Even the categorical
>>>>>>>>>>>>> propositions of the syllogism can properly encode this.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My concrete example that one cannot take the elevator of a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> puppy to the fifteenth floor of this puppy conclusively
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that {true on the basis of meaning} does have some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instances.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And just shows that you believe the fallacy of proof by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually proper logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In logic and mathematics, proof by example (sometimes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inappropriate generalization) is a logical fallacy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whereby the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> validity
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a statement is illustrated through one or more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cases—
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rather than a full-fledged proof.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_by_example
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note, you said "Illustrated", which doesn't mean PROVE.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> So then what I said is even less of a proof by example because
>>>>>>>>>>>>> my example does prove an instance of {true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As an example, the statement that Mens names begin with P
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> could be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "illustrated" with example like Peter and Paul, but that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> show
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the statement is actually true, at least not if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interpreted as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ALL Men's names begin with P.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It conclusively proves that it is true for at least two
>>>>>>>>>>>>> instances.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My proof by example does prove that the notion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is not invalid in every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> single
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> case.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Right, and no one says that it is invalid in every single
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> case, so
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are arguing a strawman, another fallacy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note, as shown above, True by the Meaning of the words is not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> always applicable.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *My unique insight into this issue is that*
>>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} (TotBoM) is restricted to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations
>>>>>>>>>>>>> between finite strings, thus making {true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>>>> unequivocally divided from {true on the basis of observation}
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (TotBoO)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Try and show that there is an exception to (TotBoM).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I never said I was generalizing to any other cases so there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> error.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *The next step is testing the boundary conditions*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And that says you are trying to do so.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What are the closest counter-examples to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} when this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which is an invalid arguement,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is limited to relations between finite strings?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But it doesn't work for ALL finite strings, so that case is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> outside
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the boundery where it is a true statement, as shown above.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I cannot find any finite string that it does not work for
>>>>>>>>>>>>> except for
>>>>>>>>>>>>> unknowns.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "All Cats are Animals" is NOT a "True Statement" in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> field of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic, because Cats and Animals are outside that field.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I HAVE NEVER EVERY BEEN TALKING ABOUT THE FIELD OF ARITHMETIC
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN TALKING ABOUT THE GENERIC NOTION OF
>>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} that applies to everything
>>>>>>>>>>>>> including arithmetic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It also fails for the more general issue that your "finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> string"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> needs to be interpreted in the full context of the field you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyzing,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> No interpretation needed when all of the details of all of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> meanings
>>>>>>>>>>>>> are fully specified as axioms or derived form axioms.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The prior analytic / synthetic distinction was very blurry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> my TotBoM/TotBoO distinction seems totally unequivocal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nope
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Show all of the details of exactly how I am incorrect instead
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> merely dogmatic bluster of disagreement.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *My unique insight into this issue is that*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} (TotBoM) is restricted to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between finite strings, thus making {true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unequivocally divided from {true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> observation}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (TotBoO)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And, since you can't show how this lets you show that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pythogrean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Theorem it true in Plane Geometery, or that 2 + 3 = 5
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (since
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fail to answer the challanges) you are just admitting that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unique insight just works for TOY problems that don't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> matter,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and you are just too stupid to understand that restriction.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't have time to get into endless details. I can get
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> few key details. I do understand how the Peano axioms prove
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2 + 3 = 5. And since you do too and it is not a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> counter-example
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to {true on the basis of meaning} it seems like an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inessential
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distraction. I don't have time for those.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It shows that True on the basis of meaning is not a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sufficient
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of truth. At best, True on the basis of meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> method
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to establish what might make sense as a primitive axiom of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if it can't easily be proven by existing axioms.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> A "primitive" axiom system that has every single detail of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> accurate
>>>>>>>>>>>>> model of the actual world would enable every aspect of human
>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be computable. To be actually feasible the main system
>>>>>>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>>>>>>>> have general knowledge. A separate subsystem could have all
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> details of the current situation, ie the full discourse
>>>>>>>>>>>>> context.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Of course, that only happens once you pass the concept
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions used need to be from the definitions of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the concepts are also in the system.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since Definitions provide a base set of axioms, things
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by definition should already be axioms or provable from
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> them, if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are actually in the system.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It took the cyc project 100 labor years to manually encode the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> tiny
>>>>>>>>>>>>> subset of human knowledge known as "common sense". We need to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> leverage
>>>>>>>>>>>>> something like LLM technology to make populating such an
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology
>>>>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the rest of the general knowledge of the world.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> An actual counter-example boundary condition to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} would be the next step.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Like "Cats are Animals" is not true in some (many) fields of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> study
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because those fields don't HAVE "Cats" or "Animals"?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have always only been talking about a formal system that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> has all of the general knowledge of the actual world encoded
>>>>>>>>>>>>> within it. Yes it does exclude unknown things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> We don't need to know whether the Goldbach conjecture is true
>>>>>>>>>>>>> or false to prove that there is no publicly available evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of election fraud that could have possibly changed the outcome
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the 2020 presidential election.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You already know how the above two examples would be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> specified.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What we need are examples that are very tricky to specify.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They aren't that tricky, as I have shown even more for you.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The only thing that I recall that you have ever shown is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that an
>>>>>>>>>>>>> accurate model of the actual world must exclude unknowns.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bachelor is simply assigned a range of semantic meanings
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are entirely defined in terms of other defined words.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We can easily 100% precisely define 10,000 different
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of bachelor and give them their own unique index.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But we don't, so it doesn't matter.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bachelor[0] = never married adult male
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bachelor[1] = not currently married adult male
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bachelor[951] having completed a four year degree.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In this case we can clearly see that the LHS is synonymous
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the RHS because the RHS is assigned to the LHS.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, if you want to define your "Natural Language" logic to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> NOT be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actaully based on "Natural Language" but this marked up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> version
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> where every word needs to be fully qualified to precisely
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> state its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning, this just shows you don't understand the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> words you are using.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It conclusively proves that I fully addressed the objections
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you and Quine specified. If you think that I did not prove
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then show what I missed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nope. You may have answer the objections you understand, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> still
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't understand the problem, because you are too stupid and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is too simple.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then please state clearly the essence of the key details
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that I
>>>>>>>>>>>>> missed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I did prove every single detail of exactly and precisely
>>>>>>>>>>>>> how the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> term
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "bachelor" is synonymous to the set of constituent terms that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> define its
>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> This seemed to be the whole issue that you elaborated. If I
>>>>>>>>>>>>> did not sufficiently address words that you never said then
>>>>>>>>>>>>> you must first say these words.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Until you publish this dictionary that FULLY defines all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> shades of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning for every word, and then fully mark up every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> right, you are just proving yourself to be a hypocrit,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> liar.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Not at all and you know it. The architecture design is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> already
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> substantially implemented in the CYC project. They already
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> spent
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than 1000 labor years on this over the last few
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> decades.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nope, you don't get it. Since Natural Language doesn't come
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tags, until you make natural language come with the tags, or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> show an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithmic method to assign tags with 100% accuracys, you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> use
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> them.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sure you can. Each word has a finite set of sense meanings
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be precisely referenced by its subscript in an ISO
>>>>>>>>>>>>> standard
>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary of English. When a subscript is not specified then
>>>>>>>>>>>>> it defaults to its [0] index meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> But that juts not the way that people do this.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> We were not talking about the way that people do this
>>>>>>>>>>>>> we were answering the question:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is it possible to eliminate ambiguity in natural language
>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics?
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes it is possible. The CYC project already does this.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You are just guilty of a lying Strawman by claiming to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> talking
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about "Natural Language", when you actually are talking
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> UNnatural language of full tagged language.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Your ACTUAL claim turns out to be more like in a FULLY FORMAL
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with all references being unambigious, we can detect if a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an axiom of the system by it being isomorphic to one of them.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Formalized natural language enables an axiomatic system
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of natural language meanings that has zero ambiguity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems you describe "intersubjectivity", yet the
>>>>>>>>>>>> interpretation of texts is subjective, so, while it
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> So maybe 5 > 3 actually means: "go eat a peanut butter sandwich
>>>>>>>>>>> right
>>>>>>>>>>> now" ? My axiomatic system abolishes all subjectivity by making
>>>>>>>>>>> all of
>>>>>>>>>>> the facts of the world as stipulated relations between finite
>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> is so that there are formal languages that happen
>>>>>>>>>>>> to intersect and be unambiguous subsets of natural
>>>>>>>>>>>> language, there's always a wider context.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I am saying that all of the facts of the general knowledge
>>>>>>>>>>> of the actual world are stipulated relations between finite
>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, the idea that there is a universe of language,
>>>>>>>>>>>> a "Comenius language", which equals "all truisms plus
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I knew that there was a guy that specified a language
>>>>>>>>>>> that contains only truisms. The internet seems to have
>>>>>>>>>>> lost track of this.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> one prototype of a fallacy discernible from the rest",
>>>>>>>>>>>> is a sort of platonist, monist view of an interobjectivity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know what that means.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You might learn from both scientific approaches to
>>>>>>>>>>>> interpretation, and deconstructionist approaches to
>>>>>>>>>>>> interpretation, with regards to those being
>>>>>>>>>>>> intersubjective, and eventually structuralist and, "true".
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> My system eliminates the need for any interpretation it is all
>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated relations between finite strings where each sense
>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>> of every word has a unique 128-bit integer GUID. Words are
>>>>>>>>>>> combined
>>>>>>>>>>> together forming larger units of meaning by the principle of
>>>>>>>>>>> compositionality. Discourse context is explicitly encoded.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> There's a significant canon about the dogma and doctrine
>>>>>>>>>>>> of these ultimately philosophical and metaphysical aspects
>>>>>>>>>>>> with their teleological and technically philosophical,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and logical and mathematical, objects of interobjectivity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> So, again, there _are_ extra-ordinary approaches to otherwise
>>>>>>>>>>>> the incomplete aspects of incompleteness and so on,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and there _are_ reasons how to reject and rehabilitate
>>>>>>>>>>>> any "paradoxes" of logic, here for example excluding EFQ,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and making TND only a class of concerns, yet, one may
>>>>>>>>>>>> not simply stipulate that instead only find its disclosure
>>>>>>>>>>>> and discovery, the learning thereof, and the scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>> practice and intersubjective interpretation, for that
>>>>>>>>>>>> two wrongs make not a right.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> X can't be derived from facts of the world entails untrue.
>>>>>>>>>>> ~X can't be derived from facts of the world entails unfalse.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A knowledge bank is a great thing for matters of
>>>>>>>>>>>> intersubjective definition.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Garbage in? Garbage out, is the usual idea.
>>>>>>>>>>>> The usual hope is "garbage in: garbage detected,
>>>>>>>>>>>> garbage deleted".
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When you say "derived" and "entails", it seems you're assuming
>>>>>>>>>> you have some "consistent world of facts" which is the usual
>>>>>>>>>> idea of a "model", which is not the same thing as "the theory's
>>>>>>>>>> model", if in any case at all you're employing "not p, or, q",
>>>>>>>>>> or "material implication".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Material implication is rejected and is replaced with the binary
>>>>>>>>> form of the unary □ necessity operator. This is all done in proof
>>>>>>>>> theory as relations between finite strings. (A ∧ ¬A) □ FALSE
>>>>>>>>> The underlying analysis of True(L, A) requires that A by provable
>>>>>>>>> from the axioms of L. Propositional logic is excluded. One is
>>>>>>>>> not allowed to dogmatically declare that A is True.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Then, you got "untrue" and "unfalse", which one might figure
>>>>>>>>>> as "not necessarily true" and "not necessarily false", that
>>>>>>>>>> "not" and "necessarily" sort of necessarily require precedence
>>>>>>>>>> associating contingency or lack thereof with negation or lack
>>>>>>>>>> thereof.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ~True(L, x) and ~True(L, ~x) entails ~Proposition(L, x).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Saying that you have a coding of terms to a large address space,
>>>>>>>>>> and being granular in terms instead of composite, has that,
>>>>>>>>>> while a dictionary may have entries for each term, the language
>>>>>>>>>> has words that are composites etymologically. Words have roots
>>>>>>>>>> and turns of phrase have, roots, and the entire history and
>>>>>>>>>> historiography of their usage, in, "definitional dynamics".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Close, yet not quite. All of the current recursive definitions of
>>>>>>>>> terms
>>>>>>>>> are stipulated to be true and historical usage is ignored.
>>>>>>>>> Pluto is
>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>> a planet.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The "intersubjectivity" is to mean that "there's no need for
>>>>>>>>>> generous or ingenerous interpretation or any sort of
>>>>>>>>>> under-standing, it's unambiguous a sole interpretation in
>>>>>>>>>> terms of a reference formal model". The idea that a
>>>>>>>>>> dictionary is each of its words is that the language
>>>>>>>>>> is all of its words.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The entire formal system of all of the facts of the world are
>>>>>>>>> stipulated relations between finite strings. To minimize space
>>>>>>>>> and maximize effectiveness the most basic facts are stipulated
>>>>>>>>> and most other facts are derived from these basic facts.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We don't say: {cats are animals} and {animals are living things}.
>>>>>>>>> Instead {cats} inherits from {animals} that inherits from {living
>>>>>>>>> things} in a knowledge ontology.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I encountered the term "Comenius language" in Rucker or
>>>>>>>>>> Hofstadter
>>>>>>>>>> if I recall. Then I appropriated it for "a universe of terms",
>>>>>>>>>> truisms.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> OK. I have Rucker, I don't have Hofstadter.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, a dictionary, is a sort of algebraization, arithmetization,
>>>>>>>>>> geometrization. That is, the widely varying objects of algebra,
>>>>>>>>>> or the more staid objects of arithmetic or geometry, having an
>>>>>>>>>> assignment as a model to a model of other objects, have that
>>>>>>>>>> all and only the relations of the model effect the relations of
>>>>>>>>>> the modeled. So, having an address space of 2^128 terms,
>>>>>>>>>> variously does or doesn't effect any of those. The whole idea
>>>>>>>>>> of the vector models is for a group of related terms, to
>>>>>>>>>> have them have some of the properties of an algebra, that
>>>>>>>>>> reflect that related terms are near to each other in the
>>>>>>>>>> address space, reducing the space once landing somewhere
>>>>>>>>>> among the terms, from a vector association, to a group of
>>>>>>>>>> terms. That's about all there is to it, making an arithmetic
>>>>>>>>>> coding of sorts, or a geometric coding of sorts, computing
>>>>>>>>>> addresses, and having some of their vector products associated
>>>>>>>>>> with the relations in the address space.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It is all a knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy used in proof
>>>>>>>>> theory not model theory.
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Same idea as the Cyc project.
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A usual old definition of insanity is "doing things the same
>>>>>>>> and expecting things to change", while, another usual old
>>>>>>>> definition of insanity is "doing things the same and expecting
>>>>>>>> things to never change".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is the old Apollo/MarkTwain bit, "for each great saying,
>>>>>>>> there's an equal and opposite great saying", also "old wrapped
>>>>>>>> as new".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So, a "quasi-modal", logic, and where proof theory and model
>>>>>>>> theory are equi-interpretable, is not altogether in the common
>>>>>>>> modality, which is time's temporality, i.e., that's only
>>>>>>>> quasi-modal.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A foolish consistency in little minds is bigger in bigger minds.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I seem to recall it was Rucker, yet there's a lot in Hofstadter.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The only constant is change, ....
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So, anyways, your ass|u|me and efq+mi is old hat, and,
>>>>>>>> it's old quasi-modal hat.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When people realize that the POE is a psychotic break
>>>>>>> from reality why has it not been abandoned?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> mi is counter-intuitive because it says if-then yet does
>>>>>>> not actually mean if-then may be more of a communication
>>>>>>> error than a logic error.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Adding temporality and contingency everywhere is a large
>>>>>>>> part of what makes logical positivism and science the theory.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Where in your theory is that it changes?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If it is raining right now where you are and you go
>>>>>>> outside unprotected from the rain then you will get wet.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> contingency
>>>>>>> temporality
>>>>>>> location
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How cold is absolute zero?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It's not hot at all, ....
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The joke here goes, three people are on a train to
>>>>>> Scotland. They make a rise of a hill, and above
>>>>>> the rise, is a rise. On the rise, of the hill,
>>>>>> is a sheep. Sheep, are black, or white. The sheep,
>>>>>> is black.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The first person says "ah, sheep, in Scotland, are black".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The second says "ah, at least one sheep, in Scotland, is black".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The third notes "ah, at least one side, of one sheep, at one moment,
>>>>>> appears black".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In Scotland, ....
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A usual Zen koan reads, two Buddhist priests observe a flag,
>>>>>> in the breeze.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The first says, "the flag, moves, in the breeze".
>>>>>> The second says, "the breezes, moves, the flag, in it".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A third says "it is your mind that moves".
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A usual expectation is that water is wet,
>>>>>> a usual notion of slacking, removes water,
>>>>>> and, not all substances absorb water.
>>>>>> The water in this case falls right off.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Model and proof theory are equi-interpretable,
>>>>>> including where exceptions are rules and rules are exceptions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Man simplifies the conception of these things
>>>>>> with the fuller dialectic and entertaining
>>>>>> the complementary duals as one.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It's called "thinking" beyond "stimulus box response".
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> None-the-less at the rate we are going there is too much
>>>>> of a chance that humanity will kill off all life on the
>>>>> planet in defense of Putin's land grab mostly because we
>>>>> did not have a sufficiently precise meaning of words so
>>>>> that "land-grab" could be accurately discerned from
>>>>> "fighting fascism" through the clouds of propaganda.
>>>>>
>>>>> I aim to correct that yet some people on this platform
>>>>> (not you) would rather play silly head games at the
>>>>> expense of the survival of life on Earth.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Well, then you get into models of belief, of others.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x)
>>> specified as relations between finite strings such that a
>>> correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every
>>> element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language.
>>>
>>>> There's psychology, you know, and analytic psychology,
>>>> then that's psychology of a person (one hopes), then
>>>> there's ochlology, or mass or mob psychology, and the
>>>> usual idea that statistical hypotheses according to the
>>>> law(s) of small and large numbers are hypotheses
>>>> about individuals from crowd yet invalid about
>>>> individuals apiece.
>>>>
>>>> So, you have a model that humans don't share a hive-mind,
>>>> and they each have their own different and self-contained
>>>> bodies of knowledge, where as Sagan put it the reason
>>>> humans are intelligent as a species is because of libraries
>>>> of course, that also it's because the library's got the classics.
>>>>
>>>> "I consider it a moral obligation not to make assertions
>>>> about things one cannot see or whose existence cannot
>>>> be proved, and I consider it an abuse of epistemological
>>>> power to do so regardless. These rules apply to all
>>>> experimental science. Other rules apply to metaphysics.
>>>> I regard myself as answerable to the rules of experimental
>>>> science. As a result nowhere in my work are there any
>>>> metaphysical assertions nor – nota bene – any negations
>>>> of a metaphysical nature." - Carl Jung
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Now, here, of course, there is a brief metaphysics,
>>>> because that there's a foundations involves the entire
>>>> theory of the universe of logical and mathematical
>>>> objects, nary a paradox to be found. (That there
>>>> may be metaphysical paradox is only super-scientific,
>>>> while that humans have various and sometimes
>>>> irrational models of belief is part of "the human condition".)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So, there is a brief metaphysics, yet it's also quite full,
>>>> where "axiomless natural deduction" arrives at "axiomless
>>>> geometry" and a "the logic" and a "the mathematics",
>>>> with yet the overall pragma, requirements, and desiderata
>>>> that it's constant, consistent, complete, and, concrete.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Then when you got instead "I got a giant peephole on
>>>> people's inner lives and I think most of them are bad",
>>>> well you got "familiarity breeds contempt" yet mostly
>>>> "mind your own business because knowledge is responsibility".
>>>>
>>>> And, you know, teapot kettle black.
>>>>
>>>> There's a certain strength in having a giant body of knowledge.
>>>>
>>>> There's another in having a quite more brief one,
>>>> because the larger it is the more likely something's wrong.
>>>>
>>>> There seems a most certain strength in a small, yet thorough,
>>>> constant consistent complete concrete theory.
>>>>
>>>> It helps when most of the work of the Ontological Commitment
>>>> is provided by a dogma and doctrine called reason (mathematics, logic)
>>>> and natural science (physics, science).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> Ah. What you have there is "Believes(you, L, x)", I believe.
>>
>
>
> Not at all and that characterization totally freaks me out.
>
> That is the kind of view that enables killing the whole
> planet in nuclear Winter to defend Putin's land grab that
> other people were conned into believing is something else.
>
> There are quadrillions things that are true such that
> disagreeing can be nothing besides incorrect.
>
> A puppy <is> an animal if you think it is a fifteen story
> office building THEN YOU ARE WRONG !!!
>
> We could probably fill a book 100 light years deep with
> expressions of language that are inherently true and
> impossibly false.
>
> I am proposing that we hypothesize that such a book already
> exists as an inheritance hierarchy knowledge ontology.
>
> Now we have an actual True(L, x) on that basis.
>
>> Not that there's anything necessarily wrong with that,
>> yet, "Believes(you, L, True(L, x))" is not the same
>> thing, necessarily, as "True(L(me), x)"
>> nor "Believes(me, L, True(L, x))"
>>
>> The objects of mathematic and logic at least have their
>> own sort of language, with the idea that the "technical philosophy",
>> vis-a-vis, "analytic philosophy" generally, reduces to that
>> "this is what any reasoning agent could think and believe is true",
>> with no other of body of knowledge or facts of belief at all,
>> just all arising from axiomless natural deduction in a
>> deliberate ponderance of technical philosophy. I.e.,
>> a "technical philosophy" is a sort of "logico-philosophical monad".
>>
>> Or, you know, "the" technical philosophy, and separating "techne"
>> or "techno" from "Machine", vis-a-vis technique, what results in
>> language, formal language, for model and proof theory, the things,
>> for logos, and the real and true logos the logism. (Words, ....)
>>
>> The you claim a certain certitude or certum of verum, verity,
>> which may be so or may be not so.
>>
>> I imagine you desire a very high guarantee of certum of verum,
>> so that people will regard you as an authority in correspondence,
>> coherent, and pragmatist theories of truth. Or, you know to
>> demonstrate that, then whether you maintain your expressed beliefs
>> whether people accept your certum or verum or not.
>>
>>
>> Then, about your goal to say "my theory is complete", then, we
>> get to Goedel. Now, people who've studied foundations for the
>> reasons of comprehending truth in logic in universals, and
>> why and how paradoxes are resolved in logic, in foundations,
>> point to Goedel for incompleteness, yet, it's so that first,
>> he demonstrated, completeness.
>>
>> So, for given categories of non-logical things, "properly" logical
>> if you'd rather not have them be considered "il-" logical,
>> the non-logical what these definitions are, cats and buildings
>> and steamships and sheep and hillsides and flags and the breeze
>> and such, you're welcome to close out those categories.
>>
>> And, it is: so, that most dogs have at least three legs.
>>
>> Yet, to acknowledge the ubiquitous success of mathematics,
>> in the mathematical sciences, you sort of have to start
>> with the objects of logic and mathematics all fitting in
>> one universe, then that in various theories of parts, wholes,
>> predicates, relations, types, categories, functions, topologies,
>> geometry, number, those are properly logical to each other,
>> modeling each other, in this theory.
>>
>>
>> I would aver that you have there a large body of knowledge,
>> or a giant grab-bag of facts, a large body of _embodied_
>> "estimates" of knowledge, that whether it accurately _models_ knowledge,
>> is an altogether separate concern for each case.
>>
>> "Objectively" and "intersubjectively", ....
>>
>> Does a cat know that it's a cat?
>>
>>
>

On 04/24/2024 08:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 4/24/24 10:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/24/2024 9:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 4/24/24 8:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/24/2024 7:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 4/24/24 8:17 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/24/2024 6:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/24/24 11:33 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/24/2024 3:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-23 14:31:00 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/23/2024 3:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 17:37:55 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 10:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 14:10:54 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 4:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-21 14:44:37 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautology of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true. For
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This means that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> longer valid and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Whenever an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then it is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations. It
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is basically invalid input.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't need any teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is too close to ad homimen.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you think my reasoning is incorrect then point to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> error
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in my reasoning. Saying that in your opinion I am a bad
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> teacher
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is too close to ad hominem because it refers to your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opinion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> me and utterly bypasses any of my reasoning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, it isn't. You introduced youtself as a topic of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion so
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you are a legitimate topic of discussion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't claim that there be any reasoning, incorrect or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you claim I am a bad teacher you must point out what is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the lesson otherwise your claim that I am a bad teacher is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an as hominem attack.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You are not a teacher, bad or otherwise. That you lack
>>>>>>>>>>>>> skills that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> happen to be necessary for teaching is obvious from you
>>>>>>>>>>>>> postings
>>>>>>>>>>>>> here. A teacher needs to understand human psychology but
>>>>>>>>>>>>> you don't.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You may be correct that I am a terrible teacher.
>>>>>>>>>>>> None-the-less Mathematicians might not have very much
>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>>>>>>>> of the link between proof theory and computability.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Sume mathematicians do have very much understanding of that.
>>>>>>>>>>> But that
>>>>>>>>>>> link is not needed for understanding and solving problems
>>>>>>>>>>> separately
>>>>>>>>>>> in the two areas.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> When I refer to rejecting an invalid input math would seem
>>>>>>>>>>>> to construe
>>>>>>>>>>>> this as nonsense, where as computability theory would
>>>>>>>>>>>> totally understand.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> People working on computability theory do not understand
>>>>>>>>>>> "invalid input"
>>>>>>>>>>> as "impossible input".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The proof then shows, for any program f that might determine
>>>>>>>>>> whether
>>>>>>>>>> programs halt, that a "pathological" program g, called with
>>>>>>>>>> some input,
>>>>>>>>>> can pass its own source and its input to f and then
>>>>>>>>>> specifically do the
>>>>>>>>>> opposite of what f predicts g will do. No f can exist that
>>>>>>>>>> handles this
>>>>>>>>>> case, thus showing undecidability.
>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem#
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So then they must believe that there exists an H that does
>>>>>>>>>> correctly
>>>>>>>>>> determine the halt status of every input, some inputs are simply
>>>>>>>>>> more difficult than others, no inputs are impossible.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That "must" is false as it does not follow from anything.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Sure it does. If there are no "impossible" inputs that entails
>>>>>>>> that all inputs are possible. When all inputs are possible then
>>>>>>>> the halting problem proof is wrong.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Termination Analyzer H is Not Fooled by Pathological Input D*
>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/369971402_Termination_Analyzer_H_is_Not_Fooled_by_Pathological_Input_D
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Everyone that objects to the statement that H(D,D) correctly
>>>>>>>> determines the halt status of its inputs say that believe that
>>>>>>>> H(D,D) must report on the behavior of the D(D) that invokes H(D,D).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Right, because that IS the definition of a Halt Decider.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Everyone here takes the definition of a halt decider to be
>>>>>> required to determine the halt status of the program that
>>>>>> invokes this halt decider, knowing full well that the program
>>>>>> that invokes this halt decider IS NOT ITS INPUT.
>>>>>
>>>>> And what you don't seem to understand is that it *IS*.
>>>>>
>>>>> The DEFINITION of a Halt Decider is to decide on the program
>>>>> described by it input.
>>>>>
>>>>> What else could that mean but the program described by the input?
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> All these same people also know the computable functions only
>>>>>> operate on their inputs and are not allowed to consider anything
>>>>>> else.
>>>>>
>>>>> First, we don't know that a Halt Decider is a "Computable Function"
>>>>> and in fact, that is the question, is the Halting Function computable?
>>>>>
>>>>> Second, the input IS a "Description of the program" to be decided
>>>>> on, so that IS the input.
>>>>>
>>>>> You don't seem to understand the meaning of the word "description"
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Everyone else is wrong about this when they allow a description
>>>> to include the program that invokes the halt decider.
>>>
>>>
>>> Why?
>>>
>>> Why can't you describe that program?
>>>
>>
>> The x86 code is the only description finite string input that H is
>> allowed to have.
>
> And either that can describe the full program D(D), or you are just
> admitting that H fails to be a Halt Decider by its own limitations.
>
> Remember, the REQUIREMENTS prevail, if you somehow restrict H so you can
> not describe some programs to it, then H BY DEFINITION fails to be the
> needed decider.
>
>
>>
>>> If you can't, then you have just admitted that you decider can't
>>> handle ALL possible inputs.
>>>
>>
>> The D(D) that invokes H(D,D) IS NOT ITS INPUT AND YOU KNOW THAT!
>
> Why not? The x86 code given to H it the code for it, at least if you
> include ALL the x86 code of the full program D.
>
> If YOU decided to not give it enough of the description, then you are
> just admitting to LYING about what you are doing.
>
>>
>>>>
>>>> These same people already know that the program that invokes
>>>> the decider is definitely not its input.
>>>
>>> But it IS, as that is PRECISELY the program described by the input.
>>>
>>
>> The D(D) that invokes H(D,D) IS NOT ITS INPUT AND HAS DIFFERENT BEHAVIOR
>
> Nope. If H is the required computation, then D is also a computation,
> and all copies of it behave the same.
>
> I guess you are just admitting that you your logic system determinism
> doesn't exist, and thus a given statement might be both True or False at
> the same or diffferent times. In other words, you are describe a system
> without a real definiton of Truth,
>
> That seems right for what you have described.
>
>
>>
>> the behavior of the simulated D(D) before H aborts its simulation is
>> different than the behavior of the executed D(D) after H has aborted its
>> simulation. H(D,D) must report on the behavior that it actually sees.
>
> Then the simulation is INCORRECT, PERIOD, BY DEFINITION.
>
> THis is because the DEFINITION of a correct simulation is the behavior
> of the actual program.
>
> In fact, when you describe the "simulation" your program does, it
> doesn't actually simulate a "Call H instruction", but instead used
> INVALID and UNSOUND logic to try to "guess" what that behavior will be.
>
> Thus, your claim of different behavior of simulation is just a LIE.
>
>>
>>>>
>>>> These same people also know that computable functions only
>>>> operate on their inputs.
>>>
>>> Again, why do you FALSELY assume the function is computable?
>>>
>>
>> Requiring a computation to report on the behavior its its caller
>> is computationally incorrect. COMPUTATIONS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO DO THAT!!!
>
> But it isn't asked to report on the behavior of its caller, it is asked
> to report on the behavior of the program given described by its input.
> If that just happens to its caller, there is nothing wrong with giving
> the answer about what it will do, and in fact, that is what it MUST do.
>
> Yes, you can not phrase the question as the behavior of its caller, but
> if you make the input describe the caller, than that is what it must
> answer about, as that is what its input is.
>
> You just keep on trying to lie by changing the words, a typical
> technique of LIARS.
>
> All you are doing is proving that you don't understand what computations
> are, how computers work, or even how logic works.
>
>>
>>> Or why that desciption isn't the description of the program that
>>> calls H?
>>>
>>>>
>>>> So they are simply contradicting their own views by not paying
>>>> attention.
>>>
>>> Nope, YOU are the one with the contradiction.
>>>
>>> You claim H meets the requirements, which means that it should be
>>> able to decide about any program described by its input, and that you
>>> can describe and program, but then say that this program can't be
>>> given to your decider.
>>>
>>> That is just admitting that you have been lying.
>>>
>>> It seems, that again, you just don't understand the meaning of the
>>> terms you are using, and just falsely accuse anything that doesn't
>>> make sense to you as incorrect.
>>>
>>> That just proves that you are utter ignorant about what you are
>>> talking about and have made yourself into a pathological liar.
>>
>

On 4/24/2024 10:59 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x)
specified as relations between finite strings such that a
correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every
element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language.

As far as Eastern religion goes Zen/Tao & Advaita.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/24/24 11:53 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/24/2024 10:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 4/24/24 10:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/24/2024 9:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 4/24/24 8:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/24/2024 7:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/24/24 8:17 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/24/2024 6:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/24/24 11:33 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/24/2024 3:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-23 14:31:00 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/23/2024 3:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 17:37:55 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 10:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 14:10:54 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 4:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-21 14:44:37 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautology of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true. For
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This means that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> longer valid and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that is complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Whenever an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then it is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations. It
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is basically invalid input.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't need any teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is too close to ad homimen.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you think my reasoning is incorrect then point to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the error
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in my reasoning. Saying that in your opinion I am a bad
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> teacher
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is too close to ad hominem because it refers to your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opinion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> me and utterly bypasses any of my reasoning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, it isn't. You introduced youtself as a topic of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion so
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you are a legitimate topic of discussion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't claim that there be any reasoning, incorrect or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you claim I am a bad teacher you must point out what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is wrong with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the lesson otherwise your claim that I am a bad teacher
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is essentially
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an as hominem attack.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You are not a teacher, bad or otherwise. That you lack
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> skills that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> happen to be necessary for teaching is obvious from you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> postings
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here. A teacher needs to understand human psychology but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you don't.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You may be correct that I am a terrible teacher.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> None-the-less Mathematicians might not have very much
>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the link between proof theory and computability.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Sume mathematicians do have very much understanding of that.
>>>>>>>>>>>> But that
>>>>>>>>>>>> link is not needed for understanding and solving problems
>>>>>>>>>>>> separately
>>>>>>>>>>>> in the two areas.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> When I refer to rejecting an invalid input math would seem
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to construe
>>>>>>>>>>>>> this as nonsense, where as computability theory would
>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally understand.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> People working on computability theory do not understand
>>>>>>>>>>>> "invalid input"
>>>>>>>>>>>> as "impossible input".
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The proof then shows, for any program f that might determine
>>>>>>>>>>> whether
>>>>>>>>>>> programs halt, that a "pathological" program g, called with
>>>>>>>>>>> some input,
>>>>>>>>>>> can pass its own source and its input to f and then
>>>>>>>>>>> specifically do the
>>>>>>>>>>> opposite of what f predicts g will do. No f can exist that
>>>>>>>>>>> handles this
>>>>>>>>>>> case, thus showing undecidability.
>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem#
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> So then they must believe that there exists an H that does
>>>>>>>>>>> correctly
>>>>>>>>>>> determine the halt status of every input, some inputs are simply
>>>>>>>>>>> more difficult than others, no inputs are impossible.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That "must" is false as it does not follow from anything.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Sure it does. If there are no "impossible" inputs that entails
>>>>>>>>> that all inputs are possible. When all inputs are possible then
>>>>>>>>> the halting problem proof is wrong.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Termination Analyzer H is Not Fooled by Pathological Input D*
>>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/369971402_Termination_Analyzer_H_is_Not_Fooled_by_Pathological_Input_D
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Everyone that objects to the statement that H(D,D) correctly
>>>>>>>>> determines the halt status of its inputs say that believe that
>>>>>>>>> H(D,D) must report on the behavior of the D(D) that invokes
>>>>>>>>> H(D,D).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Right, because that IS the definition of a Halt Decider.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Everyone here takes the definition of a halt decider to be
>>>>>>> required to determine the halt status of the program that
>>>>>>> invokes this halt decider, knowing full well that the program
>>>>>>> that invokes this halt decider IS NOT ITS INPUT.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And what you don't seem to understand is that it *IS*.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The DEFINITION of a Halt Decider is to decide on the program
>>>>>> described by it input.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What else could that mean but the program described by the input?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> All these same people also know the computable functions only
>>>>>>> operate on their inputs and are not allowed to consider anything
>>>>>>> else.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> First, we don't know that a Halt Decider is a "Computable
>>>>>> Function" and in fact, that is the question, is the Halting
>>>>>> Function computable?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Second, the input IS a "Description of the program" to be decided
>>>>>> on, so that IS the input.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You don't seem to understand the meaning of the word "description"
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Everyone else is wrong about this when they allow a description
>>>>> to include the program that invokes the halt decider.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Why?
>>>>
>>>> Why can't you describe that program?
>>>>
>>>
>>> The x86 code is the only description finite string input that H is
>>> allowed to have.
>>
>> And either that can describe the full program D(D), or you are just
>> admitting that H fails to be a Halt Decider by its own limitations.
>>
>> Remember, the REQUIREMENTS prevail, if you somehow restrict H so you
>> can not describe some programs to it, then H BY DEFINITION fails to be
>> the needed decider.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> If you can't, then you have just admitted that you decider can't
>>>> handle ALL possible inputs.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The D(D) that invokes H(D,D) IS NOT ITS INPUT AND YOU KNOW THAT!
>>
>> Why not? The x86 code given to H it the code for it, at least if you
>> include ALL the x86 code of the full program D.
>>
>> If YOU decided to not give it enough of the description, then you are
>> just admitting to LYING about what you are doing.
>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> These same people already know that the program that invokes
>>>>> the decider is definitely not its input.
>>>>
>>>> But it IS, as that is PRECISELY the program described by the input.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The D(D) that invokes H(D,D) IS NOT ITS INPUT AND HAS DIFFERENT BEHAVIOR
>>
>> Nope. If H is the required computation, then D is also a computation,
>> and all copies of it behave the same.
>
>
> The D(D) that invokes H(D,D) IS NOT ITS INPUT AND HAS DIFFERENT BEHAVIOR
> The D(D) that invokes H(D,D) IS NOT ITS INPUT AND HAS DIFFERENT BEHAVIOR
> The D(D) that invokes H(D,D) IS NOT ITS INPUT AND HAS DIFFERENT BEHAVIOR

On 4/24/24 11:56 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/24/2024 10:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 4/24/24 10:16 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/24/2024 9:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 4/24/24 8:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/24/2024 7:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/24/24 8:17 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/24/2024 6:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/24/24 11:33 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/24/2024 3:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-23 14:31:00 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/23/2024 3:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 17:37:55 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 10:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 14:10:54 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 4:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-21 14:44:37 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautology of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true. For
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This means that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> longer valid and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that is complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Whenever an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then it is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations. It
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is basically invalid input.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't need any teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is too close to ad homimen.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you think my reasoning is incorrect then point to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the error
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in my reasoning. Saying that in your opinion I am a bad
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> teacher
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is too close to ad hominem because it refers to your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opinion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> me and utterly bypasses any of my reasoning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, it isn't. You introduced youtself as a topic of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion so
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you are a legitimate topic of discussion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't claim that there be any reasoning, incorrect or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you claim I am a bad teacher you must point out what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is wrong with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the lesson otherwise your claim that I am a bad teacher
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is essentially
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an as hominem attack.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You are not a teacher, bad or otherwise. That you lack
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> skills that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> happen to be necessary for teaching is obvious from you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> postings
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here. A teacher needs to understand human psychology but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you don't.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You may be correct that I am a terrible teacher.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> None-the-less Mathematicians might not have very much
>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the link between proof theory and computability.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Sume mathematicians do have very much understanding of that.
>>>>>>>>>>>> But that
>>>>>>>>>>>> link is not needed for understanding and solving problems
>>>>>>>>>>>> separately
>>>>>>>>>>>> in the two areas.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> When I refer to rejecting an invalid input math would seem
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to construe
>>>>>>>>>>>>> this as nonsense, where as computability theory would
>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally understand.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> People working on computability theory do not understand
>>>>>>>>>>>> "invalid input"
>>>>>>>>>>>> as "impossible input".
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The proof then shows, for any program f that might determine
>>>>>>>>>>> whether
>>>>>>>>>>> programs halt, that a "pathological" program g, called with
>>>>>>>>>>> some input,
>>>>>>>>>>> can pass its own source and its input to f and then
>>>>>>>>>>> specifically do the
>>>>>>>>>>> opposite of what f predicts g will do. No f can exist that
>>>>>>>>>>> handles this
>>>>>>>>>>> case, thus showing undecidability.
>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem#
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> So then they must believe that there exists an H that does
>>>>>>>>>>> correctly
>>>>>>>>>>> determine the halt status of every input, some inputs are simply
>>>>>>>>>>> more difficult than others, no inputs are impossible.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That "must" is false as it does not follow from anything.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Sure it does. If there are no "impossible" inputs that entails
>>>>>>>>> that all inputs are possible. When all inputs are possible then
>>>>>>>>> the halting problem proof is wrong.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Termination Analyzer H is Not Fooled by Pathological Input D*
>>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/369971402_Termination_Analyzer_H_is_Not_Fooled_by_Pathological_Input_D
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Everyone that objects to the statement that H(D,D) correctly
>>>>>>>>> determines the halt status of its inputs say that believe that
>>>>>>>>> H(D,D) must report on the behavior of the D(D) that invokes
>>>>>>>>> H(D,D).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Right, because that IS the definition of a Halt Decider.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Everyone here takes the definition of a halt decider to be
>>>>>>> required to determine the halt status of the program that
>>>>>>> invokes this halt decider, knowing full well that the program
>>>>>>> that invokes this halt decider IS NOT ITS INPUT.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And what you don't seem to understand is that it *IS*.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The DEFINITION of a Halt Decider is to decide on the program
>>>>>> described by it input.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What else could that mean but the program described by the input?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> All these same people also know the computable functions only
>>>>>>> operate on their inputs and are not allowed to consider anything
>>>>>>> else.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> First, we don't know that a Halt Decider is a "Computable
>>>>>> Function" and in fact, that is the question, is the Halting
>>>>>> Function computable?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Second, the input IS a "Description of the program" to be decided
>>>>>> on, so that IS the input.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You don't seem to understand the meaning of the word "description"
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Everyone else is wrong about this when they allow a description
>>>>> to include the program that invokes the halt decider.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Why?
>>>>
>>>> Why can't you describe that program?
>>>>
>>>
>>> The x86 code is the only description finite string input that H is
>>> allowed to have.
>>
>> And either that can describe the full program D(D), or you are just
>> admitting that H fails to be a Halt Decider by its own limitations.
>>
>> Remember, the REQUIREMENTS prevail, if you somehow restrict H so you
>> can not describe some programs to it, then H BY DEFINITION fails to be
>> the needed decider.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> If you can't, then you have just admitted that you decider can't
>>>> handle ALL possible inputs.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The D(D) that invokes H(D,D) IS NOT ITS INPUT AND YOU KNOW THAT!
>>
>> Why not? The x86 code given to H it the code for it, at least if you
>> include ALL the x86 code of the full program D.
>>
>> If YOU decided to not give it enough of the description, then you are
>> just admitting to LYING about what you are doing.
>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> These same people already know that the program that invokes
>>>>> the decider is definitely not its input.
>>>>
>>>> But it IS, as that is PRECISELY the program described by the input.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The D(D) that invokes H(D,D) IS NOT ITS INPUT AND HAS DIFFERENT BEHAVIOR
>>
>> Nope. If H is the required computation, then D is also a computation,
>> and all copies of it behave the same.
>>
>> I guess you are just admitting that you your logic system determinism
>> doesn't exist, and thus a given statement might be both True or False
>> at the same or diffferent times. In other words, you are describe a
>> system without a real definiton of Truth,
>>
>> That seems right for what you have described.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> the behavior of the simulated D(D) before H aborts its simulation is
>>> different than the behavior of the executed D(D) after H has aborted its
>>> simulation. H(D,D) must report on the behavior that it actually sees.
>>
>> Then the simulation is INCORRECT, PERIOD, BY DEFINITION.
>>
>> THis is because the DEFINITION of a correct simulation is the behavior
>> of the actual program.
>>
>> In fact, when you describe the "simulation" your program does, it
>> doesn't actually simulate a "Call H instruction", but instead used
>> INVALID and UNSOUND logic to try to "guess" what that behavior will be.
>>
>> Thus, your claim of different behavior of simulation is just a LIE.
>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> These same people also know that computable functions only
>>>>> operate on their inputs.
>>>>
>>>> Again, why do you FALSELY assume the function is computable?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Requiring a computation to report on the behavior its its caller
>>> is computationally incorrect. COMPUTATIONS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO DO THAT!!!
>>
>> But it isn't asked to report on the behavior of its caller,
>
> You have been saying that it must report on the behavior of the D(D)
> that calls H(D,D)

On 4/25/24 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/24/2024 10:59 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x)
> specified as relations between finite strings such that a
> correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every
> element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language.
>
> As far as Eastern religion goes Zen/Tao & Advaita.
>

Then what is the value of True(L,x) where x is defined as to be the
stagtement: "Not True(L,x)"?

If it is TRUE, the x is the equivalent of NOT TRUE, or FALSE and thus
your True(L,x) has said a false statement was true.

If it is FALSE, then x is the equivalent of NOT FALSE, or TRUE, and thus
your True(L,x) has said that a TRUE statement was FALSE.

If it refuses to answer, then you have lied that it can be defined for
ANY finite string.

That, our your logic system just can't handle the basics of the problem.

On 4/25/2024 3:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-04-24 15:33:12 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 4/24/2024 3:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-04-23 14:31:00 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> On 4/23/2024 3:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-04-22 17:37:55 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 10:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 14:10:54 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 4:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-21 14:44:37 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
>>>>>>>>>>>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This
>>>>>>>>>>>>> means that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer
>>>>>>>>>>>>> valid and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Whenever an
>>>>>>>>>>>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
>>>>>>>>>>>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical
>>>>>>>>>>>> operations. It
>>>>>>>>>>>> is basically invalid input.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills. Therefore
>>>>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>>>> don't need any teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That is too close to ad homimen.
>>>>>>>>>> If you think my reasoning is incorrect then point to the error
>>>>>>>>>> in my reasoning. Saying that in your opinion I am a bad teacher
>>>>>>>>>> is too close to ad hominem because it refers to your opinion of
>>>>>>>>>> me and utterly bypasses any of my reasoning.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> No, it isn't. You introduced youtself as a topic of discussion so
>>>>>>>>> you are a legitimate topic of discussion.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I didn't claim that there be any reasoning, incorrect or
>>>>>>>>> otherwise.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If you claim I am a bad teacher you must point out what is wrong
>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>> the lesson otherwise your claim that I am a bad teacher is
>>>>>>>> essentially
>>>>>>>> an as hominem attack.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You are not a teacher, bad or otherwise. That you lack skills that
>>>>>>> happen to be necessary for teaching is obvious from you postings
>>>>>>> here. A teacher needs to understand human psychology but you don't.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You may be correct that I am a terrible teacher.
>>>>>> None-the-less Mathematicians might not have very much understanding
>>>>>> of the link between proof theory and computability.
>>>>>
>>>>> Sume mathematicians do have very much understanding of that. But that
>>>>> link is not needed for understanding and solving problems separately
>>>>> in the two areas.
>>>>>
>>>>>> When I refer to rejecting an invalid input math would seem to
>>>>>> construe
>>>>>> this as nonsense, where as computability theory would totally
>>>>>> understand.
>>>>>
>>>>> People working on computability theory do not understand "invalid
>>>>> input"
>>>>> as "impossible input".
>>>>
>>>> The proof then shows, for any program f that might determine whether
>>>> programs halt, that a "pathological" program g, called with some input,
>>>> can pass its own source and its input to f and then specifically do the
>>>> opposite of what f predicts g will do. No f can exist that handles this
>>>> case, thus showing undecidability.
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem#
>>>>
>>>> So then they must believe that there exists an H that does correctly
>>>> determine the halt status of every input, some inputs are simply
>>>> more difficult than others, no inputs are impossible.
>>>
>>> That "must" is false as it does not follow from anything.
>
>
>> Sure it does. If there are no "impossible" inputs that entails
>> that all inputs are possible.
>
> Correct so far. However, whether there are any impossible inputs depends
> on the meaning of the word "impossible". If "impossible input" means an
> imput that cannot be an input then of course every input is possible.
>

In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an
undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved to be
impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a correct yes-
or-no answer. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem

Inputs not having an algorithm leading to a correct YES/NO
answer are called impossible inputs.

>>  When all inputs are possible then
>> the halting problem proof is wrong.
>
> That is not true.
>

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/25/2024 3:16 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-04-25 00:17:57 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 4/24/2024 6:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 4/24/24 11:33 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/24/2024 3:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-04-23 14:31:00 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/23/2024 3:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 17:37:55 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 10:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 14:10:54 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 4:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-21 14:44:37 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true. For
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> valid and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Whenever an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations. It
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is basically invalid input.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore you
>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't need any teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> That is too close to ad homimen.
>>>>>>>>>>>> If you think my reasoning is incorrect then point to the error
>>>>>>>>>>>> in my reasoning. Saying that in your opinion I am a bad teacher
>>>>>>>>>>>> is too close to ad hominem because it refers to your opinion of
>>>>>>>>>>>> me and utterly bypasses any of my reasoning.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> No, it isn't. You introduced youtself as a topic of
>>>>>>>>>>> discussion so
>>>>>>>>>>> you are a legitimate topic of discussion.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't claim that there be any reasoning, incorrect or
>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If you claim I am a bad teacher you must point out what is
>>>>>>>>>> wrong with
>>>>>>>>>> the lesson otherwise your claim that I am a bad teacher is
>>>>>>>>>> essentially
>>>>>>>>>> an as hominem attack.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You are not a teacher, bad or otherwise. That you lack skills that
>>>>>>>>> happen to be necessary for teaching is obvious from you postings
>>>>>>>>> here. A teacher needs to understand human psychology but you
>>>>>>>>> don't.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You may be correct that I am a terrible teacher.
>>>>>>>> None-the-less Mathematicians might not have very much understanding
>>>>>>>> of the link between proof theory and computability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Sume mathematicians do have very much understanding of that. But
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> link is not needed for understanding and solving problems separately
>>>>>>> in the two areas.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When I refer to rejecting an invalid input math would seem to
>>>>>>>> construe
>>>>>>>> this as nonsense, where as computability theory would totally
>>>>>>>> understand.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> People working on computability theory do not understand "invalid
>>>>>>> input"
>>>>>>> as "impossible input".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The proof then shows, for any program f that might determine whether
>>>>>> programs halt, that a "pathological" program g, called with some
>>>>>> input,
>>>>>> can pass its own source and its input to f and then specifically
>>>>>> do the
>>>>>> opposite of what f predicts g will do. No f can exist that handles
>>>>>> this
>>>>>> case, thus showing undecidability.
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem#
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So then they must believe that there exists an H that does correctly
>>>>>> determine the halt status of every input, some inputs are simply
>>>>>> more difficult than others, no inputs are impossible.
>>>>>
>>>>> That "must" is false as it does not follow from anything.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Sure it does. If there are no "impossible" inputs that entails
>>>> that all inputs are possible. When all inputs are possible then
>>>> the halting problem proof is wrong.
>>>>
>>>> *Termination Analyzer H is Not Fooled by Pathological Input D*
>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/369971402_Termination_Analyzer_H_is_Not_Fooled_by_Pathological_Input_D
>>>>
>>>> Everyone that objects to the statement that H(D,D) correctly
>>>> determines the halt status of its inputs say that believe that
>>>> H(D,D) must report on the behavior of the D(D) that invokes H(D,D).
>>>
>>> Right, because that IS the definition of a Halt Decider.
>>>
>>
>> Everyone here takes the definition of a halt decider to be
>> required to determine the halt status of the program that
>> invokes this halt decider, knowing full well that the program
>> that invokes this halt decider IS NOT ITS INPUT.
>>
>> All these same people also know the computable functions only
>> operate on their inputs and are not allowed to consider anything
>> else.
>>
>> Computable functions are the formalized analogue of the intuitive notion
>> of algorithms, in the sense that a function is computable if there
>> exists an algorithm that can do the job of the function, i.e. given an
>> input of the function domain it can return the corresponding output.
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computable_function
>>
>> When the definition of a halt decider contradicts the definition of
>> a computable function they can't both be right.
>
> When the definitions of a term contradicts the definition of another term
> then both of them are wrong. A correct definition does not contradict
> anything other than a different definition of the same term.
>

On 04/25/2024 04:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 4/25/24 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/24/2024 10:59 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x)
>> specified as relations between finite strings such that a
>> correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every
>> element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language.
>>
>> As far as Eastern religion goes Zen/Tao & Advaita.
>>
>
>
> Then what is the value of True(L,x) where x is defined as to be the
> stagtement: "Not True(L,x)"?
>
> If it is TRUE, the x is the equivalent of NOT TRUE, or FALSE and thus
> your True(L,x) has said a false statement was true.
>
> If it is FALSE, then x is the equivalent of NOT FALSE, or TRUE, and thus
> your True(L,x) has said that a TRUE statement was FALSE.
>
> If it refuses to answer, then you have lied that it can be defined for
> ANY finite string.
>
> That, our your logic system just can't handle the basics of the problem.

"In the Flat-Land of Tertium Non Datur".

On 4/25/2024 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 4/25/24 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/24/2024 10:59 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x)
>> specified as relations between finite strings such that a
>> correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every
>> element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language.
>>
>> As far as Eastern religion goes Zen/Tao & Advaita.
>>
>
>
> Then what is the value of True(L,x) where x is defined as to be the
> stagtement: "Not True(L,x)"?
>
> If it is TRUE, the x is the equivalent of NOT TRUE, or FALSE and thus
> your True(L,x) has said a false statement was true.
>
> If it is FALSE, then x is the equivalent of NOT FALSE, or TRUE, and thus
> your True(L,x) has said that a TRUE statement was FALSE.
>
> If it refuses to answer, then you have lied that it can be defined for
> ANY finite string.
>
> That, our your logic system just can't handle the basics of the problem.

∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x))
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
x)))

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF

I created Minimal Type Theory so that I could concisely encode
actual self-reference. In all the literature it is conventional
to encode self-reference incorrectly.

LP := ~True(LP)

Prolog rejects expressions having the same structure as LP
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.

Truth_Bearer(L, LP) == FALSE

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 04/25/2024 10:04 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/25/2024 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 4/25/24 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/24/2024 10:59 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x)
>>> specified as relations between finite strings such that a
>>> correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every
>>> element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language.
>>>
>>> As far as Eastern religion goes Zen/Tao & Advaita.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Then what is the value of True(L,x) where x is defined as to be the
>> stagtement: "Not True(L,x)"?
>>
>> If it is TRUE, the x is the equivalent of NOT TRUE, or FALSE and thus
>> your True(L,x) has said a false statement was true.
>>
>> If it is FALSE, then x is the equivalent of NOT FALSE, or TRUE, and
>> thus your True(L,x) has said that a TRUE statement was FALSE.
>>
>> If it refuses to answer, then you have lied that it can be defined for
>> ANY finite string.
>>
>> That, our your logic system just can't handle the basics of the problem.
>
> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x))
> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
> x)))
>
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
>
>
> I created Minimal Type Theory so that I could concisely encode
> actual self-reference. In all the literature it is conventional
> to encode self-reference incorrectly.
>
> LP := ~True(LP)
>
> Prolog rejects expressions having the same structure as LP
> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
> LP = not(true(LP)).
> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
> false.
>
> Truth_Bearer(L, LP) == FALSE
>
>

I can understand that that may be what you want,
it's a little more involved what it is.

It's like Einstein the other day made a quote,
and it was about making truth-makers, I saw it
on Wikiquote.

"Whoever undertakes to set himself up as a
judge of Truth and Knowledge is shipwrecked
by the laughter of the gods."
- https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein#Essay_to_Leo_Baeck_(1953)

Now, that goes for all of you all, because,
if it's not courtesy axiomless natural deduction,
and a brief metaphysics and teleology and entelechy
for a broad epistemology of a thorough ontology,
it's not.

So, Peter, on the one hand you're grasping for
some of what basically the foundations, the very
foundations must provide, and, that somehow
there is one, some "true" foundation, "sole" foundation,
that it provides "even given free expansion of
comprehension that quantifier impredicativity
is not a thing", you have to confront that all
fully down in an entire foundation altogether,
to arrive at some of these extended goals you
have in mind for yourself.

Then the rest of you are sort of in a Flat-Earther's
opinionated penury of Russell's retro-thesis.

Of course, overgeneralizations are generally unsound,
if even moreso profoundly of the counterintuition
of failure.

No offense, ..., keine Beleidigung beabsichticht.

On 4/25/2024 12:45 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/25/2024 10:04 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/25/2024 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 4/25/24 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/24/2024 10:59 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x)
>>>> specified as relations between finite strings such that a
>>>> correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every
>>>> element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language.
>>>>
>>>> As far as Eastern religion goes Zen/Tao & Advaita.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Then what is the value of True(L,x) where x is defined as to be the
>>> stagtement: "Not True(L,x)"?
>>>
>>> If it is TRUE, the x is the equivalent of NOT TRUE, or FALSE and thus
>>> your True(L,x) has said a false statement was true.
>>>
>>> If it is FALSE, then x is the equivalent of NOT FALSE, or TRUE, and
>>> thus your True(L,x) has said that a TRUE statement was FALSE.
>>>
>>> If it refuses to answer, then you have lied that it can be defined for
>>> ANY finite string.
>>>
>>> That, our your logic system just can't handle the basics of the problem.
>>
>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x)  ≡ (L ⊢ x))
>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
>> x)))
>>
>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
>>
>>
>> I created Minimal Type Theory so that I could concisely encode
>> actual self-reference. In all the literature it is conventional
>> to encode self-reference incorrectly.
>>
>> LP := ~True(LP)
>>
>> Prolog rejects expressions having the same structure as LP
>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>> false.
>>
>> Truth_Bearer(L, LP) == FALSE
>>
>>
>
>
> I can understand that that may be what you want,
> it's a little more involved what it is.
>

It is simply arranging the existing set of facts of general
knowledge into a knowledge ontology of stipulated relations
between finite strings.

That it would take a million labor years for humans to
this manually does not change the essence of this.

> It's like Einstein the other day made a quote,
> and it was about making truth-makers, I saw it
> on Wikiquote.
>
>
> "Whoever undertakes to set himself up as a
> judge of Truth and Knowledge is shipwrecked
> by the laughter of the gods."
> - https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein#Essay_to_Leo_Baeck_(1953)
>

We keep coming back to the unassailable fact that puppies are
dogs are animals and they are not in any way shape of form
15 story office buildings and you continue to assert the position
that maybe they really are 15 story office buildings.

Puppies are dogs and animals even if every single detail of all
of reality is absolutely nothing more than a mere figment of the
imagination.

My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is
only about the nature of meaning expressed using language.

> Now, that goes for all of you all, because,
> if it's not courtesy axiomless natural deduction,
> and a brief metaphysics and teleology and entelechy
> for a broad epistemology of a thorough ontology,
> it's not.
>
> So, Peter, on the one hand you're grasping for
> some of what basically the foundations, the very
> foundations must provide, and, that somehow
> there is one, some "true" foundation, "sole" foundation,
> that it provides "even given free expansion of
> comprehension that quantifier impredicativity
> is not a thing", you have to confront that all
> fully down in an entire foundation altogether,
> to arrive at some of these extended goals you
> have in mind for yourself.
>
> Then the rest of you are sort of in a Flat-Earther's
> opinionated penury of Russell's retro-thesis.
>
> Of course, overgeneralizations are generally unsound,
> if even moreso profoundly of the counterintuition
> of failure.
>
> No offense, ..., keine Beleidigung beabsichticht.
>
>

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/25/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/25/2024 3:16 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-04-25 00:17:57 +0000, olcott said:
>>
>>> On 4/24/2024 6:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 4/24/24 11:33 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/24/2024 3:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-04-23 14:31:00 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/23/2024 3:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 17:37:55 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 10:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 14:10:54 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 4:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-21 14:44:37 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true. For
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> valid and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Whenever an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations. It
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is basically invalid input.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't need any teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is too close to ad homimen.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you think my reasoning is incorrect then point to the error
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in my reasoning. Saying that in your opinion I am a bad
>>>>>>>>>>>>> teacher
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is too close to ad hominem because it refers to your
>>>>>>>>>>>>> opinion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> me and utterly bypasses any of my reasoning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> No, it isn't. You introduced youtself as a topic of
>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion so
>>>>>>>>>>>> you are a legitimate topic of discussion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't claim that there be any reasoning, incorrect or
>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If you claim I am a bad teacher you must point out what is
>>>>>>>>>>> wrong with
>>>>>>>>>>> the lesson otherwise your claim that I am a bad teacher is
>>>>>>>>>>> essentially
>>>>>>>>>>> an as hominem attack.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You are not a teacher, bad or otherwise. That you lack skills
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> happen to be necessary for teaching is obvious from you postings
>>>>>>>>>> here. A teacher needs to understand human psychology but you
>>>>>>>>>> don't.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You may be correct that I am a terrible teacher.
>>>>>>>>> None-the-less Mathematicians might not have very much
>>>>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>>>>> of the link between proof theory and computability.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Sume mathematicians do have very much understanding of that. But
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> link is not needed for understanding and solving problems
>>>>>>>> separately
>>>>>>>> in the two areas.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When I refer to rejecting an invalid input math would seem to
>>>>>>>>> construe
>>>>>>>>> this as nonsense, where as computability theory would totally
>>>>>>>>> understand.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> People working on computability theory do not understand
>>>>>>>> "invalid input"
>>>>>>>> as "impossible input".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The proof then shows, for any program f that might determine whether
>>>>>>> programs halt, that a "pathological" program g, called with some
>>>>>>> input,
>>>>>>> can pass its own source and its input to f and then specifically
>>>>>>> do the
>>>>>>> opposite of what f predicts g will do. No f can exist that
>>>>>>> handles this
>>>>>>> case, thus showing undecidability.
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem#
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So then they must believe that there exists an H that does correctly
>>>>>>> determine the halt status of every input, some inputs are simply
>>>>>>> more difficult than others, no inputs are impossible.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That "must" is false as it does not follow from anything.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Sure it does. If there are no "impossible" inputs that entails
>>>>> that all inputs are possible. When all inputs are possible then
>>>>> the halting problem proof is wrong.
>>>>>
>>>>> *Termination Analyzer H is Not Fooled by Pathological Input D*
>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/369971402_Termination_Analyzer_H_is_Not_Fooled_by_Pathological_Input_D
>>>>>
>>>>> Everyone that objects to the statement that H(D,D) correctly
>>>>> determines the halt status of its inputs say that believe that
>>>>> H(D,D) must report on the behavior of the D(D) that invokes H(D,D).
>>>>
>>>> Right, because that IS the definition of a Halt Decider.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Everyone here takes the definition of a halt decider to be
>>> required to determine the halt status of the program that
>>> invokes this halt decider, knowing full well that the program
>>> that invokes this halt decider IS NOT ITS INPUT.
>>>
>>> All these same people also know the computable functions only
>>> operate on their inputs and are not allowed to consider anything
>>> else.
>>>
>>> Computable functions are the formalized analogue of the intuitive notion
>>> of algorithms, in the sense that a function is computable if there
>>> exists an algorithm that can do the job of the function, i.e. given an
>>> input of the function domain it can return the corresponding output.
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computable_function
>>>
>>> When the definition of a halt decider contradicts the definition of
>>> a computable function they can't both be right.
>>
>> When the definitions of a term contradicts the definition of another term
>> then both of them are wrong. A correct definition does not contradict
>> anything other than a different definition of the same term.
>>
>
> *Wrong*
> In logic, the law of non-contradiction (LNC) (also known as the law of
> contradiction, principle of non-contradiction (PNC), or the principle of
> contradiction) states that contradictory propositions cannot both be
> true in the same sense at the same time
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_noncontradiction
>
> Computable functions are the formalized analogue of the intuitive notion
> of algorithms, in the sense that a function is computable if there
> exists an algorithm that can do the job of the function, i.e. given an
> input of the function domain it can return the corresponding output.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computable_function
> *That one is correct*

On 4/25/24 2:47 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/25/2024 12:45 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/25/2024 10:04 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/25/2024 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 4/25/24 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/24/2024 10:59 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x)
>>>>> specified as relations between finite strings such that a
>>>>> correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every
>>>>> element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language.
>>>>>
>>>>> As far as Eastern religion goes Zen/Tao & Advaita.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Then what is the value of True(L,x) where x is defined as to be the
>>>> stagtement: "Not True(L,x)"?
>>>>
>>>> If it is TRUE, the x is the equivalent of NOT TRUE, or FALSE and thus
>>>> your True(L,x) has said a false statement was true.
>>>>
>>>> If it is FALSE, then x is the equivalent of NOT FALSE, or TRUE, and
>>>> thus your True(L,x) has said that a TRUE statement was FALSE.
>>>>
>>>> If it refuses to answer, then you have lied that it can be defined for
>>>> ANY finite string.
>>>>
>>>> That, our your logic system just can't handle the basics of the
>>>> problem.
>>>
>>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x)  ≡ (L ⊢ x))
>>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
>>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
>>> x)))
>>>
>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
>>>
>>>
>>> I created Minimal Type Theory so that I could concisely encode
>>> actual self-reference. In all the literature it is conventional
>>> to encode self-reference incorrectly.
>>>
>>> LP := ~True(LP)
>>>
>>> Prolog rejects expressions having the same structure as LP
>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>> false.
>>>
>>> Truth_Bearer(L, LP) == FALSE
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> I can understand that that may be what you want,
>> it's a little more involved what it is.
>>
>
> It is simply arranging the existing set of facts of general
> knowledge into a knowledge ontology of stipulated relations
> between finite strings.
>
> That it would take a million labor years for humans to
> this manually does not change the essence of this.

But is a process of KNOWLEDGE, not TRUTH.

You don't seem to understand the difference.

Encoding everything KNOWN tells us very little about what might be true
but not yet known, which is part of the purpose of logic.

>
>> It's like Einstein the other day made a quote,
>> and it was about making truth-makers, I saw it
>> on Wikiquote.
>>
>>
>> "Whoever undertakes to set himself up as a
>> judge of Truth and Knowledge is shipwrecked
>> by the laughter of the gods."
>> - https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein#Essay_to_Leo_Baeck_(1953)
>>
>
> We keep coming back to the unassailable fact that puppies are
> dogs are animals and they are not in any way shape of form
> 15 story office buildings and you continue to assert the position
> that maybe they really are 15 story office buildings.

You just don't understand the arguements being used do you.

NO ONE is saying that dogs are not animals or that they are 15 story
office buildings (at least not in any system similar to our real world).

>
> Puppies are dogs and animals even if every single detail of all
> of reality is absolutely nothing more than a mere figment of the
> imagination.

But not if the "reality" of the system doesn't HAVE Puppies.

>
> My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is
> only about the nature of meaning expressed using language.

And thus, you need to realize that you need to use the language of the
system you are working in.

So, in basic mathematics, it is NOT true that "Dogs are Animals" is a
true statement, because in basic mathematics, there is no definition of
a "Dog".

>
>> Now, that goes for all of you all, because,
>> if it's not courtesy axiomless natural deduction,
>> and a brief metaphysics and teleology and entelechy
>> for a broad epistemology of a thorough ontology,
>> it's not.
>>
>> So, Peter, on the one hand you're grasping for
>> some of what basically the foundations, the very
>> foundations must provide, and, that somehow
>> there is one, some "true" foundation, "sole" foundation,
>> that it provides "even given free expansion of
>> comprehension that quantifier impredicativity
>> is not a thing", you have to confront that all
>> fully down in an entire foundation altogether,
>> to arrive at some of these extended goals you
>> have in mind for yourself.
>>
>> Then the rest of you are sort of in a Flat-Earther's
>> opinionated penury of Russell's retro-thesis.
>>
>> Of course, overgeneralizations are generally unsound,
>> if even moreso profoundly of the counterintuition
>> of failure.
>>
>> No offense, ..., keine Beleidigung beabsichticht.
>>
>>
>

On 4/25/24 1:04 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/25/2024 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 4/25/24 12:33 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/24/2024 10:59 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x)
>>> specified as relations between finite strings such that a
>>> correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every
>>> element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language.
>>>
>>> As far as Eastern religion goes Zen/Tao & Advaita.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Then what is the value of True(L,x) where x is defined as to be the
>> stagtement: "Not True(L,x)"?
>>
>> If it is TRUE, the x is the equivalent of NOT TRUE, or FALSE and thus
>> your True(L,x) has said a false statement was true.
>>
>> If it is FALSE, then x is the equivalent of NOT FALSE, or TRUE, and
>> thus your True(L,x) has said that a TRUE statement was FALSE.
>>
>> If it refuses to answer, then you have lied that it can be defined for
>> ANY finite string.
>>
>> That, our your logic system just can't handle the basics of the problem.
>
> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x)  ≡ (L ⊢ x))

So, that True give ONE correct answer doesn't make it correct.

> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))

And, again ONE correct answer doesn't make it correct.

> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
> x)))

And that fact that there exists at least one statement that is either
true or false doesn't mean a lot.

You seem to have a VERY weak concept of what a Truth Predicate needs to
do, or don't understand what the logic statement you are using mean.

>
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
>
> I created Minimal Type Theory so that I could concisely encode
> actual self-reference. In all the literature it is conventional
> to encode self-reference incorrectly.
>
> LP := ~True(LP)
>
> Prolog rejects expressions having the same structure as LP
> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
> LP = not(true(LP)).
> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
> false.
>
> Truth_Bearer(L, LP) == FALSE
>
>

In other words, you are admitting that your "True" predicate, can't
handle ALL statements.

Glad you admit it, or is it that you just don't understand what you are
talkling about

On 4/25/24 10:08 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/25/2024 3:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-04-24 15:33:12 +0000, olcott said:
>>
>>> On 4/24/2024 3:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-04-23 14:31:00 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>
>>>>> On 4/23/2024 3:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 17:37:55 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 10:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 14:10:54 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 4:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-21 14:44:37 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> valid and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Whenever an
>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations. It
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is basically invalid input.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore you
>>>>>>>>>>>> don't need any teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That is too close to ad homimen.
>>>>>>>>>>> If you think my reasoning is incorrect then point to the error
>>>>>>>>>>> in my reasoning. Saying that in your opinion I am a bad teacher
>>>>>>>>>>> is too close to ad hominem because it refers to your opinion of
>>>>>>>>>>> me and utterly bypasses any of my reasoning.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> No, it isn't. You introduced youtself as a topic of discussion so
>>>>>>>>>> you are a legitimate topic of discussion.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I didn't claim that there be any reasoning, incorrect or
>>>>>>>>>> otherwise.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If you claim I am a bad teacher you must point out what is
>>>>>>>>> wrong with
>>>>>>>>> the lesson otherwise your claim that I am a bad teacher is
>>>>>>>>> essentially
>>>>>>>>> an as hominem attack.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You are not a teacher, bad or otherwise. That you lack skills that
>>>>>>>> happen to be necessary for teaching is obvious from you postings
>>>>>>>> here. A teacher needs to understand human psychology but you don't.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You may be correct that I am a terrible teacher.
>>>>>>> None-the-less Mathematicians might not have very much understanding
>>>>>>> of the link between proof theory and computability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sume mathematicians do have very much understanding of that. But that
>>>>>> link is not needed for understanding and solving problems separately
>>>>>> in the two areas.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When I refer to rejecting an invalid input math would seem to
>>>>>>> construe
>>>>>>> this as nonsense, where as computability theory would totally
>>>>>>> understand.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> People working on computability theory do not understand "invalid
>>>>>> input"
>>>>>> as "impossible input".
>>>>>
>>>>> The proof then shows, for any program f that might determine whether
>>>>> programs halt, that a "pathological" program g, called with some
>>>>> input,
>>>>> can pass its own source and its input to f and then specifically do
>>>>> the
>>>>> opposite of what f predicts g will do. No f can exist that handles
>>>>> this
>>>>> case, thus showing undecidability.
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem#
>>>>>
>>>>> So then they must believe that there exists an H that does correctly
>>>>> determine the halt status of every input, some inputs are simply
>>>>> more difficult than others, no inputs are impossible.
>>>>
>>>> That "must" is false as it does not follow from anything.
>>
>>
>>> Sure it does. If there are no "impossible" inputs that entails
>>> that all inputs are possible.
>>
>> Correct so far. However, whether there are any impossible inputs depends
>> on the meaning of the word "impossible". If "impossible input" means an
>> imput that cannot be an input then of course every input is possible.
>>
>
> In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an
> undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved to be
> impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a correct yes-
> or-no answer. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem
>
> Inputs not having an algorithm leading to a correct YES/NO
> answer are called impossible inputs.
>

ERROR, it isn't the "Inputs" that don't have an algorithm, but the
problem itself. A GIVEN algorithm may have input that show that it is
not a correct implementation of an algorithm that computes the mapping,
but it isn't the input that makes the problem non-computable.

Yes, if we can produce a method to create a specific input for any
algorithm that attempts to solve the problem, that that METHOD OF
CREATING INPUTS becomes a proof that the problem is uncomputable.

Thus, it isn't the machine H^ in particular that shows Halting is
non-computable, but the method to allow the creation of a specific input
H^ that represent a failure case for any specific attempted decider,
shows that Halting in not computable.

>>>  When all inputs are possible then
>>> the halting problem proof is wrong.
>>
>> That is not true.
>>
>

On 4/26/2024 3:42 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-04-25 14:27:23 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 4/25/2024 3:26 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> epistemological antinomy
>>
>> It <is> part of the current (thus incorrect) definition
>> of undecidability because expressions of language that
>> are neither true nor false (epistemological antinomies)
>> do prove undecidability even though these expressions
>> are not truth bearers thus not propositions.
>
> That a definition is current does not mean that is incorrect.
>

....14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)

> An epistemological antinomy can only be an undecidable sentence
> if it can be a sentence. What epistemological antinomies you
> can find that can be expressed in, say, first order goup theory
> or first order arithmetic or first order set tehory?
>

It only matters that they can be expressed in some formal system.
If they cannot be expressed in any formal system then Gödel is
wrong for a different reason.

Minimal Type Theory (YACC BNF)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF

I created MTT so that self-reference could be correctly represented
it is conventional to represent self-reference incorrectly. MTT uses
adapted FOL to express arbitrary orders of logic. When MTT expressions
are translated into directed graphs a cycle in the graph proves that
the expression is erroneous.

Here is the Liar Paradox in MTT: LP := ~True(LP)
00 root (1)
01 ~ (2)
02 True (0) // cycle
Same as ~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))

In Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Indicates ~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))

In mathematical logic, a sentence (or closed formula)[1] of a predicate
logic is a Boolean-valued well-formed formula with no free variables. A
sentence can be viewed as expressing a proposition, something that must
be true or false.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic)

By definition epistemological antinomies cannot be true or false thus
cannot be logic sentences therefore Gödel is wrong.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/26/2024 3:32 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-04-25 14:15:20 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 4/25/2024 3:16 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-04-25 00:17:57 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> On 4/24/2024 6:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 4/24/24 11:33 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/24/2024 3:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-04-23 14:31:00 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 4/23/2024 3:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 17:37:55 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 10:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 14:10:54 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/22/2024 4:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-21 14:44:37 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautology of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true. For
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> valid and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Whenever an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operations. It
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is basically invalid input.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't need any teaching device.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is too close to ad homimen.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you think my reasoning is incorrect then point to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> error
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in my reasoning. Saying that in your opinion I am a bad
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> teacher
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is too close to ad hominem because it refers to your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opinion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> me and utterly bypasses any of my reasoning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, it isn't. You introduced youtself as a topic of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion so
>>>>>>>>>>>>> you are a legitimate topic of discussion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't claim that there be any reasoning, incorrect or
>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> If you claim I am a bad teacher you must point out what is
>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong with
>>>>>>>>>>>> the lesson otherwise your claim that I am a bad teacher is
>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially
>>>>>>>>>>>> an as hominem attack.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You are not a teacher, bad or otherwise. That you lack skills
>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>> happen to be necessary for teaching is obvious from you postings
>>>>>>>>>>> here. A teacher needs to understand human psychology but you
>>>>>>>>>>> don't.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You may be correct that I am a terrible teacher.
>>>>>>>>>> None-the-less Mathematicians might not have very much
>>>>>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>>>>>> of the link between proof theory and computability.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Sume mathematicians do have very much understanding of that.
>>>>>>>>> But that
>>>>>>>>> link is not needed for understanding and solving problems
>>>>>>>>> separately
>>>>>>>>> in the two areas.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When I refer to rejecting an invalid input math would seem to
>>>>>>>>>> construe
>>>>>>>>>> this as nonsense, where as computability theory would totally
>>>>>>>>>> understand.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> People working on computability theory do not understand
>>>>>>>>> "invalid input"
>>>>>>>>> as "impossible input".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The proof then shows, for any program f that might determine
>>>>>>>> whether
>>>>>>>> programs halt, that a "pathological" program g, called with some
>>>>>>>> input,
>>>>>>>> can pass its own source and its input to f and then specifically
>>>>>>>> do the
>>>>>>>> opposite of what f predicts g will do. No f can exist that
>>>>>>>> handles this
>>>>>>>> case, thus showing undecidability.
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem#
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So then they must believe that there exists an H that does
>>>>>>>> correctly
>>>>>>>> determine the halt status of every input, some inputs are simply
>>>>>>>> more difficult than others, no inputs are impossible.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That "must" is false as it does not follow from anything.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sure it does. If there are no "impossible" inputs that entails
>>>>>> that all inputs are possible. When all inputs are possible then
>>>>>> the halting problem proof is wrong.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Termination Analyzer H is Not Fooled by Pathological Input D*
>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/369971402_Termination_Analyzer_H_is_Not_Fooled_by_Pathological_Input_D
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Everyone that objects to the statement that H(D,D) correctly
>>>>>> determines the halt status of its inputs say that believe that
>>>>>> H(D,D) must report on the behavior of the D(D) that invokes H(D,D).
>>>>>
>>>>> Right, because that IS the definition of a Halt Decider.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Everyone here takes the definition of a halt decider to be
>>>> required to determine the halt status of the program that
>>>> invokes this halt decider, knowing full well that the program
>>>> that invokes this halt decider IS NOT ITS INPUT.
>>>>
>>>> All these same people also know the computable functions only
>>>> operate on their inputs and are not allowed to consider anything
>>>> else.
>>>>
>>>> Computable functions are the formalized analogue of the intuitive
>>>> notion
>>>> of algorithms, in the sense that a function is computable if there
>>>> exists an algorithm that can do the job of the function, i.e. given an
>>>> input of the function domain it can return the corresponding output.
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computable_function
>>>>
>>>> When the definition of a halt decider contradicts the definition of
>>>> a computable function they can't both be right.
>>>
>>> When the definitions of a term contradicts the definition of another
>>> term
>>> then both of them are wrong. A correct definition does not contradict
>>> anything other than a different definition of the same term.
>>>
>>
>> *Wrong*
>
> That "Wrong" is wrong as it refers to a true statement.
>